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The graphic map shown here represents the key cities discussed in 
case studies throughout this report.
This report, a collaborative effort of more than 50 
organisations brought together by the Coalition for Urban 
Transitions, is being launched in September 2019 in advance 
of the Climate Action Summit and Sustainable Development 
Goals Summit in New York. The aim of the Summits, hosted 
by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, is to accelerate 
action to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the Paris Agreement. 
The Coalition for Urban Transitions is a global initiative to 
support national governments in transforming cities to 
accelerate economic development and tackle dangerous 
climate change. Collectively, the contributors hope this report 
will provide the evidence and confidence that governments 
need to submit more ambitious Nationally Determined 
Contributions in 2020, and to propel inclusive, zero-carbon 
cities to the heart of their national development strategies.
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The analysis, arguments and conclusions presented here are a 
synthesis of the diverse views of the authors, contributors and 
reviewers. The Coalition for Urban Transitions takes responsibility 
for selecting the areas of research. It guarantees its authors and 
researchers freedom of inquiry, while soliciting and responding to 
the guidance of advisory panels and expert reviewers. Coalition 
partners, some as organisations and others as individuals, endorse the 
general thrust of the arguments, findings and recommendations made 
in this report, but the text does not necessarily reflect the personal 
views or official policies of any of the contributors or their members. 
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“With the Paris Agreement, 195 countries unanimously decided to change the course 
of the global economy to protect future generations. Cities are the most powerful 
lever we have to achieve this tectonic shift. We have the technology, we have the 
finance and we have the ingenuity to create cities approaching net-zero emissions. 
Moreover, this report outlines the clear advantages to such cities: cleaner air, better 
health, more energy security and higher productivity. In the lead-up to COP26, 
countries can harness the dynamism and creativity of cities to increase the ambition 
of their Nationally Determined Contributions.”
Christiana Figueres  
Vice-Chair, Global Covenant of Mayors; Former Executive Secretary, UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (2010-2016)
Forewords
“ We are at a unique moment in human history. The policies and investments made in 
the next two decades will determine the quality of life on this planet for generations 
to come. We need cities with net-zero emissions by mid-century to have a reasonable 
chance of staying close to 1.5°C. Such a transition will need big investments, and 
quickly, but they are very productive, attractive investments. This report shows that 
low-carbon investments in cities could yield returns worth US$24 trillion over the 
next thirty years – equivalent to the GDP of the United States and Japan combined. 
Visionary leadership in the next decade will be vital to seize this opportunity.” 
Lord Nicholas Stern of Brentford, CH, Kt, FBA, FRS  
IG Patel Professor of Economics and Government at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science; Co-Chair of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate
“We urgently need a ‘new normal’ to address both the old challenge of inequality and 
the emerging challenge of climate change. We cannot do one thing at a time. If we do 
not prevent climate change, we will not eradicate poverty: floods, heatwaves, food 
shortages and water scarcity will devastate the lives and livelihoods of millions of 
people. And if we do not eradicate poverty, we cannot prevent climate change: an 
informed, engaged, empowered citizenry will be key to achieving net-zero emissions. 
We need bottom-up action to meet with top-down possibilities. National governments 
must work with urban dwellers, including those who are poor and vulnerable, if they 
are to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement.” 
Sheela Patel 
Chair, Slum Dwellers International (SDI); Founder and Director, Society for the 
Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC)
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“ There are no jobs on a dead planet. Working people want their governments to deal 
with the pollution that causes climate change, which is why trade unions across the 
world are joining global protest actions. The transition to a low-carbon economy could 
create massive employment opportunities: this report finds that creating cities with net-
zero emissions would support 87 million additional jobs in 2030. To create an economy 
that works for people and the planet, national governments need long-term strategies 
to ensure a just transition, so that decarbonising our cities delivers decent jobs for all.”
Sharan Burrow  
General Secretary, International Trade Union Confederation
“Cities offer a solution to the climate crisis because they offer an opportunity 
for citizens to enjoy a high quality of life in ways that use less land, energy and 
materials. We therefore need to create inclusive, green cities – and create them within 
a single generation – to keep the planet safe and secure an economy that works for 
everyone. This report demonstrates that we can cut 90% of emissions from cities 
using proven low-carbon measures. These measures will simultaneously stimulate 
productivity and innovation, so that economic development and climate action go 
hand-in-hand. In these urgent times, this is an opportunity not to be missed.”
Naoko Ishii 
Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson, Global Environment Facility
“ The leading countries of tomorrow will be those whose cities successfully make an 
equitable transition to a climate-safe economy. As the OECD Principles on Urban Policy 
recognise, far-sighted, consistent national urban policies will be crucial. However, 
this report highlights that fewer than two in five national governments have an 
explicit strategy for cities, and only a handful of these speak meaningfully to both 
climate action and human development. At the UN Climate Summit and Sustainable 
Development Summit, national governments should pledge to prioritise equitable, zero-
carbon cities so that they can deliver shared prosperity in the context of climate crisis.” 
Ángel Gurría 
Secretary-General, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
“ 1.5 million people are added to the urban population every week. This demographic 
transition offers a unique chance for rapidly urbanising countries to position 
themselves at the next investment frontier: the green economy. They can take 
advantage of low-carbon innovations in energy, mobility and building design 
to nurture thriving cities with affordable services and clean environments. City 
governments have a critical role to play – but they cannot realise this opportunity 
alone. National leaders will need to purposefully and strategically shape urban 
development if they are to bring hundreds of millions of people into a modern, 
climate-safe economy.” 
Professor Carlos Lopes 
High Representative, African Union Commission; Former Executive Secretary, 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (2012-2016)
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Executive 
summary
The world faces a climate emergency – but cities 
offer national governments a solution. Rising 
temperatures are already causing serious loss 
of life and threatening vital ecosystems. Further 
increases pose an existential threat to entire cities 
and countries. The battle for the planet will be won 
or lost in cities. Over half the world’s population 
lives in urban areas, which produce 80% of gross 
domestic product and three quarters of carbon 
emissions from final energy use.1 And the share of 
people, economic activity and emissions in cities  
is growing rapidly, especially in Africa and Asia. 
 
Deploying low-carbon measures in cities could reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from urban buildings, materials, 
transport and waste by nearly 90% by 2050. These measures 
would have a net present value of US$23.9 trillion – greater 
than the biggest economy in the world, the US.
This report shows that a carefully managed transition to zero-carbon, climate-resilient 
cities could help secure national economic prosperity and improve quality of life while 
tackling the climate crisis. Science tells us that to keep global temperatures from rising 
by more than 1.5°C, cities have to achieve net-zero emissions by mid-century.2 New 
analysis conducted for this report shows that greenhouse gas emissions from cities 
can be reduced by almost 90% by 2050 using technically feasible, widely available 
mitigation measures. If designed and delivered with care, these measures could also 
address urgent political priorities, including choking air pollution, chronic traffic 
congestion, poor services and lost productivity. The bundle of investments would 
collectively generate an economic return worth US$23.9 trillion in today’s terms. The 
leading countries of tomorrow will be those whose cities can successfully make an 
equitable and sustainable transition to a new urban economy.
Action by city governments is critical, but on its own, it cannot achieve this goal. 
There has been a groundswell of local-level climate action in recent decades. City 
governments have shown particular leadership: nearly 10,000 cities and local 
governments worldwide have committed to set emission reduction targets and prepare 
strategic plans to deliver on them.3 However, even the largest and most empowered 
city governments can deliver only a fraction of their mitigation potential unilaterally.4 
National governments have unique and crucial roles to play in nurturing zero-carbon, 
climate-resilient cities. Many national and state policies are explicitly urban-focused, 
such as the design of spatial planning guidelines and the drawing of municipal 
boundaries. Many more, though not urban-specific, hugely influence the performance 
of cities, such as national energy, tax and transport policies. In addition, funding 
and financing mobilised by national and state governments is crucial for cities, 
particularly for large infrastructure projects. The future of cities therefore depends 
substantially on decisions made or support provided by higher levels of government. 
National governments formally recognised the importance of cities when they adopted 
the 11th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG11), which commits countries to “make 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”. Yet today, 
fewer than two in five countries have an explicit national strategy for cities,5 and only a 
handful of these speak meaningfully to both climate action and human development. 
Worldwide, only seven countries have both a National Urban Policy and a Nationally 
Determined Contribution that specifically address climate mitigation in cities 
(although many more make sectoral-based commitments to decarbonise buildings, 
energy, transport and waste).
Cities will change dramatically in the coming decades. Technological innovation 
is enabling new forms of service delivery and transforming the nature of work, 
but also displacing many jobs. Demographic changes, from falling fertility to 
ageing populations, are driving demand for new forms of housing and services. 
Economic turbulence and structural economic change are redirecting global trade 
and investment. And in Africa and Asia, the urban population is expected to grow 
by 2.5 billion over the next 30 years.6 Business-as-usual modes of development are 
not delivering a decent standard of living for most people. Nearly a billion urban 
residents live in slums without access to decent housing, clean drinking water or safe 
sanitation.7 Too many workers toil in unsafe conditions for less than a living wage. 
Fewer than two in five 
countries have an explicit 
national strategy for cities, 
and only a handful of these 
speak meaningfully to  
both climate action and 
human development
In Africa and Asia, the urban 
population is expected  
to grow by 2.5 billion people  
over the next 30 years
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58% BUILDINGS 21% TRANSPORT 16% MATERIALS 
EFFICIENCY
5% WASTE
TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE LOW-CARBON MEASURES COULD CUT EMISSIONS FROM URBAN AREAS  BY ALMOST 90% BY 2050
INVESTMENTS REQUIRED TO REDUCE URBAN EMISSIONS
US$1.83 TRILLION (ABOUT 2%  
OF GLOBAL GDP) PER YEAR
US$2.80 TRILLION RETURN  
(PER YEAR) BY 2030
US$6.98 TRILLION RETURN  
(PER YEAR) BY 2050
At the same time, immediate action is necessary to tackle the climate crisis. The world 
is on track for average temperatures to increase to at least 3°C above pre-industrial 
levels by the end of the century.8 That would lead to more frequent and catastrophic 
weather events, ecosystem collapse and possibly several metres of sea-level rise.9 
These impacts will fall disproportionately on the poor and disenfranchised, eroding 
the development gains of recent decades and making it impossible to eradicate 
poverty. To hold global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions need to nearly halve by 2030 from 2010 levels and reach net-zero 
around 2050.10 As the major centres of production and consumption, what happens in 
cities in the next decade will be critically important to countries everywhere. National 
decision-makers can help put cities on a path to prosperity and resilience, or to decline 
and vulnerability. 
This report shows that greenhouse gas emissions in cities can be brought close to 
net-zero using proven technologies and practices. It identifies a bundle of technically 
feasible low-carbon measures that could cut emissions from key urban sectors by 
almost 90% by 2050 (see Figure ES.1). In absolute terms, these savings are greater 
than the combined 2014 energy-related emissions of the two largest emitters, China 
and the US.11 58% of these carbon savings come from the buildings sector, 21% from 
the transport sector, 16% from materials efficiency and 5% from the waste sector. 
The investments required to reduce urban emissions would be US$1.83 trillion 
(about 2% of global GDP) per year,12 but they would generate annual savings worth 
US$2.80 trillion in 2030 and US$6.98 trillion in 2050. This yields a net present value 
of US$23.9 trillion.13 This estimate is conservative. With higher energy prices and 
faster technological learning rates, the net present value of these investments rises 
to US$38.19 trillion. These figures do not include wider benefits, such as long-run 
productivity gains or improved public health. 
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FIGURE ES.1. TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE POTENTIAL TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM CITIES BY 2050, BY 
SECTOR. 
Note: The reference scenario line reflects projected greenhouse gas emissions from urban buildings, materials, transport and waste without further action. The mitigation scenario line reflects 
projected greenhouse gas emissions from these sectors with ambitious deployment of selected low-carbon measures. The striped wedges reflect the mitigation potential achievable through 
decarbonisation of electricity. More aggressive deployment of low-carbon measures, behavioural changes and innovation will be required to mitigate the remaining emissions from urban 
buildings, transport, materials and solid waste. 
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Proactive leadership from national governments and meaningful partnerships with 
other tiers of government are needed to seize this opportunity. Enabling policies and 
investments can stimulate climate action by the private and civic sectors. Over half of 
the abatement potential identified in this report comes from decarbonising electricity 
grids, which are typically overseen by national and provincial governments. Notably, 
over half of the total abatement potential is in urban areas with populations under 
750,000, which often lack the financial and technical resources of larger cities. Indeed, 
new analysis for this report finds that, worldwide, national and state governments 
have primary authority over 35% of urban mitigation potential (excluding 
decarbonisation of electricity), including from improved cement production processes 
and more stringent efficiency standards for appliances, lighting and vehicles. Local 
governments have primary authority or influence over 28%, including compact urban 
form, travel demand management and waste disposal. 37% of the identified mitigation 
potential depends on collaborative climate action among national, regional and local 
governments, including building codes, decentralised renewables and mass transit 
infrastructure. Bold national leadership is therefore needed to deliver these emission 
reductions and provide an enabling environment for local action.
Zero-carbon cities will be places where people are healthier and more productive. 
The bundle of low-carbon measures identified in this report would make cities more 
compact, connected and clean (see Figure ES.2). It also offers an opportunity to 
eradicate poverty and improve living standards for all. In the future, people around 
the world could live in neighbourhoods where they can walk quickly and safely to 
work, school and parks, along quiet streets with plenty of places to meet and rest. 
Pedestrians and cyclists could enjoy protected sidewalks and paths lined with trees, 
shops and restaurants. Speed limits on the streets could be low enough that everyone 
feels safe crossing – even if they are elderly, disabled or pushing a pram. With steady 
foot traffic, local retailers and eateries would thrive. Well-maintained public transit 
could offer convenient and comfortable commutes, connecting every district so that 
people do not have to drive. The few vehicles on the streets could all be electric, 
quiet and pollution-free. With much cleaner air in cities, asthma, allergies and other 
respiratory diseases would be far less common. It would be more pleasant inside 
homes and commercial buildings, with increased natural lighting, good ventilation, 
and material and design choices that limit the need for temperature control. Combined 
with rooftop solar panels and highly efficient heating and cooling systems, compact, 
connected and clean cities would sharply reduce costs for households and businesses. 
Case studies from around the world demonstrate that a rapid urban transition is 
possible. The vision presented here may seem far-fetched when millions of urban 
residents today live in deep poverty and degraded environments. Yet this report offers 
case studies from around the world – Medellín in Colombia, Copenhagen in Denmark, 
Indore in India, Seoul in Korea and Windhoek in Namibia – where national and local 
governments have worked together to profoundly improve the quality of life in cities 
within two or three decades. These examples show that the scale and pace of change 
required to achieve SDG11 and reach zero-carbon cities are both technically and 
politically feasible. 
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National and state governments have primary authority over 
35% of urban abatement potential,* while local governments 
have primary authority over 28%. Collaborative climate action 
across tiers of government is necessary to deliver fully 37%  
of the urban abatement potential identified in this report.
* excluding electricity decarbonisation
FIGURE ES.2. KEY ABATEMENT OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE ZERO-CARBON CITIES.
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Pursuing compact, connected and clean cities also offers a huge opportunity 
for national governments to achieve faster, fairer economic development. This 
report finds that governments in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South 
Africa) countries collectively spend US$41.6 billion a year subsidising fossil fuel 
consumption in urban areas. These subsidies effectively incentivise costly urban 
sprawl, toxic air pollution, traffic injuries and dangerous climate change. New 
approaches are needed to foster thriving cities. Policies and markets are already 
changing to support a new, low-carbon economy. Countries that do not proactively 
manage this transition will face stranded assets and stranded workers as high-carbon 
systems become unaffordable or no longer comply with evolving regulations. 
National governments that anticipate these structural trends and place zero-carbon 
cities at the heart of their long-term national development and climate strategies will 
secure four economic advantages:
It is cheaper to provide infrastructure and services in more compact, connected 
and clean cities. Less land, materials and energy are required to physically 
connect households and firms when they are closer together, and higher densities 
make infrastructure investments more economically feasible, from metro systems 
to district heating and cooling. Moreover, many low-carbon measures are now 
more economically attractive than their high-carbon counterparts. The bundle of 
low-carbon measures identified in this report represents a US$23.9 trillion 
opportunity; adopting all these low-carbon measures would also support the 
equivalent of 87 million jobs in 2030 (mostly from deep building efficiency 
improvements) and 45 million jobs in 2050 (mostly in the transport sector). 
The productivity of workers and businesses is higher in larger, more densely 
populated cities, particularly those with good public transport networks. 
A recent review of over 300 studies on compactness finds that a 10% difference 
in the number of people living and working in an area is worth about US$182 per 
person a year from higher productivity and better access to jobs and services.14 
The transition to compact, connected and clean cities can build national capacity 
to both create and absorb innovations that will be critical for economic 
competitiveness in the future. This report finds that a 10% higher population 
density (measured by number of inhabitants per square kilometre) is associated with 
an additional 1.1% patents per 1000 people in Europe and an additional  1.9% in the 
US. Innovation in all its forms can have huge real-world impact. China, for instance, 
has supported its city governments to experiment with electric vehicles and 
charging infrastructure with impressive results: as of 2017, China was home to 40% 
of the world’s electric passenger cars and over 99% of the world’s electric buses.15
A 10% higher urban 
population density is 
associated with an 
additional 1.1% patents in 
Europe and 1.9% in the US
LOW-CARBON MEASURES IN CITIES COULD SUPPORT THE EQUIVALENT OF: 
87 MILLION JOBS 
IN 2030 (MOSTLY IN THE 
BUILDINGS SECTOR) 
45 MILLION JOBS 
IN 2050 (MOSTLY IN THE 
TRANSPORT SECTOR)
 
10% MORE PEOPLE LIVING  
AND WORKING IN AN AREA  
=US$182 PER  
PERSON/YEAR
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=10M PEOPLE
=1 PERSON
The world’s 26 wealthiest 
people own as many 
assets as the 3.8 billion 
people in the poorer half  
of the population
When these benefits are taken together, compact, connected and clean cities 
would offer countries a distinct competitive advantage as they seek to secure 
global talent and investment. Most countries seek to attract firms that produce 
tradeable goods and services. Because these firms can sell their products to a 
global market, they are not constrained by the size of local or regional markets. 
Firms and workers in these sectors are highly mobile, and are likely to be 
attracted to the direct cost savings, higher productivity and better quality of life 
associated with zero-carbon cities. 
However, the full promise of zero-carbon cities cannot 
be achieved without meaningful progress to eradicate 
poverty and reduce inequality. Every transition has 
some trade-offs, and reaching net-zero emissions will 
require profound social and cultural changes. Citizens 
need to be confident that they will be protected from 
any negative impacts and that they will truly benefit 
from new ways of living, consuming, travelling 
and producing. Building public support for such a 
transformation will be difficult if profound deprivation 
and inequality persist. Today, the world’s 26 wealthiest 
people own as many assets as the 3.8 billion people 
in the poorer half of the population.16 This means that 
a few (powerful) people have a vested interest in the 
status quo, while many (voting) people feel vulnerable 
and are thus apprehensive about radical change – even 
if everyone benefits from ambitious climate action in 
the not-too-distant future. To make the most of this 
opportunity, national governments need to put equity 
and inclusion at the top of their agendas. 
Ambitious climate mitigation is no longer enough to secure national prosperity; 
investments in urban resilience will be essential to cope with inevitable climate 
change. Global temperatures are already 1°C above pre-industrial levels,17 and the 
impacts are clear. In the last few years, cities from Ahmedabad in India, to Melbourne 
in Australia, to Rome in Italy suffered heatwaves in which temperatures exceeded 
40°C.18 Cities from Cape Town in South Africa, to Chennai in India, to São Paulo in 
Brazil have all but run out of water.19 Much higher temperature increases are likely,20 
and consequently much more severe climate hazards. With their concentration of 
people, assets and economic activity, cities are hotspots of vulnerability. New analysis 
for this report finds that 710 million people live in coastal urban and quasi-urban 
areas less than 10 metres above sea level; more than three quarters of them live in 
Asia. In low-lying countries such as the Netherlands, Thailand and Viet Nam, over 
half the urban population lives in coastal settlements less than 10 metres above sea 
level. Nearly 10% of the world’s land within 10 metres above sea level is already urban 
or quasi-urban, compared with 2% elsewhere. This means that storm surges and sea-
level rise are now overwhelmingly urban threats. Urban adaptation will be critical to 
minimise the devastation that climate change will wreak upon national economies 
and societies.
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IN 2015, OVER 710 MILLION PEOPLE LIVED IN 
COASTAL URBAN CENTRES AND QUASI-URBAN 
CLUSTERS LESS THAN 10 METRES ABOVE SEA LEVEL
IN LOW-LYING COUNTRIES SUCH AS 
THE NETHERLANDS, THAILAND AND 
VIET NAM, OVER HALF THE URBAN 
POPULATION LIVES IN COASTAL 
SETTLEMENTS LESS THAN 10 METRES 
ABOVE SEA LEVEL 
10% OF THE LAND WITHIN 
10 METRES ABOVE SEA LEVEL 
IS ALREADY URBAN OR 
QUASI-URBAN, COMPARED 
WITH 2% ELSEWHERE 
STORM SURGE AND SEA LEVEL RISE ARE NOW OVERWHELMINGLY URBAN THREATS
=10M PEOPLE
National governments have many opportunities to simultaneously support climate 
mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development in cities. For example, more 
compact cities can safeguard cultivated land and natural habitats around the urban 
periphery, protecting carbon stocks stored in biomass and soils. Avoiding land 
use change can also protect biodiversity and crucial ecosystem services such as 
pollination, soil formation and nutrient recycling. Sustaining oceanic and agricultural 
productivity is particularly important in the context of the climate crisis, which 
threatens to reduce yields from fish stocks and staple crops such as wheat, maize and 
rice.21 Despite the importance of managing urban expansion, sprawl is happening 
apace. New analysis for this report finds that, between 2000 and 2014, urban areas 
expanded by an amount roughly equivalent to two Sri Lankas. Two thirds of this 
urban expansion was in Asia, and one fifth was in Africa, where millions of people 
depend on fishing, forestry and farming for their livelihoods. More sustainable urban 
development can therefore support and stimulate rural development as well.
This report presents six key priorities for actions that national governments should 
take to seize this opportunity. These priorities for national action (summarised in 
Figure ES.3) are grounded in three years of research and an extensive consultation 
process involving over 50 institutions: research institutes, networks of national and 
city governments, investors, infrastructure providers, strategic advisory companies, 
non-governmental organisations and social movements. The priorities for national 
action were tested with representatives of national and city governments to confirm 
their feasibility and relevance. The breadth of these recommendations reflects the 
interconnectedness and centrality of cities to wider national development, and the 
myriad ways in which they are influenced by national policies. 
Within each priority for national action, this report offers an array of measures to 
suit different contexts and recommendations for how to sequence them. National 
governments can realise the economic, social and environmental advantages of zero-
carbon cities in multiple ways. Some measures focus narrowly on urban and climate 
outcomes; others would create economy-wide conditions for a zero-carbon urban 
transition. Policy-makers can select specific instruments according to their national 
circumstances and development objectives. While not all options identified will be 
appropriate for every country, the toolbox as a whole has relevance to countries at all 
levels of development. 
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FIGURE ES.3. SIX PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL ACTION TO ACHIEVE INCLUSIVE, ZERO-CARBON, RESILIENT CITIES. 
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The six priorities for national action are:
Develop an overarching strategy to deliver shared prosperity while 
reaching net-zero emissions – and place cities at its heart. Few national 
governments have robust plans to deliver economic and social development 
in the context of a climate emergency. Given the growing share of people, 
economic activity and emissions concentrated in cities, any such plan needs 
to have a meaningful urban dimension. A comprehensive national strategy, 
focused on compact, connected, clean cities and underpinned by a genuine 
partnership between national and local governments, could eradicate 
poverty, reduce inequality and avoid climate catastrophe. Such a strategy 
should be grounded in a shared vision for the future of cities, and their links 
to country-wide development. It can inspire every line ministry to approach 
urban development in a considered and purposeful way, de-risk low-carbon 
investment by providing clear signals to private actors, and empower local 
governments to go farther and faster on low-carbon, climate-resilient 
development.
Align national policies behind compact, connected, clean cities. Key 
measures include removing land use and building regulations that limit higher 
density; reforming energy markets to decarbonise the electricity grid; reaching 
net-zero operating emissions in all buildings with minimal use of carbon 
offsets; decarbonising the electricity grid; banning the sale of fossil fuel-
powered vehicles; adopting green alternatives to steel and cement; and shifting 
away from building detached housing in established cities. Senior decision-
makers in India, for example, are suggesting that the sale of fossil fuel-powered 
passenger cars and two-wheelers will be prohibited from 2030.22
Fund and finance sustainable urban infrastructure. Key measures include 
eliminating subsidies for fossil fuels; establishing a carbon price of US$40–80 
per tonne, which should then increase over time; working with local governments 
to establish a pipeline of climate-safe, bankable projects to anchor compact, 
connected, clean urban development; scaling land-based financing instruments 
to fund sustainable urban infrastructure and limit sprawl; and shifting national 
transport budgets from road-building to public and active transport. As of 2018, 
45 countries have put a price on carbon, including emerging economies such as 
Chile, China, Colombia, Mexico and South Africa.23
As of 2018, 45 countries have put a price  
on carbon, including emerging economies 
such as Chile, China, Colombia, Mexico  
and South Africa
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Coordinate and support local climate action in cities. Key measures include 
passing legislation explicitly clarifying the roles and powers of different tiers 
of government, including measures to enhance own-source revenue options; 
creating integrated land use and transport authorities for cities; strengthening 
local capacities to act on climate change; authorising local governments to 
introduce climate policies and plans that are more ambitious than national 
policies; establishing “regulatory sandboxes” for low-carbon innovations in 
cities; and allocating at least a third of national research and development 
(R&D) budgets to support cities’ climate priorities. Between 2000 and 2018, 
Germany expanded the share of renewable electricity from 6% to over 38%, 
largely through the Renewable Energy Sources Act, which empowered 
municipal authorities and citizen cooperatives.
Build a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, zero-carbon cities. 
Key measures include scaling up collaborative climate action in cities in the 
Nationally Determined Contributions; requiring all international financial 
institutions to end all fossil fuel financing; ensuring that all international 
development assistance is aligned with national urban strategies that are 
compatible with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development; establishing an international carbon price floor; and helping city 
governments to access international public finance for low-carbon, climate-
resilient development (with adequate sovereign oversight). Mexico, for example, 
has been systematically recording climate policies and projects by states and 
municipalities, and will use them to enhance national ambition in the next 
round of the climate negotiations.
Proactively plan for a just urban transition. Key measures include 
strengthening tenure security for the urban poor; enhancing climate resilience 
and gender equality by educating all young people; using revenues from fossil 
fuel subsidy reform or carbon taxes to compensate people who bear the costs 
of climate action; supporting local governments to make well-located, serviced 
land available for growing urban populations; supporting community-led 
upgrading of informal settlements; and anticipating, protecting and supporting 
the workforce of the future, including by developing transition plans for fossil 
fuel-based workers and industries. Namibia, for instance, has accommodated 
most of the rapid increase in its urban population by making small plots of 
serviced, competitively priced land available in cities, reducing the heavy 
health and economic burden associated with informal settlement.
Pursuing zero-carbon, resilient cities in an inclusive way will 
simultaneously raise countries’ living standards, tackle inequality  
and address the climate crisis. For national leaders, creating such  
cities would yield short-term political dividends and secure  
long-term national prosperity. It is an opportunity not to be missed.
ExECUTIvE SUMMARY 21
1.  Purpose of  
this report
A transition to zero-carbon cities offers an immense 
opportunity to secure national economic prosperity 
and improve quality of life while tackling the 
existential threat posed by climate change. Realising 
the potential of cities demands bold action by national 
governments, working in close collaboration with 
city governments, businesses, civil society, research 
institutes and other partners. 
1950: 30%
TODAY: 55%
2050: 66%
National governments face three urgent challenges: a slowing global economy that is 
not meeting the needs of many people, especially the hundreds of millions still living 
in poverty; widening inequality and a resulting loss of faith in political institutions; 
and climate change that is happening faster and causing more damage than most 
scientists predicted even a decade ago. These challenges are closely interconnected. 
It is difficult to sustain ambitious action on poverty or climate change when wealth 
is concentrated in the hands of a powerful few who benefit from the status quo. 
Economies will slow and jobs will disappear if countries do not harness the low-
carbon innovations emerging from every corner of the world. And ever-worse climate 
change impacts will make it even harder to eradicate poverty or reduce inequalities.24
Sustainable cities offer a powerful lever to respond to these national challenges. 
Cities can be deeply unequal, with extraordinary wealth coexisting with dire poverty. 
Accounting for over 80% of global gross domestic product (GDP),25 they are also 
beacons of opportunity, offering scope for people to earn a higher income and improve 
their quality of life. This helps to explain why the number of people living in cities is 
growing so rapidly, from 30% of the world’s population in 1950 to 55% of the world’s 
population today, to a projected 66% by 2050.26 
At the same time, unsustainable consumption – concentrated among high- and 
middle-income urban residents – is a major driver of global climate change, 
biodiversity loss and land use change.27 Up to three quarters of carbon emissions from 
final energy use can be attributed to urban areas.28 Changing the ways that people 
live, play, work and move within cities is therefore an important part of tackling global 
environmental crises. Cities also offer large opportunities to provide 
a high quality of life while using land, materials and energy more 
efficiently. Long-term national prosperity within planetary boundaries 
thus increasingly depends on thriving cities.29 National governments 
formally recognised the importance of cities when they adopted the 
11th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG11), which commits countries 
to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable”.
Local action is critical, but – on its own – insufficient to achieve this 
goal. Recent decades have seen a groundswell of climate action at the 
local level. City governments have shown particular leadership: nearly 
10,000 city and local governments worldwide have committed to 
setting emission reduction targets and preparing strategic plans to 
deliver on that commitment.30 However, even the largest and most 
empowered city governments can deliver only a small share of 
mitigation potential on their own.31 Governments of small- and 
medium-sized cities, which are home to over half the global urban 
population and half the urban mitigation potential,32 have even less power and fewer 
resources to reduce emissions or enhance resilience. For them, the support provided 
and standards established by national and state governments are particularly important. 
The share of people living  
in cities is growing rapidly
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This report focuses on the unique and crucial role of national governments in creating 
successful cities that secure shared prosperity and climate safety. International 
attention so far has focused mainly on local governments’ commitments and actions, 
which are certainly worth celebrating and learning from. Yet this narrative overlooks 
the critical importance of collaborative climate action with national and provincial 
governments to deliver sustainable urban development that leaves no one behind. 
This is not an argument for recentralisation, but a recognition that the scale and 
urgency of these global challenges demands collaborative, ambitious action across all 
tiers of government. Today, fewer than two in five countries have an explicit national 
strategy for cities,33 and only a few of those strategies speak to human development and 
climate action. This report seeks to rebalance the global conversation, underscoring 
the crucial roles of national and state governments, in partnership with local governments, 
in shaping cities. 
This report responds to four recent developments that have heightened both the 
urgency of ambitious climate action in cities, and the immense benefits that might 
flow to countries that show early leadership.
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Growing scientific evidence on the climate emergency:  
The special report Global Warming of 1.5°C34 by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that 420 million additional people will be 
exposed to extreme heat and 184–270 million additional people to water 
scarcity if global temperatures rise by 2°C, compared with a 1.5°C scenario.35 
Crop yields and fishery stocks will decline much faster, exposing an additional 
330 million people to nutrition risks.36 More than twice as many plant, 
vertebrate and insect species will go extinct, leading to the collapse of entire 
ecosystems. Feedback loops and threshold effects could mean that sea levels 
rise by several metres,37 threatening the very existence of low-lying cities such 
as Alexandria, Dhaka, Guangzhou, Miami, Osaka, Rio de Janeiro and Venice. 
It is difficult to meaningfully quantify the human impacts of such catastrophic 
ecological changes. But staying below 1.5°C will require rapid system change at 
an unprecedented pace and scale. Global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions must 
nearly halve by 2030 (from 2010 levels) and reach net-zero by around 2050.38 
The IPCC special report identifies urban and infrastructure as one of four key 
systems that urgently need to be decarbonised.39 In other words, cities need to 
reach net-zero CO2 emissions by mid-century to avoid climate catastrophe.
Rising popular demand for ambitious action on climate change:  
A 2018 Pew poll of voters in 26 countries found that in 13 of those countries, 
climate change was seen as the top threat. In another seven, it was rated as 
second most urgent.40 Concern about the climate crisis has spilled out into 
the streets, with students around the world striking for climate action. On 15 
March 2019, an estimated 1.6 million protesters across 133 countries turned out 
to demand a more ambitious response to the crisis.41 These calls are echoed in 
universities, boardrooms and town halls. A survey of nearly 1,000 leaders from 
the public, private, and civic sectors identified extreme weather events as the 
most severe global risk today.42 There is clearly public appetite for leadership 
on climate change, both to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the 
impacts of rising temperatures.
A stronger economic case for low-carbon policies and investments:  
The economic and financial case for low-carbon measures, many of which can 
be deployed in cities, is increasingly compelling. Renewable electricity is now 
competitive with fossil fuel generation in most contexts,43 and electric vehicles 
are selling in record numbers.44 Energy efficiency in cities – achieved through 
building codes, energy management systems and efficiency standards for 
appliance, lighting and vehicles – can be very economically attractive, lowering 
total costs for users and the need for new power generation capacity.45 The 
Global Commission for the Economy and Climate estimates that transitioning 
to a low-carbon, sustainable development path could deliver a direct economic 
gain of US$26 trillion through 2030.46 It could also create millions of additional 
jobs in sectors as diverse as renewable energy installation, materials efficiency 
and waste management.47 
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A window of opportunity to transform cities – for better or worse:  
Cities everywhere will change dramatically in the next few decades. 
Technological innovation is changing the nature of work and enabling new 
forms of service delivery. Demographic changes, from falling fertility to ageing 
populations to rising incomes, are driving demand for new forms of housing 
and services. Economic turbulence and structural economic change are 
redirecting global trade, driving massive investment in urban infrastructure. In 
Africa and Asia, the urban population is expected to grow by 2.5 billion people 
over the next 30 years.48 Much of this urbanisation is happening at unusually 
low levels of income, creating significant resource challenges for governments 
trying to provide housing and services. Profound economic and social changes 
around the world in the coming years will be concentrated in cities. The 
decisions made today could lock countries in to prosperity and resilience –  
or vulnerability and decline.49 
At this critical moment, this report aims to support national governments in three 
ways. First, it lays out the case for pursuing inclusive, zero-carbon cities.* It identifies 
a bundle of widely available, commercially feasible low-carbon measures that would 
make cities more compact, connected and clean – and reduce their emissions by 
nearly 90% by 2050. It then explores what life would be like in such cities, and the 
many associated social and economic benefits. 
Second, this report examines the key roles that national governments need to play in 
realising this vision, working with local governments, businesses and civil society to 
craft and achieve a shared vision for cities. 
Third, drawing on three years of research and extensive consultation with government 
networks, businesses, civil society and research institutes, this report identifies 
six priorities for national action. It lays out ambitious, evidence-based, specific 
policies, showing how national governments in all parts of the world can lay a strong 
foundation for climate action, seize opportunities to deliver inclusive economic 
development while reducing emissions, and keep raising their ambition. The result is 
a robust and practical agenda for national governments to deliver inclusive economic 
development and reduce the risks of climate change by transforming their cities.
*  “Zero-carbon cities” is used as shorthand in this report to describe urban areas with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. Analyses in this 
report focus particularly on emissions from urban buildings, materials, transport and solid waste.
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Box 1. Defining the city
Urban areas are defined in different ways around the world. A place may be called a “city” because it has a 
particular type of local government, or because of its population density, its built-up area, its area within 
commuting range of urban labour markets or other measures. Each of these metrics will generate a different 
estimate of the share of land, people and economic activity that is deemed urban. Different definitions 
are appropriate for different geographies and questions. For instance, a suburban area in the US might be 
regarded as peri-urban in sub-Saharan Africa due to the lack of connecting infrastructure. A political analysis 
might use urban boundaries as defined by a national government, whereas a spatial analysis might focus on 
built-up area or population densities. For simplicity, this report uses the term “city” to encompass urban areas 
of all sizes. The analyses commissioned for this report use specific definitions of “cities” and “urban”, which 
are spelled out in their corresponding annexes.
2.  A pathway  
to inclusive, 
zero-carbon 
cities
To avoid a global temperature increase of more than 
1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, science shows 
cities worldwide must reach net-zero CO2 emissions 
by mid-century.50 This chapter shows how to 
achieve that and explores how this urban transition 
could raise living standards for all. 
90% REDUCTION
Though no zero-carbon cities exist yet, most necessary elements are already available, 
and there are many success stories that can inspire decision-makers as they craft 
their own climate action plans. Section 2.1 demonstrates how a wide array of proven 
abatement options, implemented together, could move cities towards net-zero 
emissions. 
A rapid transition to zero-carbon cities is challenging, but it is both feasible and 
attractive. In all countries, deep decarbonisation will require overcoming vested 
interests and managing difficult trade-offs. It is thus crucial for decision-makers to 
understand and be able to communicate the many benefits of climate mitigation. 
Section 2.2 explores how the bundle of abatement options required to reach net-
zero emissions can help create cities with a high quality of life, particularly if the 
measures are implemented in ways that reduce inequality and vulnerability. These 
gains could in turn help build and sustain public appetite for further climate action.51 
Copenhagen, Indore, Medellín, Seoul and Windhoek offer potent examples of how 
quickly cities can be transformed for the better when different tiers and sectors of 
government work together towards a shared vision. 
Without a zero-carbon urban transition, countries risk being left behind economically 
as global policies and markets evolve. This would leave workers and assets stranded. 
Moreover, as global climate change accelerates, cities will be hotspots of vulnerability, 
with dire repercussions for the whole country. Even with immediate action to reduce 
emissions, cities will need to adapt to significantly greater climate risk. Section 2.3 
examines the consequences for cities and countries if there is no swift action to limit 
warming to 1.5°C, and underscores the importance of enhancing climate resilience.
2.1  What is the pathway to zero-carbon cities?
The IPCC special report makes it clear that cities need to reach net-zero emissions by 
mid-century.52 An analysis by the Stockholm Environment Institute for this report 
finds that, without further action to tackle climate change, greenhouse gas emissions 
attributable to urban buildings, transport and waste could reach 17.3 billion tonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-e) in 2050 – 24% higher than in 2015, when the 
Paris Agreement was signed. Urban emissions would be even higher if industry and 
other sectors were included. This projection assumes that current trends in economic 
activity and energy use will continue, but takes into account recently adopted national 
policies and commitments, including Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
under the Paris Agreement.
The new analysis identifies a range of abatement options that are already widely 
deployed in cities, and evaluates their mitigation potential if deployed at scale. It 
finds that it is possible to reduce emissions from urban buildings, materials, transport 
and waste from the projected level of 17.3 billion tCO2-e to 1.8 billion in 2050, using 
technically feasible measures that, for the most part, are already commercially 
available. This is a reduction of almost 90% relative to business-as-usual levels. In 
absolute terms, it is more than the 2014 energy-related emissions of the China and the 
US combined.53 Altogether, this analysis suggests that these abatement measures in 
cities could avoid the equivalent of 39% of projected energy-related emissions in 2050. 
This amounts to 58% of the global energy-related emission reductions needed to be on 
the International Energy Agency’s 2°C pathway (see Figure 1).54
Currently available, 
technically feasible 
measures can reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 
from urban buildings, 
transport, materials and 
waste by almost 90% in 
2050. This would 
contribute over half of the 
global energy-related 
emission reductions needed 
to keep global warming 
below 2°C.
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FIGURE 1. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CITIES TO GLOBAL ENERGY-RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTIONS 
USING TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE ABATEMENT OPTIONS.
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Source: Stockholm Environment Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 1.
The emission reductions available in cities are distributed across different sectors:  
58% would come from commercial and residential buildings, 21% from transport,  
16% from materials and 5% from solid waste management (see Figure 2). Fully half of 
the abatement potential identified in this analysis comes from decarbonising urban 
electricity, primarily by generating electricity from non-emitting technologies such as 
solar, wind, hydro, nuclear, biomass and geothermal power – as well as carbon capture 
and storage technologies.55 Other significant sources of abatement in cities include:
Improved cement production processes;
A shift from using private cars to public transport, cycling and walking; 
More efficient cooking and water heating in residential buildings;
More efficient space heating and cooling in all buildings; 
More efficient and electric vehicles;
Reduced use of materials in building construction; and
Waste prevention.
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The decarbonisation of energy must go hand-in-hand with a massive expansion in 
the supply of energy, since successful urbanisation in developing countries – linked 
as it is to structural economic change and rising per capita incomes – will drive an 
enormous increase in energy demand. In sub-Saharan Africa, a staggering tenfold 
expansion of generation capacity is required by 2040 to provide universal access to 
energy and support economic activity.56 In all countries, electrification of cooking, 
heating, transport and other end uses will shift demand from fossil fuels towards 
electricity, demanding further investment in generation infrastructure. Crucially, this 
bundle of abatement measures will deliver very substantial energy savings, reducing 
total energy use in cities by around 1,075 megatonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2030 
and 2,134 Mtoe in 2050 (see Table 1). The savings would significantly offset the total 
investments needed to expand the electricity supply. 
Still, moving towards zero-carbon cities while supporting human development and 
industrial activity will require massive new investments in electricity generation 
infrastructure, while simultaneously directing that investment towards renewable 
options. Many renewable technologies offer significant advantages over fossil fuel 
options: for instance, they produce little or no air pollution, and some can be deployed 
quickly and even off-grid. Renewable technologies are also increasingly economically 
attractive: the levelised cost of electricity generated from solar photovoltaics and 
offshore wind, for example, is now often competitive with fossil power, and capital costs 
are projected to fall by a further 25–40% between 2018 and 2023.57 These factors help 
to explain why new renewable generation capacity has grown so rapidly, with annual 
new capacity expanding eightfold between 2001 and 2014, from 20GW to over 160GW.58 
Renewables now account for 33% of global generation capacity, up from 22% in 2001.59 
Renewable technologies do also pose challenges. Their capital costs are higher, even 
if the levelised cost of electricity is competitive over the lifespan of the investment. 
Geothermal and hydropower are only available at scale in a limited number of 
countries. The intermittent nature of solar and wind energy requires upgrades to 
grid infrastructure and management. Still, while a zero-carbon energy transition 
is complex, it is certainly possible,60 and this analysis makes it clear that it is an 
essential precondition for a zero-carbon urban transition.
Moving towards zero-carbon cities while supporting human development 
and industrial activity will require massive new investments in electricity 
generation infrastructure, while simultaneously directing that investment 
towards renewable options.
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FIGURE 2. TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE POTENTIAL TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM CITIES BY 2050, BY 
SECTOR. 
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TABLE 1. ENERGY SAVINGS AND EMISSION REDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AMBITIOUS  
DEPLOYMENT IN CITIES OF A RANGE OF TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE LOW-CARBON MEASURES.
Energy savings (Mtoe) Emission reductions (GtCO2-e) Share of abatement (%)
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Buildings 545.83 956.59 4.26 8.95 61.40% 57.70%
Residential 317.35 580.04 2.41 5.66 34.70% 36.50%
Decarbonisation of electricity - - 1.25 3.38 18.10% 21.80%
Distributed solar photovoltaics (PV) - - 0.03 0.29 0.50% 1.80%
Fuel switching to low-carbon options - - 0.17 0.25 2.40% 1.60%
Cooking and water heating efficiency 100.67 237.33 0.24 0.61 3.40% 3.90%
Appliance and lighting efficiency 25.14 70.40 0.10 0.25 1.40% 1.60%
Heating and cooling efficiency 191.54 272.31 0.62 0.89 8.90% 5.70%
Commercial 228.48 376.55 1.85 3.29 26.70% 21.20%
Decarbonisation of electricity - - 0.92 1.84 13.20% 11.80%
Distributed solar photovoltaics (PV) - - 0.01 0.08 0.10% 0.50%
Fuel switching to electricity and biomass - - 0.14 0.21 2.00% 1.40%
Cooking and water heating efficiency 21.54 44.58 0.06 0.12 0.80% 0.80%
Appliance and lighting efficiency 62.23 141.16 0.24 0.49 3.50% 3.20%
Heating and cooling efficiency 144.71 190.81 0.49 0.55 7.00% 3.60%
Transport 249.31 652.37 1.13 3.29 16.40% 21.20%
Passenger 216.01 567.71 0.97 2.71 14.00% 17.40%
Decarbonisation of electricity - - 0.11 0.55 1.60% 3.60%
Fuel switching to advanced biofuels - - 0.07 0.16 1.00% 1.00%
Vehicle efficiency and electrification 92.70 210.18 0.32 0.71 4.60% 4.60%
Motorised mode shift 62.94 199.93 0.24 0.73 3.50% 4.70%
Reduced motorised travel demand 60.37 157.61 0.23 0.56 3.30% 3.60%
Freight 33.30 84.66 0.17 0.58 2.40% 3.70%
Decarbonisation of electricity - - 0.01 0.19 0.10% 1.30%
Fuel switching to advanced biofuels - - 0.03 0.06 0.40% 0.40%
Vehicle efficiency and electrification 24.15 62.02 0.09 0.23 1.30% 1.50%
Logistics improvements 9.15 22.63 0.04 0.09 0.50% 0.60%
Infrastructure 220.42 423.59 1.26 2.45 18.20% 15.80%
Decarbonisation of electricity - - 0.70 1.16 10.10% 7.50%
Reduced cement process emissions - - 0.21 0.48 3.00% 3.10%
Reduced materials – vehicles 19.32 36.55 0.02 0.05 0.30% 0.30%
Reduced materials – road and rail 18.91 37.43 0.02 0.02 0.30% 0.10%
Reduced materials – buildings 182.19 349.61 0.31 0.73 4.40% 4.70%
Waste 64.22 134.36 0.28 0.84 4.10% 5.40%
Recycling 18.81 30.46 0.10 0.15 1.40% 1.00%
Landfill methane capture and utilisation - - 0.04 0.30 0.60% 2.00%
Waste prevention 45.42 103.89 0.15 0.39 2.10% 2.50%
TOTAL 1,075.18 2,133.81 6.93 15.53 100.00% 100.00%
 
 Source: Stockholm Environment Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 1.
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FIGURE 3. TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE MITIGATION POTENTIAL IN CITIES IN 2050, BY REGION AND CITY SIZE. 
Annual average abatement (million tonnes CO2-e) in 2050.  
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 1. 
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The urban abatement potential is dispersed across cities of different sizes and in 
different regions (see Figure 3). Megacities – those with over 10 million inhabitants – 
make an outsized contribution to global emissions and also have the largest scope for 
climate mitigation: the world’s 29 megacities in 2015 account for 12% of the identified 
urban abatement potential in 2050. Including cities with over 5 million inhabitants 
brings the share to over a fifth of the world’s urban abatement potential. These larger 
cities often have relatively well-resourced and capable city governments, so local 
leadership and action will be particularly significant in these contexts. 
However, over half of all urban abatement potential is in cities with populations 
of less than 750,000 (as of 2015). These cities often lack the financial and technical 
resources of their larger counterparts. And even for cities with sufficient capacity, 
taking aggressive unilateral efforts to reduce emissions may be untenable if their 
economic peers fail to act. It is for these cities that national support and standards are 
most important.
Nearly three quarters (71%) of urban abatement potential identified in this analysis 
is in countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Cities in China account for 22% and cities in India account for 12% of the 
identified emission reductions. In OECD countries, meanwhile, over half of the urban 
abatement potential is in US cities, which account for 15% of the global potential 
identified. National and state governments in China, India and the US thus have 
particularly important roles to play in supporting a zero-carbon urban transition.
Crucially, the bundle of measures identified in this report would not be quite enough 
to reach net-zero emissions in the selected urban sectors by 2050. They could 
reduce emissions by 96% from commercial and residential buildings, 76% from 
materials use, 86% from passenger and freight transport, and over 99% from solid 
waste management. But reaching net-zero emissions by mid-century would require 
still more aggressive deployment of existing measures or additional innovations. 
Moreover, this analysis focuses mainly on emissions from energy use within city 
boundaries, electricity production, materials use and municipal waste. Reaching 
net-zero emissions worldwide will demand much greater attention to emissions 
from consumption,61 including air travel, meat and dairy products, and goods 
manufactured and disposed of beyond city boundaries.62 Because of cities’ economic 
heft, a small subset of urban residents have especially high levels of consumption and 
particularly strong influence over global supply chains. The nearly 100 cities that are 
members of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group alone represent 10% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions when using consumption-based accounting.63 A suite of 
additional climate actions will be required to engage citizens around this issue and 
cut emissions from unsustainable levels of consumption.64 
Over half of all urban abatement potential is in cities 
with populations of less than 750,000 (as of 2015).
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2.2  What might life be like in zero-carbon cities?
The bundle of measures identified above could rapidly improve quality of life by 
making cities at all levels of development more compact, connected and clean (see 
Figure 4). These three aspects are closely interrelated and complementary. Good 
connectivity – with safe sidewalks, cycling lanes and mass transit – facilitates 
compactness by reducing dependence on space-hungry private cars. More compact 
cities are more resource-efficient, because they use less space per resident and provide 
more opportunities for mass transit, active travel and district heating and cooling 
systems.65 This section spells out the characteristics of compact, connected and clean 
cities, and explores what life in such cities might look and feel like. It highlights the 
wide range of social and environmental benefits of an urban transition (Chapter 3 
examines the economic benefits), then considers the wider societal and technological 
forces that can be harnessed to realise these benefits.
This bundle of low-carbon measures could raise living standards and improve urban 
environments, but complementary actions are needed to realise their full potential. 
For instance, effective rule of law is crucial to improving public safety and the ease of 
doing business; strong labour standards are needed to ensure working people have 
decent jobs that pay a living wage; and careful macroeconomic policies are crucial 
to reducing investment risk. Additional measures will also be needed to achieve 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and make cities truly resilient to climate 
change impacts. Governments need to pursue an inclusive urban transition that 
ensures that markets are regulated, services are provided and space is used in ways 
that meet the needs of disadvantaged groups, such as the poor, women, the elderly, 
children, people with disabilities, migrants and minorities. Exclusionary urban 
development can lead to informality, fragility and insecurity that are hard to redress 
in the longer term.66 While the poor bear the most severe consequences, everyone 
suffers if a city is less productive and more violent. Climate change will only deepen 
poverty and inequality. Policies must therefore be designed to address the social and 
economic drivers of vulnerability, as well as physical exposure to hazards.67 Meeting 
the needs and building the adaptive capacity of the urban poor is a precondition for 
creating resilient cities with flourishing economies, healthy communities and clean 
environments68 – and sustaining public appetite for a zero-carbon urban transition.
More compact cities are more resource-efficient because they use  
less space per resident and provide more opportunities for mass  
transit, active travel and district heating and cooling systems.
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FIGURE 4. KEY LOW-CARBON MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH COMPACT, CONNECTED AND CLEAN CITIES.
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The benefits of compact cities
Envision a city that truly makes the most of its land. Countless  
cities like this already exist, especially in places settled well  
before cars became common. But they are not the norm.
TREE-LINED STREETS ARE JUST WIDE ENOUGH 
TO MEET LOCAL NEEDS AND OFFER PLENTY 
OF PLACES TO SIT AND REST.
A RESIDENT OF SUCH A CITY MIGHT WALK OR BIKE TO 
WORK, PERHAPS THROUGH A PARK; GET LUNCH AT ONE OF 
MULTIPLE EATERIES JUST OUTSIDE HER WORKPLACE; THEN 
STOP AT A LOCAL STORE AFTER WORK TO BUY GROCERIES.
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The shape and layout of cities greatly affects their economic, social and environmental 
performance. Compact cities have three key characteristics:69
Economic density, with a high concentration of people living, doing business 
and working in a given area; 
Morphological density, making the most efficient use of available land and built 
space to meet people’s needs; and 
Mixed land use, putting residential, employment, retail, and leisure 
opportunities close to one another. 
The average population density of cities is falling in every region of the world.70 
This is largely because greenfield land around the urban periphery tends to be 
cheaper (at least from the perspective of property developers and households), and 
building there is easier than redeveloping and/or densifying existing urban areas.71 
Many subnational governments also generate revenues from land sales, so they are 
incentivised to favour sprawl rather than densification: in China, local land revenues 
now fund nearly a quarter of local fiscal expenditure.72 Policies at all levels of 
government typically mean that residents in outlying areas do not bear the full costs 
of sprawl, which are outlined in Section 3.1. Cultural preferences for larger homes, 
private gardens and car-based transport may reinforce those economic factors.
HOMES ARE MODEST BUT COMFORTABLE, 
IN MULTI-STOREY BUILDINGS THAT ARE 
CLUSTERED CLOSELY TOGETHER.
EFFICIENT LAND USE MAKES IT EASIER TO 
CARVE OUT GREEN SPACES WHERE PEOPLE 
CAN RELAX AND DIVERSE SPECIES THRIVE.
WITH STEADY FOOT TRAFFIC, LOCAL RETAILERS 
AND EATERIES THRIVE, SO RESIDENTS ENJOY  
PLENTY OF EMPLOYMENT, SHOPPING AND  
LEISURE OPPORTUNITIES CLOSE BY.
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Reversing this trend by pursuing more compact urban development could deliver 
better living standards and more vibrant cities. People could enjoy easier access to 
jobs, services and amenities.73 Public services could be cheaper, as they could be 
delivered more efficiently.74 More time in shared spaces could help to connect people 
across class and cultural lines.75 Higher densities could support a greater variety 
of shops, restaurants and public spaces within neighbourhoods. By safeguarding 
farmland and natural habitats around the city, compact urban growth could conserve 
biodiversity and maintain ecosystem services that enhance climate resilience.76 
Compactness is not a panacea – in particular, increasing the density of people living 
and working in cities can drive up housing prices significantly, with the burden borne 
disproportionately by the poor and the young.77 But if this risk is carefully managed, 
the potential economic, social and environmental benefits of compactness are 
substantial. 
Figure 5 compares the spatial footprint of two cities: Stockholm (Sweden) and 
Pittsburgh (US). These cities have roughly the same population, but Pittsburgh 
occupies five times as much land area. This means that people need to travel farther, 
at greater personal and environmental expense, excluding many of them from 
economic and social opportunities. Meanwhile, Stockholm is widely recognised as 
having a very high quality of life and a thriving, inclusive economy thanks in part to 
its compact, connected form. 
Demographic change, cultural change and urbanisation offer a window of opportunity 
to achieve more compact urban forms. Many cities in high-income countries have 
ageing populations and smaller households than they did historically. These trends 
are complemented by an increasing preference for city life over suburbia. The result 
is falling demand for larger homes around the urban periphery and growing demand 
for smaller homes with better access to the city centre. These changes in the housing 
market offer a chance to encourage densification around transport hubs. Seoul 
in South Korea demonstrates how a relatively established city can align land use, 
transport and housing strategies to create dense, vibrant, mixed-use neighbourhoods 
(see Box 2). 
By comparison, many cities in developing Africa and Asia have rapidly expanding 
populations with large youth bulges and severe infrastructure deficits. Governments 
need to proactively prepare for this growth, recognising that people at all income 
levels have a right to the city and that meeting their needs is crucial to long-term 
economic, social and environmental success.78 The urban poor need special 
attention to ensure that competition for well-located land does not lead to eviction or 
gentrification. Windhoek, Namibia, for example, made small plots of competitively 
priced and serviced land available to poor residents, reducing the heavy health 
burden associated with informal settlement and making it cheaper to upgrade housing 
and services over time (see Box 3).
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FIGURE 5. URBAN EXTENT OF PITTSBURGH AND STOCKHOLM, SHOWN AT THE SAME SCALE. 
Source: Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 2.
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AREA: 2,324 KM2
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2
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2
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With more than 17,000 residents per 
square kilometre, Seoul is one of the 
densest cities in the world. It generates 
23% of national GDP, although it occupies 
only 0.6% of the country’s land area.
Box 2. Seoul: How planning for urban 
density fuelled a nation’s economic 
development
As the engine of the world’s 11th largest economy,79 
Seoul is an ultra-modern megacity with exceptionally 
high quality of life.80 But this wasn’t always the case. 
After the Korean War (1950–1953) destroyed much 
of Seoul’s traditional society and infrastructure, the 
Republic of Korea was one of the world’s poorest 
countries. The journey to present-day Seoul involved 
tripling the population, developing or reconstructing 
70% of the city, and increasing its gross value added 
by a factor of 330.81 The national and city government 
worked closely together to foster high but liveable 
density, creating bustling neighbourhoods around 
efficient transport systems.82 
Between 1950 and 1980, Seoul’s population grew 
eightfold, from about 1 million people to over 8.2 
million.83 As formal markets did not meet demand 
for urban infrastructure and housing, informal 
settlements proliferated around the city. In response, 
the national government introduced the Urban 
Planning Act, Land Expropriation Act and Land 
Readjustment Act to regularise and improve these 
settlements. Fragmented land parcels were 
consolidated into contiguous, standardised tracts 
that enabled large-scale property development and 
much-needed infrastructure investment. While the 
original land owners and occupiers saw the size of 
their land parcels shrink, their land was worth more 
because it was serviced.84 Between the 1960s and 
1980s, land readjustment was implemented on 
14,000 hectares – 23% of the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 
In the late 1970s, it became apparent that land 
readjustment alone would not deliver enough 
housing or contain sprawl. Seoul’s city centre 
remained low-density and grew dilapidated. In 
response, the national government passed the 
Urban Redevelopment Act and the Housing Site 
Development Promotion Act. This enabled local 
authorities and property developers to replace low-
rise, central houses and medium-rise peripheral 
apartments with high-rise buildings. A further 
7,950 hectares were densified and redeveloped over 
the following two decades.85 The process garnered 
some criticism for uprooting communities and 
replacing traditional Korean architecture with a 
culturally indistinct urban landscape. However, the 
expansion of well-situated housing interspersed 
with commercial and public facilities kept prices 
affordable and commutes short.
Seoul’s density both enabled, and was enabled by, 
the rapid construction of a world-class metro, which 
opened in 1971. New lines were added roughly every 
five years between 1980 and 2009.86 Today, the 
metro comprises 22 lines over 155 miles and carries 
over 10 million riders every day for about US$2.50 
per trip. The system is notably clean and easy to 
use, offering WiFi, air conditioning, and sliding 
doors along platforms. The metro lines are operated 
largely by public rail companies, some of which 
are owned by the national government and others 
by the city governments of Seoul, Uijeongbu and 
Incheon (which fall within the greater metropolitan 
area).87 The metro is complemented by an extensive 
bus system and a comprehensive sidewalk network. 
The efficiency and connectivity of Seoul’s public 
transportation allows households and firms in the 
city to enjoy the benefits of agglomeration without 
severe traffic congestion. 
About 10 million people live within Seoul’s city 
limits,88 and the greater metropolitan area houses 
over 25.5 million – more than half the population of 
South Korea.89 With more than 17,000 residents per 
square kilometre,90 Seoul is one of the densest cities 
in the world. It generates 23% of national GDP,91 
although it occupies only 0.6% of the country’s land 
area.92 Countries across developing Asia and Africa 
today could replicate Korea’s success in regularising 
informal settlements and expanding core 
infrastructure, laying the foundations for the private 
sector to provide high-quality, high-density housing 
in vibrant, well-connected neighbourhoods.
Box 3. Windhoek: How a participatory 
approach delivered affordable housing  
and services at scale 
Under the colonial and apartheid regimes, Windhoek 
was deeply segregated. White Namibians enjoyed 
high-quality services and amenities in suburban 
homes, while black Namibians were relegated to 
under-developed townships.93 
Since independence in 1990, Windhoek’s population 
has nearly tripled, to over 400,000 people.94 The 
increase was driven largely by migration, as 
oppressive apartheid restrictions on black Namibians 
were lifted and civil war in Angola displaced 
families in the north.95 In the absence of sufficient 
formal housing, informal settlements proliferated 
on the outskirts of the city. 85% of households in 
these settlements had incomes below subsistence 
levels and lacked access to public services, jobs and 
legal tenure. Neither household incomes nor public 
budgets were sufficient to finance the large-scale 
provision of land, housing and services for these 
households.96 
The national and local government together 
pioneered incremental and participatory approaches 
that have enabled low-cost shelter provision at scale. 
In 1991, the national government introduced the 
National Housing Policy, shortly followed by the 
Build Together Programme in 1992. These measures 
established housing as a development priority, 
provided low-cost loans for households that could 
not access formal credit and granted local authorities 
some of the powers and resources needed to provide 
basic services.97 
Within this enabling national framework, Windhoek 
City Council introduced two radical innovations, 
decriminalising squatting and designating 
“reception areas” to accommodate new urban 
residents. The reception areas had plots of 100–200 
square metres laid out in a grid, with a communal 
water point and toilet block within one kilometre. 
Certain national building regulations were relaxed 
in the reception areas: the minimum plot was 300 
square metres and water points were supposed to 
be no more than 200 metres from each plot.98 These 
adjustments promoted higher-density development 
and reduced plot prices. Each household could then 
incrementally construct housing and infrastructure 
as its limited funds permitted, borrowing under 
the auspices of the national Build Together 
Programme.99
The Windhoek City Council later refined its 
approach by providing low-cost loans to support 
informal settlement upgrading (as well as 
greenfield construction) and demarcating better-
situated land in anticipation of continued urban 
population growth. The new plots were provided 
with a range of different levels of services in order 
to charge differential prices. These innovations 
were developed in close partnership with organised 
communities of the urban poor, particularly the 
Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia, supported by 
the Namibia Housing Action Group.100 These policies 
have ensured that a majority of Windhoek’s residents 
were settled on regularised plots with acceptable 
services. In 2011, for instance, 81% of Windhoek’s 
households had access to a flush toilet and two thirds 
used electricity as their main source of energy.101 
Windhoek has not solved its housing crisis. Many 
urban residents live in low-quality accommodation 
with poor services. Informal settlement remains 
common, particularly around the urban periphery, 
where it contributes to sprawl. National experiments 
with public housing construction have proven 
unaffordable and inefficient,102 while private 
developers remain uninterested in low-income 
housing because of the small profit margins.103 The 
city remains deeply unequal and still needs to do 
much more to meet residents’ basic needs.
Still, Windhoek stands out for its low-cost shelter 
solutions and land use planning. Most African cities 
have much higher rates of informal settlement and 
much deeper service deficits, which impose a heavy 
health burden on their residents.104 By comparison, 
Windhoek shaped land use and installed basic 
infrastructure before most informal settlements 
had emerged, and supported informal settlers to 
contribute shelter solutions.105 Low- and lower 
middle-income countries with fast-growing cities 
could emulate Namibia’s far-sighted approach, 
reducing the costs of service provision up to two 
thirds106 and laying the foundation for more 
compact, healthier cities.
Windhoek stands out for its low-cost shelter 
solutions and land use planning. Most African cities 
have much higher rates of informal settlement and 
much deeper service deficits, which impose a heavy 
health burden on their residents.
The benefits of connected cities
Let’s go back to that city we visited earlier. It’s not just compact; 
it’s also very easy to move around. The air is much cleaner. And 
with commuting times sharply reduced, people have much more 
free time, which they spend enjoying the city with their loved ones.
WHEN NECESSARY, 
PEOPLE CAN HAIL AN 
AUTONOMOUS CAR OR 
USE A RIDE-SHARE.
WITH FAR FEWER CARS ON THE 
ROADS, MANY STREETS AND 
PARKING LOTS HAVE BEEN 
TURNED INTO PARKS  
AND PEDESTRIAN PLAZAS.
THESE NETWORKS CONNECT EVERY DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY QUICKLY, EFFICIENTLY AND AT A 
LOW COST, REACHING INTO ADJACENT 
COMMUNITIES SO NO ONE HAS TO DRIVE.
PEDESTRIANS AND CYCLISTS ENJOY  
PROTECTED SIDEWALKS AND PATHS,  
AND SPEED LIMITS ON THE STREETS ARE  
LOW ENOUGH THAT EVERYONE FEELS  
SAFE CROSSING – EVEN IF THEY ARE  
ELDERLY, DISABLED OR PUSHING A PRAM.
COMMUTING IS QUICK AND AFFORDABLE.  
PUBLIC TRANSIT IS WELL-MAINTAINED AND  
SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATED, SO PEOPLE ENJOY 
QUIET AND COMFORTABLE COMMUTES 
WHETHER THEY ARE TRAVELLING BY TRAIN, 
BUS, FERRY OR CABLE CAR.
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Cars in cities contribute to: 
Up to 70% of air pollution.  
 
1.3 million deaths globally every year. 
78.2 million traffic injuries warranting 
medical care.
Inefficient and expensive urban sprawl.  
 23% of carbon emissions from final energy 
use (up to 40% in urban areas).
People are drawn to cities for economic and social opportunities – but access to 
those opportunities depends on the time, cost and convenience of moving around. 
Good connectivity helps maximise and share the benefits of agglomeration, while 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Connected cities have transport systems that 
link people’s homes to areas with employment opportunities and services such as 
schools, hospitals and parks. Connectivity may be achieved through compact, mixed-
use neighbourhoods with safe sidewalks and cycle lanes that allow people to live, 
work, shop, study and meet one another without long trips. Meanwhile, high-capacity 
transport systems can seamlessly connect people with jobs, services and amenities 
all across the city.107 Options include railways, metro lines, trams, buses, cable cars 
and ferries, complemented by ride-sharing and e-hailing services to fill any gaps in 
transport services.
Through most of the 20th century, urban transport 
planning has focused on moving cars efficiently. The 
result has been chronic congestion, toxic air pollution, 
and unacceptable traffic fatalities. Many people assume 
these are inherent features of cities, but they are not.  
In cities of the global South, up to 70% of air pollution 
can be attributed to cars.108 Road crashes account for  
1.3 million deaths globally every year, and 78.2 million 
traffic injuries warranting medical care.109 Cars also 
require huge amounts of land, exacerbating urban sprawl. 
Moreover, the transport sector globally accounts for 23% 
of carbon emissions from final energy use, with up to 40% 
of that energy use in urban areas.110 Simply electrifying 
established transport systems will not solve these 
issues. The next generation of urban transport planning 
must focus primarily on moving people, not cars.111 
Urbanisation, technological innovation and public concerns about air quality and 
congestion can be harnessed to create more connected cities. Rapid population growth 
offers an opportunity for transit-oriented development, in which attractive residential 
and commercial neighbourhoods are built up around high-capacity transit stations. 
Once “the murder capital of the world”,112 Medellín in Colombia exemplifies how 
creative transport solutions – complemented by better service delivery and iconic 
cultural projects – can reduce commuting times and improve social inclusion (see 
Box 4). Meanwhile, advances in cashless payments, data collection and analytics, 
mobile communications and machine learning have led to the proliferation of new 
mobility services. Car- and bike-sharing systems, mobile trip-planning apps and ride-
hailing networks are now common, while self-driving cars may soon be a common 
sight in cities.113 Governments can influence the development and uptake of these 
innovations so that they not only improve convenience for passengers, but also tackle 
pollution, congestion and greenhouse gas emissions. Transport planning and policy 
must bring urban residents along on the journey – or follow their lead. Copenhagen 
in Denmark is arguably the world’s cycling capital, a legacy of its visionary citizenry, 
who protested against highways and petitioned for better cycle lanes. National and 
local governments embraced their demand, and today nearly half of Copenhagen’s 
population cycles to work (see Box 5).114
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Medellín is Colombia’s second-largest city, with 
a population of nearly 4 million people.115 Since 
the early 1990s, it has transformed from a violent 
and poverty-stricken city to a safe, vibrant centre 
studded with striking parks and buildings. Thanks 
to a combination of transport investments, upgrades 
to informal settlements, and iconic architectural 
projects in the most deprived neighbourhoods, its 
residents now enjoy higher living standards and a 
sense of civic pride. Medellín’s experience shows 
how bold, creative interventions to connect people to 
opportunities can revitalise a city.
Medellín originally prospered thanks to railways, 
coffee exports, and a robust manufacturing sector. 
In the 1960s and ’70s, the city’s economy stagnated 
even as its population grew, with many Colombians 
fleeing guerrilla violence in the countryside and 
settling in comunas. These informal settlements 
lacked basic services such as water and sanitation, 
and often sat precariously on the steep hills around 
Medellín, making it difficult to reach the city centre. 
With a shrinking formal economy, Medellín’s residents 
resorted to selling goods such as black-market 
whiskey, appliances, marijuana – and eventually 
cocaine. This thrust Medellín into the epicentre 
of Colombia’s burgeoning drug trade. As drug 
cartels and local militias clashed with the national 
government, Medellín became the world’s deadliest 
city, with a murder rate of 4 per 1,000 in 1992. 
In 1991, Colombia approved a new constitution 
that granted more power and resources to city 
governments. It required them to create municipal 
development plans, promised significant fiscal 
transfers, and strengthened accountability and 
transparency.116 In 1993, a Presidential Council 
was convened specifically to address poverty 
and violence in Medellín, bringing together the 
national and local government, private businesses, 
community-based organisations and academics.
Thus emerged PRIMED (Programa Integral de 
Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellín), 
a programme to integrate the comunas into the rest 
of Medellín. PRIMED granted over 2,100 households 
legal tenure, improved over 3,500 houses, built 
and improved vital infrastructure, and relocated 
or stabilised almost 70% of the neighbourhoods 
Box 4. Medellín: How 
connecting informal 
settlements helped 
transform an embattled city
where steep slopes made construction unsafe.117 
It benefitted over 100,000 residents, prioritising 
neighbourhoods that scored lowest on the Human 
Development Index – all for the relatively low price 
tag of US$23 million. In addition to improving 
tenure and basic services, the Presidential Council 
oversaw public investment in schools, libraries 
and parks. These projects were designed to be both 
beautiful and functional, and symbolised Medellín’s 
commitment to transforming the comunas. 
Improvements in transport were also essential to 
physically connect the comunas to the rest of the city. 
Construction of a cable car began in 2000,118 and less 
than three years later, Line K made its inaugural trip 
up the hillside.119 It carries up to 3,000 passengers 
per hour and has cut travel time by up to an hour.120 
Two additional Metrocable lines were subsequently 
opened in 2008 and 2010. The Metrocables were 
critical because they helped connect the poorest to 
economic and social opportunities in the city centre, 
but were complemented by an impressive array 
of other transport investments. Most significant 
of these was the urban rail network, the only one 
in Colombia. Although designed and operated by 
the city government, the national government 
provided 70% of the funds for this huge project.121 
The Medellín Metro transports around 256 million 
passengers every year122 with only a fraction of the 
emissions of a car-based network.
The aesthetically striking projects, participatory 
approach and improved accessibility helped attract 
direct foreign investment to Medellín: between 
2008 and 2011, 46 international businesses moved 
there, collectively investing over US$600 million. 
Medellín has also hosted world-class cultural and 
political events, from the 2014 World Urban Forum to 
recent tours by Madonna and Beyoncé.123 Per capita 
incomes are the highest of any Colombian city, and 
inequality within the city has fallen. 
Though far from perfect, modern Medellín is a world 
apart from the violence and despair of the 1990s. 
Innovative approaches to improving connectivity – 
particularly for the lowest-income residents – could 
help other fragile cities to tackle poverty, exclusion 
and vulnerability, an even greater priority as climate 
hazards become more frequent and severe.
 
The Medellín Metro 
transports around 256 
million passengers every 
year with only a fraction of 
the pollutants and emissions 
of a car-based network.
Box 5. Copenhagen: How tax 
policy and public demand created 
the world’s cycling capital 
Today, Copenhagen’s cyclists request a collective  
1.1 million fewer sick days than residents who don’t 
cycle, avoid 20,000 tonnes of carbon emissions 
every year, and enjoy US$1.16 in health benefits  
per kilometre travelled by bicycle instead of by car.
Copenhagen is known for its beautiful public spaces, 
the colourful houses that line its waterways, and its 
cycling culture. Danish bike culture goes back at least 
100 years.124 However, as the city grew more prosperous 
in the wake of World War II, people started to switch 
to mopeds and cars.125 In 1948, Copenhagen’s urban 
planners put forward the “Finger Plan”, which 
concentrated urban development along five arteries 
extending from the city centre to nodes of high-rise 
housing and development on the periphery.126 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, Copenhagen’s tram 
and cycling infrastructure was incrementally 
replaced by highways.
However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Copenhagen’s finances floundered. Rising oil prices 
hit Denmark hard, forcing Copenhagen to shut 
off every other streetlight and implement car-free 
Sundays.127 Public opposition to highways grew more 
vocal, with petitions and protests proliferating.128 
Lacking both funding and support for the “Finger 
Plan”, the national government established Greater 
Copenhagen’s Capital Regional Authority to facilitate 
integrated transport planning.129 Over decades, this 
local agency has steadily expanded the cycle track 
network130 and converted planned highways to parks 
and housing.131 As of 2017, 43% of Copenhagen’s 
commutes to work or school are by bicycle,132 which 
residents rate as most convenient.133 Copenhagen 
today has 375 kilometres of dedicated lanes, and 
there are further plans for a network of 45 “cycle 
superhighways”, about 746 kilometres, to connect 
the entire capital region.134 Today, Copenhagen’s 
cyclists request a collective 1.1 million fewer sick 
days than residents who don’t cycle, avoid 20,000 
tonnes of carbon emissions every year, and enjoy 
US$1.16 in health benefits per kilometre travelled by 
bicycle instead of by car.135
Cycling is the most visible part of Copenhagen’s 
transport networks, but the city also benefits from 
an excellent mass transit system. The Ørestad 
Development Corporation, a joint venture between 
the national and local government, was established 
in 1992 with the mandate to build and operate a 
metro.136 The first line opened in 2002,137 and in 
the following year, car trips in the harbour corridor 
decreased by 2.9% on average workdays.138 A new 
Circle Line is slated to open shortly, and is expected 
to bring 100,000 more passengers on to public transit 
every day.139 
Cycling has flourished in Copenhagen not only 
because of the “pull” of good local infrastructure, 
but also national policies to “push” people 
away from car use.140 The national government 
introduced a two-tier vehicle ownership tax in 1977, 
incentivising smaller and more fuel-efficient cars.141 
These national efforts have been complemented by 
city-scale initiatives, including a steady reduction in 
downtown parking and the creation of pedestrian-
only zones. Car owners also pay a petrol tax and 
high fees for vehicle registration, insurance, parking 
and disposal.142 As a result, in 2012, Copenhagen had 
360 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, while Rome had 641 
and Melbourne had 593.143 
Copenhagen nearly became another congested 
city carved up by highways and choked with air 
pollution. Instead, the Government of Denmark and 
City of Copenhagen worked closely together to build 
a safe, easy and clean transport network. Today, 
many fast-growing cities face the same choice: 
invest in cars or invest in connectivity. They can 
look to Copenhagen for inspiration, with its vibrant 
streetscapes and healthy residents.
THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RUBBISH – NO BIG PILES  
OF PLASTIC BAGS ON COLLECTION DAYS, NO LITTER 
ALONG WATERWAYS, AND NO OVERFLOWING  
LANDFILLS ON THE EDGE OF THE CITY.
WITH NO SMOG, YOU CAN CLEARLY SEE 
THE HILLS MANY KILOMETRES AWAY. 
THE CLEAN AIR HAS MADE ASTHMA,  
ALLERGIES AND OTHER RESPIRATORY  
DISEASES FAR LESS COMMON.
IT’S MORE PLEASANT INSIDE HOMES AND  
COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS, WITH INCREASED  
NATURAL LIGHTING, GOOD VENTILATION,  
AND MATERIAL AND DESIGN CHOICES THAT  
LIMIT THE NEED FOR TEMPERATURE CONTROL.
The benefits of clean cities
Let’s visit that city one more time. Look around…   
Greater compactness and improved connectivity will substantially reduce demand 
for materials and energy – but as the analysis in Section 2.1 shows, getting to net-zero 
emissions will require a wide range of additional measures. “Clean” cities will be 
characterised by the highly efficient use of materials and energy; electrification of 
heating, cooking and transport; decarbonisation of the electricity supply; large-scale 
prevention and recycling of municipal solid waste; and use of nature-based solutions 
wherever possible. A recent review of the evidence, summarising the results of over 
700 studies, illustrates how dramatically these low-carbon measures can improve 
public health and social inclusivity.144 The poor, who tend to live in low-quality 
housing in the most polluted parts of a city, have the most to gain.145
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Low-carbon cities would be much healthier, thanks to massive reductions in waste 
and pollution of all kinds. Illnesses and premature mortality associated with air 
pollution from road transport were estimated to cost US$1.7 trillion in 2010 in OECD 
countries alone. Electrification will cut much of this air pollution, particularly if 
vehicles are powered by clean electricity. Electrifying two-wheelers, cars, trucks and 
buses will also reduce noise pollution, which has been associated with disturbed sleep 
patterns,146 impaired cognitive development in children147 and poor mental health. 
Ambitious waste prevention and circular economy strategies would dramatically 
reduce the amount of materials, food and other items produced and discarded every 
day, while improved collection and management services will ensure proper disposal 
of the remainder. Better solid waste management would hugely improve public health: 
cleaner air, soil and water could reduce the prevalence of diseases from cholera, to 
encephalitis, to typhoid, while clearing solid waste from waterways could also reduce 
flooding and remove mosquito breeding grounds. Municipal waste strategies could 
be specifically designed to improve the incomes, health and social status of informal 
waste-pickers, enhancing their resilience to shocks and stresses of all kinds.148 Indore 
(see Box 6) has proven how quickly a city’s air and streets can be improved, and now 
cities across India are learning from its success.
ROOFTOP SOLAR PANELS AND HIGHLY  
EFFICIENT HEATING AND COOLING SYSTEMS,  
HAVE SHARPLY REDUCED COSTS, ENABLING  
EVERYONE TO LIVE COMFORTABLY YEAR-ROUND.
THE RIVERS AND CANALS THAT FLOW  
THROUGH THE CITY ARE CLEAR, AND  
THERE ARE GREEN ROOFS AND GREEN  
WALLS DOTTED ALONG EVERY STREET.
THE FEW VEHICLES  
ON THE STREETS ARE  
ALL ELECTRIC, QUIET  
AND POLLUTION-FREE.
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Box 6. Indore: How public, private and civil society 
organisations collectively created India’s cleanest city
 
Indore’s organic waste plant now generates 
800 kg of biogas every day, which fuels about 
15 city buses. Based on this success, there  
are plans to build three more biogas plants 
that would fuel another 100 city buses.
Just a few years ago, the nearly 2 million people in 
Indore lived with noxious smog, thanks to 13,000 
kg of plastic burned every year.149 Piles of solid 
waste accumulated on the streets,150 and open 
defecation remained a major concern for people’s 
health and dignity. In January 2016, motivated by 
terrible pollution and widespread protests,151 Indore 
Municipal Corporation (IMC) resolved to fix the waste 
problem. In 2018, Indore was named the cleanest city 
in India – a huge leap from 149th place in 2014.152
Instead of expecting residents to put their household 
waste in large public bins, Indore now offers twice-
daily, door-to-door waste collection to households 
and businesses – including those in informal 
settlements.153 This is highly unusual: only 77% 
of urban households in South Asia are covered by 
municipal waste collection services.154 Households 
pay a monthly collection fee of INR 6 (US$0.86) and 
sort the waste themselves.155 Door-to-door collection 
is complemented by twice-daily street sweeping and 
regular hosing down of larger roads. These have 
reduced Indore’s chronic air pollution: particulate 
matter from dusty roads and other sources was 
halved between 2014 and 2017.156 
As of 2018, over 90% of Indore’s waste is collected 
and sorted.157 Since this would mean little without 
improved waste recycling and disposal, Indore has 
constructed a biogas plant to process organic waste 
from Choithram Mandi market. The project cost INR 
150 million (US$2.3 million), funded through a public-
private partnership. The plant now generates 800 kg 
of biogas every day, which fuels about 15 city buses.158 
The city government is planning three more plants 
to serve other organic waste producers and fuel 
another 100 buses.159 Plastic is also recycled for use in 
the construction of roads and buildings.160 The sale 
of biogas and recycled plastic provides a stream of 
revenue to cover the costs of solid waste management.
Solid waste was only one part of Indore’s problem; 
open defecation was an equally urgent issue. 
The city government has built 12,343 individual 
household latrines, 128 community toilets, and 
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189 public toilets.161 Improved sanitation not only 
makes the city cleaner and prevents disease, but also 
offers dignity to those who used to lack the privacy 
of a toilet facility. The city government’s ongoing 
investments in sanitation are partially funded 
through the national government’s Swachh Bharat 
and Smart Cities Missions162 and partially through 
the issuance of municipal bonds.163 This was 
enabled by clear national legislation permitting city 
governments to borrow and a national programme to 
enhance their credit ratings.164
The city government has sought to engage both 
the workforce and the wider public with waste 
management. A rigorous focus on discipline and 
accountability improved labour attendance from 
less than 40% to 90%,165 dramatically improving the 
cost-effectiveness of public spending on solid waste 
management. The city government also partnered 
with NGOs to educate residents,166 including through 
creative channels such as street plays, street art and 
radio. Growing civic pride is complemented through 
warnings and fines: for instance, the city government 
fines litterbugs INR 50–500 (US$0.72–7.12).167 The 
main weakness of Indore’s waste management 
programme has been a lack of inclusion. Informal 
waste-pickers have been unable to get occupational 
identity cards and have not been significantly 
involved in reformed waste collection and operations 
– despite the national Solid Waste Management
Rules 2016 that guaranteed these rights.168 Similarly,
there are now fines for open defecation, which
punishes those who cannot afford the public toilets.
Those flaws notwithstanding, the national 
government has publicised Indore’s waste 
transformation widely, and today cities across India 
are looking to replicate its success. City networks 
such as ICLEI are supporting knowledge-sharing,169 
and Indore plans to establish a training centre 
focused on waste management.170 There is huge 
scope to scale these solutions to cities across India 
and the world, particularly with enabling national 
policies like the Swachh Bharat Mission.
2.3  Why urban mitigation and  
adaptation go hand-in-hand
Cities are hotspots of climate vulnerability, due to their concentration of people, assets 
and economic activity. Cities in arid regions will face water shortages, while cities along 
rivers or deltas will be battered by more regular and severe flooding. Some cities will face 
hellish heat waves, while others will suffer insect infestations that cause discomfort and 
disease. Most critically, many cities will face multiple climate hazards that interact and 
reinforce one another, making adaptation still harder. Any climate shocks that hit a city 
are likely to ripple across the country. Moreover, interactions between urban and rural 
areas will become increasingly complex and politically charged, as low agricultural 
yields raise urban food prices and drive rural migration to cities. 
This is no distant apocalyptic future. Average global temperatures have already risen 
by more than 1°C since pre-industrial times, so cities face climate change impacts 
regardless of future emissions. In 2019, cities from Ahmedabad, to Melbourne, to 
Rome suffered heatwaves with highs of over 40°C, with authorities warning residents 
to stay indoors.171 California’s 2018 wildfire season was one of the worst on record, 
scorching more than 6,700 square kilometres of land.172 Major cities such as Cape 
Town, Chennai and São Paulo have all but run out of water in recent years.173 Within 
cities, the urban poor face the most severe climate impacts. Many live in informal 
settlements on land where formal development is prohibited due to hazards such as 
landslides, flooding and industrial contamination.174 Many also live in poor-quality, 
overcrowded housing without the basic infrastructure, services or green space that 
could offset the worst impacts of climate hazards. It is thus unsurprising – though 
devastating – that low- and lower-middle-income countries suffer the most deaths in 
urban centres from extreme weather.175 
A transition to zero-carbon cities will not, in itself, fully avoid the impacts of climate 
change. Even if global warming is kept below 1.5°C, climate shocks will be more 
frequent and severe, and make poverty eradication and economic development 
harder. Urban policies and investments must therefore seek to simultaneously reduce 
emissions, enhance resilience and support sustainable economic development 
to build cities where people can meet their needs and pursue their aspirations. A 
commitment to improving living standards and leaving no one behind can also serve 
to sustain public support for aggressive climate action: countries that do not make 
progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals are unlikely to reach the targets 
laid out in the Paris Agreement. 
A closer look at coastal cities underscores the importance of pursuing these three 
agendas – mitigation, adaptation and development – simultaneously. Both urban 
disasters and fragile ecosystems occur disproportionately in low-lying coastal 
areas.176 Floods and saltwater intrusion pose a hazard to coastal populations and 
infrastructure. Many coastal cities are exposed to hurricanes, which are becoming 
stronger and more frequent with rising ocean temperatures. Urban development can 
both exacerbate natural disasters and add environmental pressures.177 Impervious 
surfaces such as asphalt and concrete disrupt natural drainage, increasing peak flows 
and flood risks. In many parts of the world, wetlands are drained and mangroves are 
cleared to enable property development, removing important buffers against floods 
and storms while damaging rich natural habitats. Many other coastal ecosystems 
such as coral reefs, seagrass and salt marshes are threatened by coastal development, 
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pollution, sea-level rise and temperature change.178 Without further action on climate 
change, sea levels may rise by several metres by the end of the century.179 This will 
threaten the very existence of low-lying cities such as Alexandria, Guangzhou, Miami, 
Osaka, Rio de Janeiro and Venice.
Despite these risks, coastal areas less than 10 metres above sea level are more densely 
populated than the rest of the world, and growing faster. New analysis for this report 
by CUNY Institute for Demographic Research, the Institute of Development Studies 
and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at 
Columbia University found that over 10% of the world’s population – over 820 million 
people – lived within 10 metres above sea level in 2015, and 86% of those people lived 
in urban centres or quasi-urban clusters (which have lower densities than urban 
centres, and could include peri-urban or suburban areas). Nearly 10% of the land in 
this low-lying coastal zone is already urban or quasi-urban, compared with less than 
2% elsewhere (see Figure 6), which contributes to the fact that coastal population 
densities are six times higher than the world average (309 versus 56 people per square 
kilometre). This means that storm surges and sea-level rise are now overwhelmingly 
urban threats. Moreover, population growth rates since 1990 have been higher in these 
low-lying coastal zones, and the growth rates in urban centres are about 20% higher 
in these areas than elsewhere. Growth rates in urban centres are actually highest in 
the lowest-lying areas – at less than 5 metres above sea level. Most of these settlements 
have developed with little regard for coastal environmental sensitivities, and almost 
no regard for growing climate risks.
In 2015, over 710 
million people lived in 
coastal urban centres 
and quasi-urban 
clusters less than 10 
metres above sea level. 
FIGURE 6. SHARE OF GLOBAL POPULATION OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE LOW-ELEVATION COASTAL ZONE, BY SETTLEMENT TYPE, 2015.
Source: CUNY Institute for Demographic Research, Institute for Development Studies and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, for the 
Coalition for Urban Transitions and Global Commission on Adaptation. For the full methodology, see Annex 3. 
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Certain countries have much larger numbers or shares of their urban residents 
concentrated in low-elevation coastal zones, and consequently face greater risk. 
China, India and Bangladesh had the highest total number of people living in urban 
centres less than 10 metres above sea level, with 129.5 million, 55.2 million, and 40.9 
million urban residents respecetively (see Table 2). Several countries had the vast 
majority of their urban populations in low-lying coastal zones, particularly small 
coastal or island nations such as Guyana, Maldives, Belize and Suriname, which all 
have 100% of their urban centre populations living in the low-elevation coastal zone, 
as well as populous deltaic countries like Thailand (81%), Netherlands (77%), and Viet 
Nam (62%). Cities in these countries are at risk of being stranded by climate change, 
with devastating repercussions for national economies and well-being.
Many countries have already begun to reckon with the reality of climate change and 
are preparing for inevitable shocks and stresses. But fewer countries are accounting 
for the ways that climate policies and market shifts will also provoke massive 
economic changes. These nations risk being left behind by the rapid evolution of 
global policies and markets. For example, stricter air quality controls and the falling 
costs of renewables mean that 42% of global coal capacity is already unprofitable.180 
Similarly, countries that develop polluting or carbon-intensive industries like steel 
or cement may struggle as regulation and innovation shift demand towards more 
recycled products and new green alternatives, or as mobile workers and companies 
“vote with their feet” for cities with cleaner air and water. 
These economic shifts would leave both assets and workers stranded. Major capital 
projects could become unprofitable or damaged by the effects of climate change, well 
short of their projected useful lifespan.181 Public and private investors alike would 
lose out, forced to spend new funds for projects that they could have chosen in the 
first place – had their risk assessments accounted for climate change. Workers will 
be stranded too, scrambling for new jobs as the economy changes.182 These impacts 
TABLE 2. TOP 10 COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST URBAN RESIDENTS (LEFT) AND LARGEST SHARE OF THEIR URBAN 
POPULATION (RIGHT) LIVING IN URBAN CENTRES IN THE LOW-ELEVATION COASTAL ZONE IN 2015.
Ranked by total population living in urban centres  
in the low-elevation coastal zone
Ranked by share of urban population living in urban centres  
in the low-elevation coastal zone
Country Population (thousands) % Country Population (thousands) %
1. China 129,507 23% 1. Guyana 226 100%
2. India 55,216 8% 2. Maldives 132 100%
3. Bangladesh 40,912  47% 3. Belize 72 100%
4. Indonesia 34,805  24% 4. Suriname 201 100%
5. Japan 26,593  32% 5. Bahrain 1,004 81%
6. Viet Nam 23,871  62% 6. Thailand 16,811 81%
7. United States of America 17,607  12% 7. Bahamas 169 80%
8. Thailand 16,811  81% 8. Netherlands 6,027 77%
9. Egypt 14,200  24% 9. Mauritania 1,175 76%
10. Philippines 12,998  33% 10. Djibouti 474 69%
Source: CUNY Institute for Demographic Research, Institute for Development Studies and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, for the 
Coalition for Urban Transitions and the Global Commission on Adaptation. For the full methodology, see Annex 3.
Note: Countries with a total population of under 100,000 people, or smaller than 1,000 square kilometres were excluded from this list.
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will be felt first in cities, where jobs and infrastructure are concentrated, but will have 
nationwide impacts. Cities and countries with a narrow, high-carbon economic base 
will likely struggle most to recover and redefine themselves. Detroit has yet to recover 
from the loss of auto industry jobs in the 1950s, and Wales has endured widespread 
economic stagnation due to the closure of coal mines. National governments that 
do not actively manage these transitions face the risk of widespread job loss and 
economic insecurity as industries fail or relocate. They will increasingly struggle 
to secure low-cost capital, as investors and lenders find they cannot get the returns 
they require. And future taxpayers will bear the costs of refurbishing or replacing 
unsustainable infrastructure investments. These unnecessary burdens will fuel 
political anger against a system that failed the people.
There really is no viable high-carbon growth story in the 21st century. However, a zero-
carbon urban transition would raise living standards for all residents and – as the next 
chapter outlines – help secure national economic prosperity for the decades to come. 
FIGURE 7. BUILT-UP AREA IN LOW-ELEVATION COASTAL 
ZONES AROUND THE JIANGSU PROVINCE AND SHANGHAI 
MUNICIPALITY IN CHINA (RIGHT), JAVA IN INDONESIA 
(BOTTOM LEFT) AND THE BAY OF BENGAL IN INDIA AND 
BANGLADESH (BOTTOM RIGHT). 
Source: CUNY Institute for Demographic Research, Institute for Development Studies and the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, 
for the Coalition for Urban Transitions and the Global Commission on Adaptation. For the full 
methodology, see Annex 3.
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3.  The economic 
case for
inclusive,
zero-carbon
cities
Smaller cities can leverage their proximity to 
larger cities to develop specialised industries and 
services – or in less-urbanised areas, become hubs 
in their own right, bringing new economic 
opportunities to local residents. Inclusive urban 
development can also support and stimulate rural 
development.
60 CLIMATE EMERGENCY, URBAN OPPORTUNITY
The global economy is fundamentally misaligned with the needs of most people. Growth 
in industrialised countries has stagnated since the mid-2000s, and many workers are 
in precarious jobs, with limited economic security and little hope for a better future. 
Meanwhile, in many emerging and developing economies, the robust growth enjoyed 
for years has slowed significantly, limiting new job opportunities and improvements 
in living standards. Inequality is rising in many countries. The wealthiest 1% have 
enjoyed a 40% increase in real incomes over the last three decades,183 but middle-class 
people in wealthier countries are feeling squeezed, and in most low-income countries, 
a majority of people still face serious deprivation. All of this has caused growing 
discontent and a loss of faith in the public institutions that shape economic policy.184
The development models of recent decades are not sustainable: China’s coal 
dependence, North America’s oil and gas boom and Brazil’s deforestation, for instance, 
are driving the world to the brink of multiple ecological crises.185 As the global population 
continues to grow, pressures on key resources such as water and arable land will 
intensify. At the same time, advances in digitalisation and automation could soon make 
millions of jobs obsolete,186 creating an urgent need for structural economic transformation. 
It is not enough to re-energise national economies to pursue business-as-usual growth. 
Fundamental changes are needed to ensure that economic development strategies tackle 
inequalities, use resources more efficiently, and enhance social and environmental 
resilience. National governments need new approaches that improve living standards, 
create opportunities for all, use resources more efficiently, and can respond nimbly to 
a changing global environment. Zero-carbon cities could do that particularly well.
Sustainable cities offer a powerful lever to address national macroeconomic challenges. 
Cities are hubs of economic activity, where wealth, finance and people are concentrated. 
Higher education institutions provide skilled workers, retraining opportunities, and a 
broad range of innovations ready to be commercialised. This, in turn, attracts more 
inventors and entrepreneurs. Cities are also hubs for arts and culture, which are 
important for local quality of life and can fuel a vibrant “creative economy”, sustained 
by local audiences and attracting tourism. With a critical mass of customers, retailers 
and service providers can thrive as well. 
The prosperity generated in urban areas can extend to large swathes of a country. Some 
demographic shifts will occur naturally as economies industrialise and agriculture is 
modernised, which can push people left behind into deeper poverty. However, if cities 
have robust transport linkages, they can provide economic vitality to entire regions, as 
residents of surrounding areas are able to commute to get better jobs or advance their 
education. Smaller cities can leverage their proximity to larger cities to develop specialised 
industries and services – or in less-urbanised areas, become hubs in their own right, 
bringing new economic opportunities to local residents. Inclusive urban development can 
also support and stimulate rural development. Rising incomes in cities increase demand 
for high-value food and agricultural products, which benefits farmers. Cities also provide 
modern farming inputs and consumer goods to rural households.187 Rural residents who 
secure training or jobs in the city can bring those skills or innovations back to rural areas, 
or send money back to their families, making them more resilient to shocks and enabling 
them to invest in improving the productivity of their land.188 This is not to say that broad-
based prosperity is an inevitable outcome of urbanisation, but rather that urban and rural 
well-being are closely linked. Even when economic development is centred in cities, the 
benefits of agglomeration can be distributed nationwide.189 
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THE CAPITAL COSTS OF PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE AT DIFFERENT POPULATION DENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
This chapter explores the economic case for national governments to develop smart, 
deliberate policies and investments that support a zero-carbon urban transition. 
Section 3.1 outlines the economic benefits that accrue from greater proximity and 
density in more compact, connected cities. Section 3.2 quantifies the economic returns 
that might accrue from choosing low-carbon options that create more connected, 
clean cities, and explores how ambitious climate action in cities can build a country’s 
innovation capabilities. Section 3.3 goes on to consider how compact, connected and 
clean cities can give countries an advantage in the global competition for talent and 
investment. Careful planning and policies are needed to prioritise the needs of the 
poor and the middle class and ensure no one is left behind. Otherwise, projects that 
enhance growth and reduce emissions can sometimes exacerbate inequality and 
economic insecurity. Section 3.4 highlights two critical preconditions for creating 
thriving, inclusive zero-carbon cities.
3.1  The economic case for compact and connected cities
There is robust evidence of the economic benefits of compact, connected cities around 
the world, in countries at all stages of development. As discussed in greater detail 
below, higher population density significantly decreases the cost of infrastructure 
required to meet people’s needs. Indeed, it makes a whole range of investments more 
economically feasible, from metro systems to district heating and cooling. Moreover, 
compact, connected cities tend to be more productive and innovative, which helps them 
achieve sustained economic development. At the same time, they can significantly 
reduce their residents’ carbon footprint by reducing energy use and land use change. 
Infrastructure development is most cost-effective in compact urban areas because 
it takes less land, materials and energy to physically connect households and firms 
when they are closer together. Higher population densities thus reduce the per capita 
investment needs for network infrastructure such as roads, railways, electricity grids, 
telecommunications lines, water supplies and sewage systems.190 In sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, the capital costs of providing piped water, flush toilets, power, 
and landline telephones average US$325 per person in the highest-density cities, 
but US$665 in medium-density cities and up to US$2,837 in remote rural areas.191 
Moreover, access to a higher concentration of users can reduce the per capita operating 
costs of infrastructure and service delivery, since providers can exploit their fixed 
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costs better with each additional user.192 For instance, most of the costs of operating 
a public transport system are constant, so higher ridership reduces per capita costs 
while boosting fare revenue. At very high levels of density, costs can increase again 
due to high land prices and the need to manage the interests of so many residents and 
businesses: evidence from Latin America suggests that expenditure for municipal 
services is optimised at densities close to 9,000 residents per square kilometre.193
Many highly effective low-carbon infrastructure options are only economically viable at 
certain levels of density.194 In neighbourhoods with single-family dwellings, a district 
heating network might lose 20–30% of the heat in the distribution network; this falls to 
5–10% in higher-density neighbourhoods.195 Similarly, below a certain threshold, 
individual air conditioners make more economic sense than district cooling, and bus 
networks are more viable than a rail system. More compact cities therefore offer a 
significant opportunity to make infrastructure investments more cost-effective and 
provide services more affordably. These savings will be particularly important for 
countries that are tackling the challenges of urbanisation while still at low levels of income.
The economic benefits of density and proximity go beyond these direct cost savings. 
Compact, connected cities produce agglomeration effects with broad economic 
benefits. The productivity of workers and businesses is higher in larger, more densely 
populated cities,196 particularly those with good public transport networks that enable 
people to easily reach jobs and services. Density and proximity can also stimulate 
higher rates of innovation.197 Agglomeration generates economic benefits through 
three main channels:198
Sharing benefits: Where many firms seek a common set of inputs, suppliers of 
those inputs are able to specialise and achieve economies of scale. This in turn 
means that purchasers benefit from lower costs and/or increased productivity. 
For example, the automobile manufacturing industry in Bangkok has grown 
steadily, initially thanks to an enabling policy environment and subsequently 
due to the co-location of related establishments including additional 
automakers, parts suppliers and R&D centres. 
Matching benefits: Larger markets allow firms to find a better fit with their 
specialised needs, by employing workers with distinct skills and/or by linking 
to suppliers with distinct products. Greater specialisation of both labour and 
firms enables greater efficiency. For example, Johannesburg’s origins as a 
mining town contributed to the growth of firms that made machinery and 
equipment for mining companies, as well as firms manufacturing metal 
products, chemicals, plastic products and jewellery from the mining products.199
Learning benefits: Geographic proximity of workers and firms enables more 
frequent interactions both within and across sectors. This facilitates the spread 
of existing knowledge, in particular tacit knowledge that is hard to codify in 
documents or formulas. For example, the co-location of automobile and battery 
manufacturing in Chinese cities has supported the development of the electric 
vehicle industry, since knowledge and technology from both sectors is required 
to produce electric vehicles.200
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There is a growing body of evidence on the productivity gains associated with 
larger and denser cities. A recent review of over 300 studies on compactness found 
that in higher-income countries, when 10% more people live and work in a city, 
annual gross value added per person is US$182 higher due to higher productivity, 
greater job accessibility and better access to services.201 In developed countries, a 
doubling of urban employment or population density is associated with 3–5% higher 
wages.202 Employment density is found to explain over half of the variation in labour 
productivity across US states.203 Though there have been fewer such studies in 
developing countries, China appears to have enjoyed unusually large agglomeration 
effects: a worker moving from a low-density city (in the first decile of density) to a 
high-density one (in the last decile) would experience a wage gain of 53%.204 Large 
agglomeration effects are also found for India.205 New analysis conducted by the 
London School of Economics and Political Science for this report finds that there 
is a strong positive relationship between urban population density and economic 
performance. In Europe, a 10% higher urban population density (measured by number 
of inhabitants per square kilometre) is linked to an increase of 1.9% in gross value 
added. In the US, the relationship is even stronger: a 10% increase in population 
density correlates with an increase of 4.6% in high-skilled wages and 5.5% in 
medium-skilled wages (see Annex 4 for the methodology).206
More evidence is also emerging on the positive relationship between urban density 
and innovation. The capacity of countries to both create and absorb innovations will 
be increasingly important for economic competitiveness in the future. Innovation is 
a broad term, encompassing the introduction of new goods or quality improvements, 
new methods of production, the opening of new markets, the conquest of new sources 
of supply of materials or parts, or the new organisation of an industry.207 It includes 
both the creation of entirely new technologies, products or processes, as well as their 
adoption and adaptation to different contexts. New analysis conducted by the London 
School of Economics and Political Science for this report finds a strong positive 
relationship between urban population density and innovation rates (measured by 
number of patents per person). In Europe, a 10% higher urban population density 
is associated with an increase of 1.1% in the number of patents per 1000 people. In 
the US, the relationship is even stronger: a 10% higher urban population density 
correlates with an increase of 1.9% in the number of patents per 1000 people (see 
Annex 4 for the methodology). This is borne out by the wider literature. In France, for 
example, only six regions account for 75% of all corporate R&D workers, as opposed to 
45% of production workers.208 In the US a doubling of employment intensity (jobs per 
square mile) is linked to a 20% higher rate of patenting per 1000 people. 
10% HIGHER URBAN POPULATION DENSITY IS LINKED TO: 
  1.1% PATENTS PER 1,000 PEOPLE
  1.9% INCREASE IN GROSS VALUE 
ADDED
  1.9% PATENTS PER 1,000 PEOPLE
  5.5% MEDIUM-SKILLED WAGES
  4.6% HIGH-SKILLED WAGES 
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While delivering these economic benefits, higher urban density can reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by cutting transport and residential energy consumption. 
A new analysis for this report of 120 cities found that, after controlling for per capita 
gross value added, a 10% increase in density correlates with a 2% decrease in per 
capita carbon emissions (see Annex 5 for the methodology). This relationship is 
well documented in the US, where cars and homes contribute 40% of the country’s 
carbon emissions. Vehicle fuel consumption is mainly determined by total distance 
travelled, which falls with higher urban density and proximity to the city centre. 
A household in a dense area with over 10,000 people per square mile consumed 
3,123 litres of petrol per year, over 40% less than the 5,292 litres consumed by a 
household in an urban area with fewer than 1,000 people per square mile. Holding 
family income and size constant, a household’s annual petrol consumption falls by 
482 litres for every doubling of residents per square mile.209 Dense cities also have 
lower emissions because their residents live in smaller homes, often in multi-unit 
buildings, consuming far less electricity and primary fuel for heating, cooling and 
other purposes than single-family detached homes.210 Doubling population-weighted 
density in the US is accordingly associated with a reduction in carbon emissions 
from household travel and residential energy consumption by 48% and 35%, 
respectively.211 The relationship between higher urban density and lower per capita 
emissions has also been documented for Japan212 and China.213 
More compact urban growth can reduce greenhouse gas emissions from land use 
change as well. The conversion of land from non-urban to urban use is typically 
permanent: it rarely reverts to its prior state or to open space. This means that the 
amount of urban expansion over past and coming decades has huge significance for 
ecosystem services, biodiversity and food production. Higher rates of urban sprawl 
lead to greater loss of natural habitats and cultivated land. 
A new analysis by New York University for this report found that urban settlements 
grew by nearly 113,000 square kilometres between 2000 and 2014, roughly equivalent 
to twice the size of Sri Lanka. Globally, the area of urban expansion was almost 
equally represented by urban centres and quasi-urban clusters (see Figure 8). Over 
half of this urban expansion occurred in Asia, and nearly one fifth in Africa. China 
alone accounted for 31.8% of the new urban extent, while a further 11.5% was in the 
US. Thereafter, India, Nigeria, Japan and Mexico saw the most urban expansion, 
accounting for 8.7%, 4.1%, 1.7% and 1.6% of new urban land, respectively. The way 
that urban areas are expanding is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows urban extent in 
2000 and 2014 in parts of Brazil and Nigeria.
 
Controlling for gross value added, a new analysis of 120 cities 
suggests that 10% higher urban density correlates with a  
2% decrease in per capita carbon emissions.
3. ThE ECONOMIC CASE FOR INCLUSIvE, ZERO-CARBON CITIES 65
ASIA
55% OF GLOBAL URBAN EXPANSION
61,675KM2 TOTAL LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN PURPOSES 
33,823KM2 URBAN CENTRES 
27,852KM2 URBAN CLUSTERS
NORTH AMERICA
15% OF GLOBAL URBAN EXPANSION
16,342KM2 TOTAL LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN PURPOSES 
4,453KM2 URBAN CENTRES 
11,889KM2 URBAN CLUSTERS
SOUTH AMERICA
3% OF GLOBAL URBAN EXPANSION
3,177KM2  TOTAL LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN PURPOSES 
1,557KM2 URBAN CENTRES 
1,621KM2 URBAN CLUSTERS
EUROPE
10% OF GLOBAL URBAN EXPANSION
11,704KM2 TOTAL LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN PURPOSES 
2,024KM2 URBAN CENTRES 
9,680KM2 URBAN CLUSTERS
AFRICA
17% OF GLOBAL URBAN EXPANSION
18,939KM2 TOTAL LAND CONVERTED  
TO URBAN PURPOSES 
9,687KM2 URBAN CENTRES 
9,252KM2 URBAN CLUSTERS
FIGURE 8. NET AMOUNT OF LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN PURPOSES BY REGION, 2000-2014. 
Source: Marron Institute of Urban Management, New York University, for the Coalition for Urban Transitions and the Food and Land Use Coalition. For the full methodology, see Annex 6.
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The conversion of cultivated land to urban uses can then trigger the further loss of 
natural habitats, as agriculture spreads into new areas. For instance, this analysis 
finds that croplands in Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar 
still saw a net expansion since 2000 – even though urban areas had displaced 
agriculture. It was forested areas that shrank. The conversion of these carbon-rich 
ecosystems releases substantial greenhouse gas emissions that would otherwise be 
stored in biomass and soils.
More compact cities can also make national economies more resilient and safeguard 
human well-being by avoiding the loss of natural ecosystems and biodiversity. Land 
(and sea) use change is the largest driver of biodiversity loss, with around 1 million 
animal and plant species now threatened with extinction.214 The resulting loss of 
ecosystem services such as pollination, soil formation and nutrient recycling directly 
affects oceanic and agricultural productivity. At the same time, climate change is 
reducing yields from fish stocks and staple crops such as wheat, maize and rice.215 In 
this context, it is crucial to avoid losing arable land, yet more than 60% of the world’s 
irrigated croplands are near urban areas, many of which continue to sprawl.216 In 
Asia and Africa, where most urban expansion is happening, limiting urban sprawl 
is also critical for protecting agricultural livelihoods. Moreover, conserving natural 
ecosystems can keep CO2 sequestered in biomass and soils, thereby reducing the 
extent of global heating. 
3.2  The economic case for connected and clean cities
A shift to more compact, connected urban development can greatly enhance 
economic prosperity while reducing climate risks. But cities can do even better. By 
adopting additional measures to decarbonise buildings, transport and solid waste 
management, countries can gain further economic advantages while reducing urban 
greenhouse gas emissions. Even countries that have already “locked in” to urban 
sprawl, for example, could significantly improve quality of life and carbon efficiency 
by electrifying their vehicle fleets, retrofitting their building stock and making it safer 
to walk and cycle. This section explores the compelling economic case for large-scale 
low-carbon investments to make cities more connected and cleaner.
A new analysis conducted by Vivid Economics for this report finds that investing in the 
bundle of abatement options identified in Section 2.1 will not only allow countries to 
approach zero-carbon cities, but also has a net present value of US$23.9 trillion – 
equivalent to 28.2% of global GDP in 2018.217 With higher learning rates, this would rise 
to US$25.51 trillion. In the central scenario, US$1.83 trillion would need to be invested 
each year between 2020 and 2050 – equivalent to about 2% of global GDP in 2018. 
However, these measures – all technically feasible – would generate annual savings 
worth US$2.80 trillion in 2030 and US$6.98 trillion in 2050. While there are potentially 
significant opportunity costs, this means that these low-carbon measures would 
generate a very attractive commercial return. The findings are summarised in Table 3.
Those investments could also create good jobs. Many studies in high-income countries 
suggest that a transition to a greener or more circular economy would yield an increase 
in both the number and quality of jobs.218 Just how significant the employment benefits 
would be is debated in the literature, as there are relatively few data points on which to 
base conclusions. Vivid Economics calculates that adopting all the abatement options 
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presented in Section 2.1 would support the equivalent of 87 million jobs in 2030 and 45 
million jobs in 2050. In 2030, most of these jobs would be from deep building efficiency 
improvements. In 2050, most of these jobs would be in the transport sector. These 
employment estimates usefully illustrate the magnitude of the impacts expected, but 
have not been modelled to reflect specific supply chains or labour market dynamics. 
They therefore provide a short-term picture which may not account for the skills profile 
or absorptive capacity of an urban area, or other regional differences. 
These findings are conservative estimates of the economic returns from low-
carbon investment in cities. The returns and payback periods associated with these 
abatement options are sensitive to energy prices, interest rates and technological 
learning rates (i.e. price and performance improvements as technologies are more 
widely deployed). The findings presented in Table 3 are based on a central scenario 
TABLE 3. THE ECONOMICS OF SELECTED LOW-CARBON INVESTMENTS IN CITIES BETWEEN 2020 AND 2050.  
Total incremental 
investment 
(US$ trillions)
Annual returns  
(US$ billions)
Net present 
value (US$ 
trillions)
Average 
payback 
(years)
Jobs supported 
(millions)
Measure 2030 2050 2030 2050
BUILDINGS –RESIDENTIAL
Deep building efficiency 25.42 338.63 945.30 -12.99 N/A 59.4 -
Efficient lighting 0.07 23.65 39.89 0.42 1 <0.1 0.1
Efficient appliances 2.13 24.42 185.07 -0.22 N/A 0.8 2.5
Efficient cooking - 36.17 133.66 0.90 9 n/a n/a
Rooftop solar PV 0.42 8.11 87.79 0.16 12 0.3 1.3
BUILDINGS –COMMERCIAL AND PUBLIC
Deep building efficiency 13.09 294.02 722.77 -4.09 N/A 18.1 -
Efficient lighting 0.04 27.08 234.56 1.51 1 <0.1 <0.1
Efficient appliances 0.04 -16.55 51.67 -0.05 N/A <0.1 0.1
Rooftop solar PV 0.12 2.44 23.87 0.05 11 0.1 0.3
MATERIALS EFFICIENCY
More efficient material use 
(cement and steel)
- 87.96 359.30 2.15 - n/a n/a
TRANSPORT – PASSENGER
More efficient and electric vehicles 8.61 320.42 1,095.59 3.66 8 3.6 20.4
Mode shift to mass transit 4.01 1,024.96 660.46 19.62 1 2.6 11.8
Reduced motorised travel demand 0.58 513.12 1,762.66 10.25 1 1.1 3.8
TRANSPORT – FREIGHT
More efficient and electric vehicles 0.59 79.85 529.20 2.29 1 0.1 2.4
Improved logistics 1.59 36.69 143.93 0.18 1 0.6 2.7
WASTE
Landfill gas utilisation 0.01 1.02 8.53 0.03 5 <0.1 <0.1
Note: These figures assume a discount rate of 3.5%, annual energy prices increases of 2.5% and low technological learning rates.  
Source: Vivid Economics for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 7.
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where real discount rates are 3.5% per year, real energy prices rise by 2.5% per year, 
and there is no increase in rates of technological learning. This analysis also considers 
the economic case under a range of different scenarios, as shown in Figure 10. Even 
under the least favourable conditions modelled (an annual energy price increase 
of only 1% per year and a discount rate of 5.5%), the bundle of measures still has a 
positive net present value of US$4.2 trillion.
The net present value of these investments would be even greater in scenarios with 
higher energy prices or faster technological learning rates. These conditions could 
be created through enabling national policies, such as fossil fuel subsidy reform or 
support for low-carbon research and development. With an energy price increase 
of 4% per year and high technological learning rates, the net present value of these 
investments rises to US$38.19 trillion with a standard public-sector discount rate of 
3.5%. With a higher discount rate of 5.5%, which offers substantial scope to attract 
private investment, the net present value is still an attractive US$19.17 trillion. 
Some low-carbon measures have bigger and quicker payoffs than others, but 
enabling national policy frameworks can make the whole bundle more economically 
attractive. As Figure 10 demonstrates, the proposed low-carbon investments in 
materials efficiency, transport and waste have a positive net present value under 
nearly all scenarios. Most of the abatement options in the buildings sector are also 
very economically attractive. However, deep building efficiency seems likely to 
have a negative net present value. This finding reflects the design of the analysis: 
FIGURE 10. THE NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) OF AMBITIOUS CLIMATE ACTION IN CITIES BETWEEN 2020 AND 2050 
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significant capital investments are projected to 2050, but the analysis only accounts 
for economic savings to 2050. Investments in deep building efficiency would pay for 
themselves by 2089 and continue to generate a stream of energy savings throughout 
the buildings’ lifespan. Moreover, this analysis only considers direct energy savings 
and is thus partial. The economic returns increase dramatically if decision-makers 
take into account the benefits in terms of more productive workers, reduced health 
care expenditure and the wider costs of carbon emissions.219 In the absence of such a 
comprehensive approach, these findings underscore the importance of establishing 
enabling national policy frameworks (for example, pricing carbon and improving 
access to low-cost capital) and of investing in the whole bundle of low-carbon 
measures together rather than cherry-picking the most profitable options.
In summary, this bundle of abatement options offers an attractive economic 
opportunity, generating substantial returns for investors and lenders. Actively 
supporting the deployment of these measures would also lay the foundations for 
sustained economic development by driving further innovation. Many low-carbon 
technologies have broad applications across the economy and generate high 
knowledge spillovers comparable to those in information and communications 
technologies or nanotechnologies.220 Their development and deployment can 
strengthen local skills, equipping firms and workers to further expand their capacity 
to innovate. Some scholars have likened the scale and pace of innovation needed 
for a zero-carbon urban transition to those of past industrial revolutions – with 
commensurate productivity gains and economic welfare benefits as well.221 A strategic 
approach to low-carbon policy and investment can therefore build workers’ and 
firms’ ability to harness other innovations, such as digitalisation. It can also enable 
countries to avoid “lock-in” to outdated systems and take advantage of emerging 
markets for low-carbon goods and services. 
Cities are important hubs not only for low-carbon technological innovation in high-
income countries, but also for the adaptation of existing technologies in emerging and 
developing economies. Cities provide an ideal scale to experiment with new goods, 
services and governance arrangements, including many of the abatement options 
in this bundle. Indeed, many low-carbon measures are already coming together 
to radically change how cities function. The simultaneous rise of decentralised 
renewables, smart metering, e-hailing and electric vehicles, for instance, is reshaping 
power and transport systems in tandem. This “network innovation” could have 
profound implications for the carbon intensity of urban activities – for good or bad. 
For example, the rise of e-hailing may encourage more people to use passenger 
vehicles to commute or fewer to purchase their own car in the first place. Similarly, 
the rise of autonomous cars may render parking spaces unnecessary, enabling 
densification or the creation of new green spaces – or it may lead people to opt out 
of mass transit, leading to sprawl and congestion.222 Because these services are 
novel, it is not yet clear how to maximise their benefits while mitigating potential 
costs. Cities are at the right scale to experiment with deployment and to coordinate 
these intersecting innovations to maximise the economic, social and environmental 
advantages. This is illustrated by China’s experience in electrifying its own transport 
fleet. The national government systematically supported city governments and 
utilities to experiment with different configurations, and the country has now 
successfully positioned itself at the forefront of the electric vehicle market (see Box 7).
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It is difficult to overstate China’s dominance of the 
global electric vehicle (EV) landscape. As of 2017, 
China was home to 40% of the world’s electric 
passenger cars, with 1.2 million battery or plug-in 
hybrid EVs.223 China also accounts for over 99% 
of the 370,000 electric buses and the 250 million 
electric two-wheelers in the world.224 China’s 
sustained commitment to EVs is grounded in their 
potential to improve air quality and energy security. 
China’s air pollution is among the world’s most 
extreme, leading to 1.37 million premature deaths 
every year,225 and the country depends heavily 
on oil imports.226 EVs, especially when powered 
by renewable electricity, can address both these 
pressing issues. 
China’s dominance in this market can be largely 
attributed to the national New Energy Vehicles 
(NEV) programme, which, since its launch in 2001, 
has systematically dismantled both supply- and 
demand-side barriers to large-scale deployment. 
The NEV programme initially focused on research 
and development (R&D) in three key technologies: 
powertrain control systems, motor control systems, 
and battery management systems. In the last few 
years, the Government of China has primarily 
channelled its R&D towards integrating NEVs into 
cities, particularly by improving and expanding 
charging infrastructure.227 Innovations have not 
just been technological: the city government of 
Shenzhen, for instance, has developed new business 
models such as leasing rather than purchasing 
electric buses, and has coordinated utilities and 
bus operators to optimise EV charging. In 2018, 
Shenzhen became the first city in the world to 
electrify its entire public bus fleet.228
Complementing these efforts, the national 
government partnered with 10 pioneering city 
governments to increase demand for EVs. The 10 
Box 7: China: Driving an electric 
transport revolution
China is home to 40% of the world’s 
electric passenger cars and over  
99% of the world’s electric buses  
and electric two-wheelers.
city governments received subsidies and technical 
support for public procurement of EVs and 
installation of public EV chargers. This strategy 
helped manufacturers to achieve the economies 
of scale and technological breakthroughs that 
eventually made EV production cost-competitive 
with internal combustion engine vehicles. Public 
procurement policies were accompanied by policies 
to incentivise the private purchase of EVs. In 2006, 
the national government reduced consumer tax on 
NEVs229 and in 2010, it extended purchase subsidies 
from the public sector to support private purchases 
of battery EVs.230 The NEV programme was 
subsequently expanded to a further 39 cities.231 The 
country’s fleet is accordingly expanding rapidly: over 
half of all electric cars sold worldwide in 2017 were 
sold in China.232
As EVs became more cost-competitive, the national 
government has been able to deploy a different set of 
policy instruments. First, it has steadily rolled back 
EV subsidies and replaced them with a cap-and-
trade system to reduce the pressure on government 
budgets.233 Second, the national government now 
mandates that any company manufacturing vehicles 
in China has to produce at least 10% NEVs. The 
quota will increase incrementally to 20% by 2025. 
Companies that fail to meet the target can buy NEV 
credits from manufacturers who exceeded the target, 
or else face federal fines. 
China’s NEV programme has built domestic and 
international capacity to cost-effectively produce 
EVs,234 paving the way for a more rapid global 
uptake. By crafting regulation, providing incentives 
and offering technical support, China’s national 
government turned its cities into test beds for 
innovation and public procurement. This has 
ensured that cities such as Beijing and Shenzhen are 
at the forefront of emerging technologies. 
3.3  Securing competitive advantage through compact, connected 
and clean cities
Actively supporting a transition to compact, connected and clean cities makes 
countries more attractive to global talent and investment. Sustained productivity 
improvements depend on a country’s ability to attract tradeable goods (and services) 
sectors. Because these industries can sell their products to a global market, they are 
not constrained by the size of local or regional markets. Firms in these industries 
make decisions about where to invest based on factors such as the cost and quality of 
labour, the regulatory environment, and access to key technologies and infrastructure 
(particularly a reliable, cheap energy supply, as outlined in Section 2.1). In addition to 
all the inherent benefits of urban areas, compact, connected, clean cities could have 
three significant advantages in the race to attract these industries. 
First, they offer a better value proposition in terms of accessibility, efficiency and 
ways to reduce companies’ own emissions. As outlined in Section 3.1, compact and 
connected cities can have lower costs and higher productivity than those plagued 
by sprawl and congestion.235 This is attractive to businesses, as it can boost profit 
margins. As outlined in Section 3.2, connected and clean cities can also have lower 
running costs and greater innovation capabilities than cities “locked in” to outdated, 
high-carbon modes of development. Moreover, a growing number of firms have made 
ambitious climate commitments and are tracking their emissions: as of 2018, nearly 
7,000 firms representing around 50% of global market capitalisation disclosed their 
climate impacts through the CDP platform.236 These companies cannot reach net-
zero emissions unless they locate in cities with clean energy and transport systems. 
Cities and countries at the forefront of the zero-carbon urban transition will have a 
competitive advantage in the race to attract these environmental pioneers. 
Second, compact, connected, clean cities are more attractive to the workers that 
top companies want to recruit. High-value industries depend on highly skilled 
workers, who are very mobile. They can move across national borders to cities that 
offer better employment opportunities and/or higher living standards.237 Liveability 
is therefore a necessary (if not sufficient) condition to attract the kinds of workers 
who form the basis of knowledge-based and creative economies. And as Section 2.2 
outlines, compact, connected and clean cities can be very attractive places to live 
and work. They are likely to have cleaner air, more walkable neighbourhoods and 
better homes. As a result, they attract both skilled workers and investment. This 
manifests even within cities. In the US, for instance, there is evidence that young 
adults prefer neighbourhoods that are dense, walkable and well-connected by public 
transport, as these tend to be richer in amenities and offer greater socio-economic 
opportunities.238 These trends, in turn, are reshaping property markets in much of the 
developed world, most notably reducing demand for suburban housing while more 
walkable developments with more mixed land use earn higher rents.239 Although 
it is unclear the extent to which these preferences are held in emerging economies, 
promoting compact, connected urban development offers many national governments 
an opportunity to simultaneously deliver the kind of homes that young workers desire 
while attracting and nurturing the businesses that can offer them employment.
Conversely, high-carbon cities can be less liveable, and therefore less able to compete 
for firms and workers. High-carbon cities can often be less attractive places to live and 
work than their lower-carbon counterparts. This manifests most visibly through the 
7,000 firms representing 
around 50% of global 
market capitalisation 
disclosed their climate 
impacts through the 
CDP platform
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air quality crisis facing cities around the world, which in many cases can be attributed 
to the use of fossil fuels for cooking, heating, energy generation and transport. 1.2 
billion workdays are lost every year due to air pollution, while related health care 
costs reach US$21 billion.240 In China, for instance, an increase of 10 micrograms of 
small particulate matter (PM10) per cubic metre reduces home prices by 4.1%;241 the 
effect of air pollution on rents is very similar in the US.242 In some cases, excessive 
pollution can actually lead households and firms to migrate from cities. There is 
evidence from China and Russia, for instance, that smog leads to brain drain, with 
skilled workers leaving for cleaner cities to reduce their exposure to air pollution.243 
Sprawling cities also struggle to offer the cultural and recreational richness that 
people desire. Many people choose to live in cities because they want to enjoy a range 
of restaurants, shops and cultural facilities; higher population density supports 
greater variety.244 Cities with lower quality of life are not able to attract as much capital 
or such skilled workers, so they have lower rents and wages. Rapid improvements 
in telecommunications – and the resulting rise of remote working – will only make 
it more difficult for dirty cities to retain high-skilled workers. High-carbon cities 
therefore face a distinct disadvantage in the global competition for capital and talent.
One of the key take-aways from this chapter is that there are large opportunities 
to decouple urban economic development from greenhouse gas emissions. A few 
cities around the world are already showing how it can be done, including London 
and Montreal (see Figure 11). The carbon savings in London are substantially due 
to a cleaner electricity mix based on natural gas and renewables instead of coal. 
More efficient buildings, industry and vehicles have also contributed to the city’s 
falling emissions. The carbon savings in Montreal can be attributed to falling 
oil consumption from stationary energy sources, as well as the closure of one oil 
refinery and more efficient collection of landfill gas. The economic case for national 
governments to support compact, connected and clean cities is clear; the challenge is 
to ensure that the costs and benefits of a zero-carbon transition are distributed fairly. 
FIGURE 11. EXAMPLES OF METROPOLITAN AREAS THAT HAVE ACHIEVED AN ABSOLUTE DECOUPLING OF PER CAPITA 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PER CAPITA PRODUCTION-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. 
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Source: Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 8.
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3.4  Securing the economic benefits through an inclusive and just 
transition
Compact, connected and clean cities can support inclusive growth and broad-based 
improvements in quality of life – but there is no guarantee that they will fulfil this 
potential. In the absence of careful land governance and infrastructure provision, 
the higher population densities associated with cities can lead to chronic traffic 
congestion, intense overcrowding, crime, infectious diseases, severe air and water 
pollution, and spiralling housing costs. Even positive changes can have some negative 
side effects. Building a new metro line, for example, can connect low-income people 
to new job opportunities and sharply reduce their travel costs, but it can also lead to 
eviction or displacement. A boom in low-carbon technologies can create significant 
new wealth, but may displace jobs in other sectors (for instance, by leading a coal 
power plant to shut down). Thus, if national governments want to realise the full 
potential of compact, connected and clean cities to “lift all boats”, they need carefully 
designed policies and infrastructure investments. Two issues are particularly critical 
for national governments: creating fair and efficient land and housing markets, and 
ensuring a just transition.
For cities to achieve their economic and social potential, urban residents need 
affordable homes with secure tenure and reliable access to transport, energy, 
telecommunications, sanitation and water. However, cities worldwide face a housing 
affordability crisis. Problematically, greater compactness often correlates with higher 
housing prices. The high housing costs in Hong Kong, London, New York, Sydney and 
Vancouver have made global headlines, but the worst of the crisis is concentrated 
in the developing world, in cities like Buenos Aires, Caracas, Hanoi, Kiev, Mumbai 
and Rio de Janeiro.245 Across the global South, a quarter of urban residents live in 
slum conditions without decent housing, safe drinking water, basic sanitation or 
legal tenure,246 often paying a very high share of their income for these substandard 
shelters.247 National governments need coherent, far-sighted strategies to deliver 
affordable and decent homes while creating vibrant, walkable urban communities.
Urban housing markets are shaped by local, national and even global trends and 
policies. National and state governments typically design the financial, legal and tax 
structures that incentivise certain housing or occupancy types, such as mortgage 
interest tax deductions that boost single-family home ownership, or strong tenant 
protections that encourage long-term renting.248 They also shape and fund national 
land reform and housing programmes. Local governments, in turn, typically 
implement those programmes and set land use regulations and building codes that 
shape the decisions of property developers.249 For instance, large minimum plot sizes 
(or even a lack of qualified surveyors) can limit the supply of affordable new homes, 
irrespective of demand. National policies and investments can help overcome local 
deficiencies, and they have a critical role to play in addressing deeper structural 
inequalities in order to fully realise the “right to the city” of all urban dwellers.250
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National, regional and local governments have a range of measures at their disposal 
to expand the supply of affordable housing while promoting compact urban growth, 
such as split-rate property taxes, impact fees, transferable development rights, 
strong tenant protection laws and well-located social housing.251 However, there 
are challenges to reforming housing and land use policies that have contributed to 
the exclusionary housing markets in many cities today. The inherently slow process 
of housing construction and the long lifespan of buildings means that it can take 
many years for policy reforms to achieve their goals. Land ownership and occupancy 
are poorly documented in many cities in the global South. City governments often 
depend on revenue from property taxes or land sales, so they are incentivised to 
support luxury developments and sprawl. In almost every context, developers can 
earn more by catering to the rich than by building homes for the poor or middle 
class (even if liveable density is likely to yield higher returns to real estate investors 
in the long-run).252 Moreover, property developers too often bypass or exploit local 
regulations in pursuit of profits.253 Meanwhile, with housing increasingly treated as 
a global financial commodity rather than as a human right,254 a city’s development 
may primarily reflect the interests of foreign investors and lenders rather than local 
communities. There is therefore a fundamental political economy challenge in 
delivering affordable housing: when only a few (powerful) people own land, they are 
rarely keen to see taxes extract their rents; when many (voting) people own land, they 
are equally reluctant to see their major asset fall in value. Bold leadership by all tiers 
of government is needed to tackle this challenge and deliver truly inclusive cities. 
Any strong housing policy starts with a comprehensive cadastre and land registry. 
The absence of reliable public information about land ownership and occupancy 
is arguably the primary obstacle to efficient property tax collection and spatial 
planning.255 Rwanda demonstrates how rapidly progress can be made, having built 
a transparent digital land cadastre that covered the whole country – including its 
informal settlements – in just seven years. This has laid the foundation for greater 
tenure security, improved property tax collection and more effective spatial planning 
(see Box 8).256 
Two issues are particularly critical for national 
governments seeking to nurture compact, connected 
and clean cities: creating fair and efficient land and 
housing markets, and ensuring a just transition.
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Rwanda has seen extraordinary progress over the 
last two decades. Since 2000, it has been one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world. The 
proportion of Rwandans living in extreme poverty 
fell from 68.3% to 55.5% in the last decade,257 
child mortality has fallen by two thirds, and the 
country has achieved near-universal primary school 
enrolment.258 Rwanda also performs exceptionally 
well in terms of women’s political participation and 
economic empowerment.259 Many of these gains 
have been made possible through land governance 
reforms and tax modernisation, which have 
equipped all levels of government to harness rapid 
urbanisation.
With respect to its fiscal reforms, the national 
government has focused strongly on building 
citizens’ trust in public administration. In 1997, it 
created the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) with 
the mandate to expand the tax base and improve tax 
collection. The RRA was also tasked with making 
it simpler to pay taxes and, in 2003, introduced 
an e-Tax Information System. Simultaneously, the 
national government explicitly reoriented public 
spending towards essential services like water 
supply, sanitation, health care and education, 
which helped to make taxes more politically 
palatable. In higher-density areas of Rwanda, 
further increases in density have been associated 
with low multidimensional poverty index scores, 
indicating that in cities these service improvements 
were equitable enough to harness the benefits of 
urbanisation for poverty reduction.260 Fiscal reform 
has also provided an opportunity to strengthen 
local government capacity, with the decentralisation 
of trading license tax, property tax and rental 
income tax in 2002. The first of these, in particular, 
proved very effective, with up to 95% of businesses 
reportedly paying the trading license tax by 2009.261 
Thanks to these and other reforms, tax revenue as 
a share of GDP rose from 3.6% in 1994 to 13.4% in 
2013.262 
With the vast majority of workers concentrated 
in the agricultural sector (88% in 2012),263 land is 
Rwandans’ most important economic and social 
asset. Prior to the land reforms of 2004, most land in 
Rwanda was acquired through inheritance, gifting, 
informal occupation, or government land allocation. 
This was often fiercely contentious; exclusionary 
Box 8. Rwanda: 
Creating effective land 
and tax administrations
and restrictive land governance is thought to have 
contributed to the 1994 genocide.264 Land reform 
was therefore a politically sensitive and urgent 
issue. In 2003, the national government introduced 
legislation that abolished customary tenure, 
initiated a participatory process for land registration, 
established inclusive dispute resolution mechanisms 
and created dedicated institutions to implement 
the land reforms.265 This framework underpinned 
a land tenure regularisation programme, which 
employed a pioneering aerial-mapping technique 
supported by official visits to verify plot boundaries 
and ownership. By June 2012 – less than four years 
after the pilot was completed – the registry team had 
built a digital cadastre that contained boundary and 
ownership information for every one of Rwanda’s 
10.4 million land parcels.266 Women especially 
benefitted from this programme, as male children 
traditionally inherited property. In 2016, 63.7% of 
titles were owned by women or co-owned by men 
and women.267 
While these programmes were being rolled out 
between 2002 and 2015, the share of Rwanda’s 
population living in urban areas increased 
from 16% to 27% due to a mix of rural-to-urban 
migration, natural increase, and refugees returning 
after the genocide.268 The tax and land reforms 
collectively laid the foundations for the government 
to better manage this rapid urbanisation. Clear 
land ownership has enabled governments to 
determine who should be compensated when land 
is expropriated for the public interest, enabling 
large-scale property and infrastructure investment 
anchored by much higher public revenues. The 
process has not been perfect: land pricing continues 
to be fiercely disputed as the government struggles 
to provide adequate compensation to established 
residents while ensuring that land prices are 
competitive for prospective investors.269 An 
unaccountable and ineffective property tax system 
(subsequently re-centralised) has also incentivised 
the construction of high-end real estate rather 
than more affordable housing.270 These issues are 
explicitly raised in Rwanda’s National Urbanization 
Policy, introduced in 2015 by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure.271 Addressing them will position 
the country to harness the economic potential of its 
rapid urbanisation – a necessity to lift Rwandans out 
of poverty and achieve middle-income status. 
In less than four years, Rwanda built a  
digital cadastre that contained boundary  
and ownership information for every one  
of the country’s 10.4 million land parcels.
Another priority for national governments is delivering the transition to zero-carbon 
cities in an inclusive and equitable way. Although ambitious climate action will 
overall increase prosperity and equality compared with a high-carbon path, the 
profound system change required to reach net-zero emissions entails real trade-offs. 
People who work in high-carbon sectors may lose their jobs, and many low-carbon 
measures may have a disproportionate impact on low-income people. Requiring 
appliances to be more energy-efficient, for instance, may raise their cost, even if they 
are cheaper to run; that could put them out of the reach of poorer families. A just 
transition – in which both the benefits and the burdens of climate mitigation actions 
are equitably shared – is not only a moral imperative, it is also essential for sustained 
political support for climate action. Moreover, a commitment to a just transition can 
create opportunities to address wider inequalities and enhance resilience to the 
climate change that is already locked in. 
National governments have important roles to play in ensuring a just transition 
because of their capacity to share costs and benefits across a country (or even further 
afield through their engagement in the multilateral system). This is especially critical 
when entire cities are threatened by the decline or change of carbon-intensive 
industries, such as steel manufacturing, food processing or chemical production.272 
It falls primarily to national and state governments to anticipate these profound 
structural economic changes, and carefully design policies and projects to capture 
the benefits while mitigating the costs. For example, China’s far-sighted investment 
in clean energy over recent decades means that the country is now home to five of 
the world’s 10 largest wind turbine companies and three of the 10 largest solar panel 
companies;273 it is similarly poised to dominate electric vehicle markets, creating 
domestic jobs and boosting public revenues (see Box 6). This is an imperative for all 
ministries: for instance, finance ministries can ensure that the gains from a zero-
carbon transition are distributed equitably, transport ministries can ensure that 
workers are connected to new economic opportunities, and education ministries can 
ensure that young people have the skills and knowledge that they need to succeed in a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient economy.
A participatory approach is key to negotiating politically acceptable and socially just 
solutions, providing legitimacy and enhancing public ownership of the transition. 
For instance, the construction of mass transit infrastructure often entails the eviction 
of low-income urban residents without compensation. Experiences in Mumbai and 
Nairobi demonstrate that governments can partner with local communities to design 
strategies that simultaneously enable the construction of urban rail and reduce 
poverty in surrounding settlements.274 Similarly, the transition to clean energy and 
zero-carbon cities demands the closure of coal-fired power plants. Lessons from 
the Coal Commission in Germany underscore the importance of including those 
most affected (both in terms of job losses and climate impacts) in decision-making 
processes, and of creating space for region-specific planning and policy within 
national frameworks.275
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A just transition depends on wider policies and programmes that lay the foundations 
for inclusive, equitable, resilient development. These go beyond the scope of this 
report, but might include implementing appropriate social protection measures for 
all (SDG1), guaranteeing universal access to primary and secondary education for all 
girls and boys (SDG4) and protecting labour rights to ensure that all working people 
have safe and secure working conditions (SDG8). This perspective demonstrates 
that ambitious action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions cannot be undertaken in 
isolation; mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development must be pursued in 
tandem. This is an immensely complex proposition, but it is essential to respond to 
the three connected challenges of a slowing global economy, widening inequality 
and accelerating climate change. The case studies throughout this report demonstrate 
that a handful of countries and cities have seen transformation at the pace and scale 
required, and that their efforts have yielded immense improvements in citizens’ 
quality of life. Local governments cannot drive such radical system change alone. The 
next chapter considers the unique and crucial roles that national governments need 
to play in driving a zero-carbon urban transition if they are to seize this immense 
economic opportunity.
The case studies throughout this report demonstrate that  
a handful of countries and cities have seen transformation  
at the pace and scale required, and that their efforts have  
yielded immense improvements in citizens’ quality of life.
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4.  The unique and
crucial roles
of national
government
Smaller cities are home to over half the global 
urban population and half the urban mitigation 
potential – but they lack the same tax base or 
capabilities as larger cities. They particularly 
benefit from national support and standards.
82 CLIMATE EMERGENCY, URBAN OPPORTUNITY
The performance of cities is of huge consequence to national governments everywhere. 
In the largely urbanised Americas, Europe and Oceania, the concentration of people, 
economic activity and infrastructure means that urban policy is one of the most 
powerful instruments to address pressing political priorities from high unemployment 
to inadequate public services to climate change. 
In rapidly urbanising Africa and Asia, urban-influencing policies and investments 
made in next decade will increasingly determine countries’ economic and social 
performance, including their capacity to attract and nurture industry, their demand 
for energy and resources, and their ability to lift people out of poverty. In each context, 
fostering compact, connected and clean cities can yield multiple benefits, from a safer 
climate, to a more vibrant economy, to cleaner air.
Local action is critical but, on its own, insufficient to create inclusive, zero-carbon 
cities with all their economic, social and environmental advantages. Recent decades 
have seen a groundswell of local climate action,276 including by local governments, 
utilities, firms, social movements, non-governmental organisations, traditional 
or customary authorities, research institutes and citizens. City governments have 
shown particular leadership: nearly 10,000 cities and local governments worldwide 
have committed to setting emission reduction targets and crafting strategic plans to 
deliver on those commitments.277 Many are taking climate action within unsupportive 
national contexts. However, even the largest, most empowered and committed city 
governments can only realise a small proportion of their mitigation potential on their 
own.278 Small- and medium-sized cities have still fewer resources and capabilities 
than large cities, but are home to over half the global urban population and half the 
urban mitigation potential (see Figure 3).279 In these cities, the support provided and 
standards introduced by higher levels of government are particularly important. 
A transition to zero-carbon cities demands collaborative climate action based on 
meaningful partnerships between national, state and local governments.280 
National and regional governments have a critical role to play in preparing a national 
strategy to deliver shared prosperity while reaching net-zero emissions – with cities at 
its heart. Such a strategy should be co-produced with local governments, businesses 
and civil society, with enough space to allow local flexibility and innovation. Working 
in partnership with all these different stakeholders, national and regional governments 
have four unique and crucial key roles to play in implementing this strategy:
Aligning national policies behind compact, connected, clean cities;
Funding and financing sustainable urban infrastructure; 
Coordinating and supporting local climate action in cities; and
Building a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, zero-carbon cities.
In addition, national governments have a critical contribution to make to ensure a just 
transition.
It is important to recognise the size and complexity of national governments. They 
are not single, unified entities, and they differ from country to country. There is a 
legislative branch, or parliament, which crafts the laws and sets the budget, and 
an executive branch, which implements and enforces the law. The power of the 
executive varies significantly across different countries and among unitary or federal 
systems. The two branches may be controlled by different political parties with 
competing agendas, and answer to electoral systems that may not hold them equally 
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accountable. There is also a bureaucracy, the civil servants who implement policies, 
whose priorities may differ depending on which agency employs them. Courts settle 
how policies are interpreted and enforced. Each of these entities and actors has a set 
of responsibilities, ideologies, ways of working and sources of power and support. 
To be successful, national leaders will need buy-in and engagement from all relevant 
branches and units of the national government. Achieving the transition to zero-
carbon cities will only be possible if they all recognise the urgency of action and seize 
the opportunity before them. 
4.1  Crafting a national strategy for cities
Cities develop and change over time through the discrete decisions of planners, politicians, 
real estate developers, bankers, investors, architects, engineers, property owners, 
businesses, media and other city dwellers. Some may be focused on a single parcel of 
land, while others look at the whole neighbourhood, or even the whole city. Sometimes 
they work in concert, but they are driven by different goals. Each has a different idea of 
what makes a city successful, and each comes to the table with different amounts and 
types of power. Building consensus among such diverse constituencies is immensely 
challenging, yet that diversity also gives cities their energy and inventiveness. 
National governments have a central role to play in bringing together these different 
groups to develop a strategy that harnesses the potential of cities to deliver prosperity 
for all in a resource-efficient way. Within cities, it falls primarily to local governments 
to set an agenda that will fulfil the needs and aspirations of urban residents – current 
and future – while responding to environmental pressures. But cities are inextricably 
linked to one another and to their surrounding regions. National governments can 
bring together governors and mayors (as well as business, community and thought 
leaders) to craft a national strategy that recognises the importance of cities and their 
interconnectedness with rural development. This strategy can be embedded into the 
national development plan or be a standalone platform such as a National Urban Policy. 
The process of developing and revising the national strategy is as important as the 
result. The strategy needs to be co-produced by the head of government, key line 
ministries and city leaders. This can ensure that it is subsequently mainstreamed into 
spatial plans and sectoral strategies, such as energy, housing, land use and transport. 
It should ideally link different communities and facilitate difficult conversations about 
the costs and trade-offs of different development paths. National and state governments 
will only be able to channel the creativity and activities of local governments, businesses 
and civil society if they jointly own a vision for cities that retains the flexibility to 
accommodate local priorities. In turn, local governments have a responsibility to make 
themselves more effective partners to national and provincial governments, so these 
different levels can genuinely co-design and co-deliver sustainable urban development.
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A central plank of any national vision for cities must be a commitment to mutual 
accountability between national and local governments. There need be no 
contradiction between having a more coherent, effective national urban strategy 
and giving city governments the autonomy they need to innovate and act on climate 
change. This is not an argument for decentralisation, which has proven both 
contentious and imperfect, but rather for ensuring that all levels of government have 
the capacity, space and support to work together towards a shared vision. What 
matters is how and why power might be devolved, and how interests at different scales 
are represented. National and state governments need to increase the capabilities of 
local governments so that they are able to fulfil their responsibilities,281 and ensure 
they receive or can raise enough resources so they do not struggle with unfunded 
mandates.282 National governments are also uniquely positioned to address issues 
like rule of law, corruption, fiscal health and trade, which prevent local action, reduce 
public trust in government (and therefore local politicians’ ability to manoeuvre), and 
deter private investment and entrepreneurship. Local governments, for their part, 
can systematically streamline their departmental operations and strengthen their 
capabilities so they can engage more straightforwardly and effectively with other 
levels of government.
A national vision for cities also needs to be sensitive to space and circumstance. All 
countries should build upon the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, 
but tailor their agenda to domestic contexts. National and provincial governments are 
typically better placed than local governments to consider spatial questions: where 
and how much might people be concentrated in a country, and how could cities of 
different sizes be connected to one another and to rural areas? A functional “system of 
cities” is important for distributing economic and social opportunity, realising regional 
comparative advantages and, increasingly, minimising exposure to climate risk. A 
national vision for cities also needs to be grounded in current political realities and 
priorities.283 This means the entry point for climate action might be improving air 
quality, or upgrading informal settlements, or revitalising post-industrial cities. What  
is crucial is that the national vision include a commitment to cities with inclusive 
economies and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.
Once national governments have established an overarching strategy that harnesses 
the power of cities to deliver shared prosperity while reaching net-zero emissions, they 
can build the main pillars required to achieve it.
National and state governments need to increase the capabilities of local 
governments so that they are able to fulfil their responsibilities, and ensure 
local governments receive or can raise enough resources that they do not 
struggle with unfunded mandates.
4. ThE UNIQUE AND CRUCIAL ROLES OF NATIONAL GOvERNMENT 85
4.2  Aligning national policies behind compact, connected, clean 
cities
A wide range of national and regional policies affect urban development. The 
relative powers of national, state and local governments vary by country. However, 
in all cases, there are national (and often regional) policies that have a significant 
impact on the quality and direction of urban development. Taxes may incentivise 
households’ and firms’ choices about where to locate and how much space to occupy; 
infrastructure investments may shape the mass transit options within and among 
cities; and mandatory performance standards for cars, lighting and appliances may 
influence total energy demand as well as local air quality and living costs. National 
and regional governments’ influence over cities is not limited to the built environment. 
Industrial regulations shape local air, soil and water quality, and a growing share of 
health and education budgets is spent in cities. 
Yet national and regional policies are often designed without regard to urban or 
climate issues.284 China, Mexico and Nigeria, for instance, have until recently focused 
on expanding the supply of affordable housing without necessarily considering how 
residents would travel to jobs, services or amenities.285 This has contributed to costly 
sprawl and even the abandonment of new housing stock around the urban periphery. The 
experience of Chile illustrates the importance of integrating housing, spatial and social 
policies to foster thriving communities (see Box 9), although looming climate catastrophe 
means that countries must in the future also layer in policies to reduce emissions 
and enhance resilience. The siloed approach that too often prevails creates perverse 
incentives that waste taxpayers’ money and undermine the long-term viability of cities. 
It should be a priority to align policies across all ministries to systematically promote 
compact, connected and clean urban development. This should involve removing 
and reforming established policies, as well as introducing new policies. Housing, 
industrial, land use and transport policies, for instance, need to be designed in 
concert to favour the development of mixed-use, walkable neighbourhoods where 
people can easily access their jobs.286 National governments are well placed to 
disentangle conflicting incentives and establish a baseline of policies that support a 
zero-carbon urban transition. Policy clarity is especially important for stimulating 
and shaping private-sector activity, increasing the ease of doing business and de-
risking low-carbon investment. National and state governments can also go farther by 
empowering local governments to set more ambitious climate targets – for example, 
through building codes, renewable energy quotas or electric vehicle deployment. This 
approach can ensure that emissions from all cities across a country fall steadily, while 
frontrunning city governments have the space to advance faster. 
A wide range of national and regional policies affect 
cities, yet these are often designed without regard to 
urban or climate issues.
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FIGURE 12. SCOPE OF MEASURES TO CONSIDER TO ACHIEVE BOTH URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE MITIGATION GOALS. 
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Meaningful policy alignment requires looking beyond the narrow bundle of instruments 
that might be explicitly urban-focused or climate-focused, and considering the much wider 
suite of policies that influence urban or climate outcomes. Almost every ministry makes 
choices that influence cities or emissions (see Figure 12), and accordingly needs to ensure 
that the policies and programmes in its purview favour a zero-carbon urban transition.287 
National Urban Policies (NUPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) could 
be valuable instruments to ensure that national policies systematically promote compact, 
connected and clean cities. A NUP is intended to govern cities and urbanisation within 
a country by aligning different sectoral policies, clarifying roles of all actors (including 
the private sector and civil society) involved in the urban sphere and creating spaces for 
them to convene. Today, only 76 countries – fewer than two in five – have an explicit NUP, 
and many of these are still in the feasibility or diagnosis stage.288 An NDC is intended 
to communicate the climate mitigation targets of a country, articulating where and how 
it might reduce emissions. With renewed attention to NUPs since Habitat III in 2016 and 
a commitment to enhance NDCs in 2020, many national governments are currently 
reviewing their overarching urban and climate policies. This offers a strategic 
international moment to harness the potential of cities to simultaneously improve 
living standards while tackling emissions.
New analysis for this report finds that only seven countries have both an NDC and 
a NUP that speak to climate mitigation in urban areas. 23 countries have an NDC 
that speaks to climate mitigation in urban areas, while 58 countries have a NUP that 
speaks to this topic. But new analysis for this report finds that only Colombia, Fiji, 
Indonesia, Mongolia, Rwanda, South Sudan and Tonga have both NUPs and NDCs 
that address this issue (see Figure 13), although many more countries have NDCs and 
NUPs that speak to urban adaptation and resilience.289 NUPs and NDCs are, of course, 
a deeply imperfect proxy for national policy alignment on cities and climate change, 
let alone policy implementation: several countries, such as Sweden, have longstanding 
commitments to urban climate action that are not captured in their NDCs. Many 
more countries have urban-relevant pledges in their NDCs, promising to reduce 
emissions from buildings, electricity generation, transport and waste. These sector-
based commitments are welcome. However, sectoral approaches miss two important 
opportunities in cities. First, they fail to capture the mitigation potential associated 
with spatially concentrating people, infrastructure and economic activity. For example, 
higher densities enable people to walk or cycle rather than using motorised transport. 
Second, sectoral approaches may not sufficiently empower local governments to 
pursue ambitious climate action within their jurisdictions. It is therefore important that 
national governments explicitly recognise cities as systems in their climate policies 
and plans. This analysis effectively illustrates that most national governments could go 
much farther to mainstream urban and climate perspectives across decision-making. If 
NDCs are not already addressing urban opportunities, there is immense scope to raise 
ambition during the climate negotiations.
Only 39% of National Urban Policies and 14% of Nationally 
Determined Contributions speak specifically to climate 
mitigation in urban areas. 
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FIGURE 13. THE PROPORTION OF COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES AND NATIONALLY DETERMINED 
CONTRIBUTIONS SPEAK TO CLIMATE MITIGATION IN URBAN AREAS.
7 COUNTRIES
HAVE BOTH
160
COUNTRIES AND
REGIONS THAT 
HAVE SUBMITTED
AN NDC
23
SPEAK TO CLIMATE
MITIGATION IN
URBAN AREAS
7
IN A DIRECT WAY
MANY MORE SPEAK 
TO CLIMATE MITIGATION 
IN URBAN-RELEVANT 
SECTORS SUCH AS 
BUILDINGS, TRANSPORT 
AND WASTE
MANY MORE SPEAK TO 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
AND RESILIENCE IN 
URBAN AREAS
16
IN AN 
IMPLIED WAY
108
COUNTRIES THAT 
HAVE FULLY 
FORMULATED
A NUP
58
SPEAK TO CLIMATE
MITIGATION IN
URBAN AREAS
30
MODERATELY
28
HIGHLY
Source: Coalition for Urban Transitions, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, UN-Habitat and the University of Southern Denmark. See Annex 9 for the full methodology. 
Note: This analysis was performed using: 
–  A database of 160 NDCs developed by UN-Habitat and the University of Southern Denmark. The European Union entered a single NDC that covered all 28 member states, which largely explains 
why the number of NDCs is lower than the number of countries.
–  A database of 108 NUPs developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and UN-Habitat. A further 42 NUPs are still in the feasibility and design phases, so they 
could not yet be assessed for their thematic scope. 
The Coalition for Urban Transitions has not been able to independently verify the databases.
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Box 9. Chile: Building a vibrant and 
affordable housing market
Over two decades, Chile reduced its housing deficit 
by two thirds.290 This achievement is particularly 
striking as it took place during Chile’s transition to 
democracy and as the country’s urban population 
grew from 10.1 million to 15.5 million.291 Chile was 
able to rapidly increase the supply of decent housing 
through an increasingly integrated approach 
spanning the banking, construction, education, 
industry, social development and transport sectors. 
Historically, the national government has either built 
or financed most formal housing in Chile. Through 
the 1990s, the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism 
(MINVU) was the most prominent real estate actor 
in Chile, building 30% of housing units, and co-
financing the construction of another 30%.292 In this 
decade alone, subsidies were paid to 515,000 mostly 
low- and lower-middle-income families. The massive 
scale of housing subsidies in Chile stimulated the 
growth of private property development, including 
(almost uniquely) large-scale housing construction 
for low- and middle-income groups.293 These efforts 
were complemented by relaxing regulations that 
constrained densification and interventions to 
expand private mortgage finance.294 By enabling the 
growth of the property development and real estate 
industries, the national government has been able 
to reform housing policy to reduce its own role in 
construction (although as late as 2010, government 
programmes of some kind were responsible for 
around half of all housing constructed in Chile).295 
Alongside these programmes to expand the 
formal housing stock, the national government 
supported upgrading of the “campamentos” 
(informal settlements) and integrating them into 
the cities. Initially, this was through regularisation 
of plots of land and supporting communities to 
incrementally improve their housing and basic 
services. These early efforts evolved into a more 
comprehensive programme called “Chile Barrio” 
(Chile Neighbourhood). Distinguished by its strong 
emphasis on reaching the poorest, the Chile Barrio 
programme mandated that local municipal plans 
The country achieved an impressive reduction in its  
formal housing deficit, and the number of people living  
in campamentos fell from 500,000 in 1996 to just  
84,000 in 2011 despite rapid urban population growth.
consider neighbourhood upgrading, poverty 
reduction, social inclusion and employment 
generation in an integrated way.296 The programme 
ended in 2006 with the successful formalisation of 
all the campamentos that had been identified in a 
1990 survey. 
Chile’s housing policies have been successful 
by many measures. Despite significant urban 
population growth, the country achieved an 
impressive reduction in its formal housing deficit, 
and the number of people living in campamentos 
fell from 500,000 in 1996 to just 84,000 in 2011.297 
Housing also remains very affordable relative to 
regional and international averages: two thirds of 
households in Santiago can afford to buy a formal 
house, whereas only a third can do so in Brazil and 
less than 10% in Argentina.298 Improved access 
to shelter and services also means that urban 
residents are much healthier, more mobile and 
generally better placed to cope with environmental 
shocks and stresses. Their resilience has been 
further enhanced by Chile’s comprehensive disaster 
relief infrastructure, originally developed to help 
manage earthquake risk. Chilean cities now benefit 
from early warning systems, building codes and 
emergency services that can reduce the impacts of a 
wide suite of climate-related hazards.
The national government has also undertaken 
far-sighted reforms to improve the housing policy 
in response to new evidence. For instance, early 
emphasis on expanding the quantity and reducing 
the cost of housing led to construction around 
the urban periphery, where land was cheaper.299 
This contributed to significant loss of agricultural 
land and the emergence of large low-income, low-
density neighbourhoods with few amenities.300 
Chile’s housing policy today prioritises the quality 
of housing stock and its connectivity to jobs and 
services.301 Chile’s strategic and integrated approach 
to housing policy has inspired governments across 
Latin America, including Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru.302
4.3  Funding and financing sustainable urban infrastructure 
To realise the potential of cities to drive sustainable development across a country, 
national governments need a far-sighted approach to revenue collection, spending 
decisions and financing choices. First, they need to work with state and local 
governments to establish tax (and spending) systems that raise sufficient revenue and 
incentivise sustainable choices and behaviours. Second, they need to mobilise private 
investment for sustainable urban infrastructure at scale by creating an enabling 
environment and managing fiscal risks.
National governments need to foster a fiscal system that generates the desired amount of 
public revenues and creates appropriate incentives for firms, households and subnational 
governments. Worldwide, national revenues represent an average of 74.3% of total 
public revenues.303 Most of these funds are typically collected through wide-area taxes 
at the national level, as this is very efficient. A portion is then typically allocated to 
provincial and local governments: indeed, grants and subsidies are the primary 
source of subnational government revenue in most countries.304 However, the share of 
fiscal transfers varies significantly among countries: grants and subsidies account for 
less than 25% of subnational revenue in Argentina, Iceland and Zimbabwe, but over 
80% in Malta, Peru and Tanzania.305 Fiscal transfers must be reliable and adequate to 
enable effective budget planning and management across all tiers of government.
Because of the large share of revenues collected through the national tax system, 
it is a key driver for structural economic change. Different tax instruments serve 
different purposes and should be deployed in tandem to achieve equity, efficiency and 
environmental goals. For instance, value-added taxes not only generate significant 
revenues but also provide useful information about the whole value chain – i.e. profits 
and wages. However, if not carefully designed, a VAT can disproportionately fall on 
lower-income people, who spend a larger share of what they earn. Progressive income 
taxes, on the other hand, are more equitable – but in much of the world, the burden 
falls disproportionately on a small number of formal workers. By using value-added 
taxes and income taxes together, governments can generate the data necessary for 
a genuinely redistributive tax system. Getting these fiscal choices right can expand 
the resource envelope for both social protection and public investment in sustainable 
infrastructure – and do so fairly and efficiently.306
State and local governments need the authority and capacity to control a range of 
own-source revenues, including the power to set rates at the margin. Responsible 
fiscal decentralisation can enhance their accountability for local service delivery 
and underpins their creditworthiness so that they can access capital markets.307 
Own-source revenue options may include taxes, grants and subsidies, user charges 
and fees, and property income. While regional governments often depend largely on 
“piggybacks” on national taxes, property taxes are typically the cornerstone of local 
taxation.308 A property tax can be politically and technically difficult to administer but, 
when well designed, is considered very economically efficient: it is typically predictable 
and progressive, and reflects the value of both public and private investments in the 
neighbourhood.309 State and local governments in federal countries collect a much 
higher share of public revenues (49.4% on average) than those unitary countries 
(20.7%).310 Subnational control over own-source revenues also varies significantly. In 
many countries, provincial and local governments are not allowed to set tax rates at 
the margin, grants are earmarked for specific purposes, and certain user charges are 
25.7%
49.4%
20.7%
Average
Federal countries
Unitary countries
Share of public 
revenues collected 
by subnational 
governments
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set by national regulations. For instance, national governments may regulate energy 
and water prices, while local governments may be able to determine waste collection 
fees and bus fares. A certain amount of fiscal autonomy at the state and local level is 
important both to improve budget management and to anchor access to credit.
Fiscal systems not only generate revenue; they also establish incentives for certain 
economic decisions and behaviours. Today, tax policy, financial regulation and 
public spending often skew urban markets in favour of high-carbon growth. New 
analysis by the Overseas Development Institute for this report finds 
that governments in the OECD and BRIICS* countries spend US$41.6 
billion each year subsidising fossil fuel consumption in urban areas. 
Subsidies were identified in most countries. Subsidies flowing to the 
transport sector amount to over US$13.82 billion per year; subsidies for 
households (for cooking, heating, lighting, etc.) amount to $US10.56 
billion per year; subsidies for industry and commerce follow closely 
behind at US$10.28 billion per year; and subsidies for the generation 
of fossil fuel-based electricity consumed in urban areas reach almost 
US$6.95 billion per year (see Figure 14). A further, small amount 
(US$27.7 million) was identified for fossil fuel consumption in social 
and public services in urban areas not covered by the above categories. 
These are conservative estimates, because many fossil fuel subsidies 
are hidden, and even when they are identified, they often cannot be quantified. 
Accounting for the costs of urban air pollution, road accidents and climate change 
would increase the value of these subsidies by several orders of magnitude.311 
FIGURE 14. THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIES FOR FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION IN URBAN AREAS IN 
THE OECD AND BRIICS COUNTRIES BY SECTOR (2015-2016 ANNUAL AVERAGE). 
US$13.82 BILLION
SUBSIDIES TO
TRANSPORT
US$6.95 BILLION
SUBSIDIES TO ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY
US$10.28 BILLION 
SUBSIDIES TO INDUSTRY
AND BUSINESS
US$10.56 BILLION
SUBSIDIES TO
HOUSEHOLDS
Source: Overseas Development Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. See Annex 10 for the full methodology. 
Note: A further US27.7 million was used to subsidise social and public services. This value is too small to see on the figure.
*  Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa.
Governments in the OECD and BRIICS 
countries spend at least US$41.6 
billion per year supporting the 
consumption of fossil fuels and fossil 
fuel-powered electricity in urban 
areas. 33% of this flows to the 
transport sector, 26% to households, 
25% to industry and business and 17% 
to fossil fuel electricity generation.
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Significant fiscal reform is needed to eradicate these perverse incentives, by 
eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and introducing a price on carbon. The political 
economy challenges of subsidy reform are hugely complex: though the wealthiest 
typically capture the largest share, energy subsidies are proportionately worth more 
to those on lower incomes, so reducing them can be deeply unpopular. The Yellow 
Vests movement in France has demonstrated the importance of a socially inclusive 
approach, as the protest against specific fuel taxes coalesced into a call for a more 
equitable approach to climate action.312 Subsidy reforms could free up significant fiscal 
space that can be used to manage the trade-offs – as illustrated by Indonesia’s recent 
success (see Box 10). And these efforts would also quickly show returns in the form of 
better air quality and improved energy efficiency. Parallel to subsidy reform, a price 
on carbon is widely considered to be the most efficient way to mitigate climate change, 
freeing markets to identify the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions.313 
An international carbon price floor could help to mitigate concerns about economic 
competitiveness and carbon leakage (i.e. when high-carbon activities relocate to 
countries without carbon pricing), making fossil fuel subsidy reform more palatable.314 
Once national governments have the fundamentals of a fair, efficient and sustainable 
fiscal system in place, they can work with state and local governments to mobilise 
private investment in sustainable urban infrastructure. As outlined in Chapter 
2, a wide range of investments are needed for cities to realise their potential as 
engines of national job creation and low-carbon innovation, including in buildings, 
electricity generation and distribution, mass transit, telecommunications, sanitation, 
water supply and waste management. These public works can support economic 
activity and human development, enhancing the benefits of urban agglomeration 
outlined in Section 3.1 while reducing potential costs. However, the financing gap for 
sustainable urban infrastructure currently exceeds US$1 trillion a year315 – and that 
does not include the incremental investment needed to reach net-zero emissions. In 
most countries (with the notable exception of China), domestic public budgets and 
international development assistance fall far short of what is required. Even if public 
revenues and spending were to significantly increase, achieving the SDGs and the 
Paris Agreement will still demand a step change in private sector investment.316 
There are a wide range of financing instruments available for this purpose. Debt 
financing distributes the costs of infrastructure projects equitably over the generations 
who benefit. Land-based financing instruments can enable governments to benefit 
from the relationship between more productive use of land and rising land values, 
yielding revenues that can be used to ensure that rising land values don’t displace 
residents or punish renters. Public-private partnerships (PPPs), when designed well, 
can secure private sector capabilities in the design, construction and management of 
infrastructure projects, as well as share risks across the public and private sectors.317 
These instruments can potentially catalyse private investment – but they need to 
be firmly grounded in a government’s ability to pay to effectively manage potential 
liabilities and risks. 
Financing instruments 
with high potential 
include:
Debt financing 
Land-based financing 
Public-private 
partnerships
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Decisions about which level of government should oversee these investments and 
which financing instruments are appropriate should be based on the specific project 
and wider national context. Large infrastructure investments such as metro systems 
have high upfront costs and capital risks, so they need close oversight by higher levels 
of government (whether line ministries or national development banks). Building 
efficiency retrofits have much smaller investment needs and can be undertaken 
incrementally, so they are more manageable for local governments. Projects such as 
bus networks or electricity generation systems will generate tariffs or user fees that 
enable at least some cost recovery, while others, such as cycling lanes and sewer 
systems, may not generate a direct economic return, even if they yield substantial 
wider benefits. In larger cities in higher-income countries, municipal governments 
may be able to structure infrastructure projects in a way that satisfies the criteria 
of prospective financiers; few smaller cities will have these sophisticated project 
preparation capabilities or the tax base to fund large projects.318 
Long-term use of these financing mechanisms depends on collaboration across tiers 
of government to overcome critical obstacles to investment. Developing countries in 
particular (but by no means exclusively) often lack the robust fiscal underpinnings, 
enabling regulation, institutional capacity or investment environment needed to 
attract private finance or manage the attendant risks.319 There are solutions for each  
of these obstacles, but they often lack scale as well as coordination and co-operation 
among key stakeholders. National governments have a key role to play in dismantling 
these barriers. They can introduce and enforce good budgeting, accounting and 
reporting standards at all levels of government to ensure disclosure of actual and 
prospective liabilities. This enables the national government to monitor total 
borrowing relative to total revenues, which is essential to avoid debt crises.320  
South Africa, for example, has introduced standard criteria and methodologies  
for appraising, procuring and disclosing public-private partnerships.321 Once these 
fundamentals are in place, national governments can introduce solid legislation  
that clearly articulates the conditions under which municipal governments can  
use different financing instruments.322 Today, fewer than half of all countries allow 
borrowing by local governments.323 Examples of good practice include Brazil’s Status 
of the City 2001 and Colombia’s Law 388 of 1997, which both explicitly authorise and 
enable the use of land value capture by municipal governments.324 
Above all, national and regional governments can strengthen the capacities of local 
governments to manage finance, plan capital investments and engage citizens, as 
well as the capacities of national development banks to finance climate-smart urban 
infrastructure. Municipal staff may need training and support to enhance own-source 
revenues, manage expenditures, maintain assets, track liabilities, scope out financing 
options and structure prospective projects. Local governments must take some 
responsibility for improving their creditworthiness and transparency – as, for example, 
the Kampala Capital City Authority has done in Uganda.325 But national governments 
can support local initiatives by investing in professional development, establishing 
effective systems and offering competitive salaries in order to secure talented, 
dedicated civil servants. Effective, accountable local governments can improve 
financial performance and access to private capital for all levels of government.
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Box 10: Indonesia: Financing development through 
fossil fuel subsidy reform
Indonesia began subsidising the consumption 
of fossil fuels in the mid-1960s, aiming to reduce 
poverty, limit inflation, and share the wealth of the 
country’s growing fossil fuel export industry.326 
However, the poor have benefitted least from the 
subsidies. In 2012, nearly 40% of fuel subsidies went 
to the richest 10% of households, and less than 1% 
went to the poorest 10%.327 Access to cheap transport 
fuel also meant that Indonesia’s car ownership rates 
rose faster than in similar countries, contributing 
to the sprawl, pollution and congestion for which 
Jakarta is especially notorious.328 
Fossil fuel subsidies may also have stunted Indonesia’s 
economic and human development by precluding 
public investments in infrastructure, health and 
education.329 In 2014, the government spent 3.5 times 
more on fossil fuel subsidies than on social welfare, 
and twice as much as on capital investments.330 Fuel 
subsidies have exposed Indonesia to volatile global 
oil prices and exchange rates too, and decreased 
incentives to improve energy efficiency and reduce 
emissions.331 Despite the negative and regressive 
impacts of fossil fuel subsidies, reform proved deeply 
politically unpopular throughout the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.
When international oil prices rose sharply in 2005, 
the costs of subsidies spiked correspondingly, 
reaching 24% of government expenditure.332 Under 
pressure to reduce the budget deficit, the government 
increased energy prices by 29% in March 2005 and 
114% in October. This saved US$4.5 billion and 
US$10 billion, respectively.333 This time, the national 
government avoided public backlash by coupling 
subsidy reforms with a bundle of spending targeted 
at the poor: cash transfers, health insurance, 
financial assistance for students, and low-interest 
loans for small businesses.334 
In 2014, the national government removed the 
subsidy on petrol and gave diesel a smaller subsidy 
tied to the market price – just as world oil prices fell. 
The fortuitous timing meant that consumers did not 
see a significant increase in fuel prices, reducing 
resistance and the need for compensation.335 
Subsidy reform saved IDR 211 trillion (US$15.6 
billion) or 10.6% of government expenditure,336 
which was explicitly reallocated to social welfare, 
infrastructure, and transfers to regional and local 
governments to improve local services.337 The highly 
visible and pro-poor nature of these investments 
fostered popular support and redressed concerns 
about corruption. By 2017, public spending on 
subsidies had been cut to 0.7% of GDP.338 Indonesia’s 
track record of investing these savings into poverty 
alleviation and economic development has secured 
public appetite for further subsidy reform as well as 
strengthening public confidence in the government.
4.4  Coordinating and supporting local climate action in cities
National, state and local governments all have important roles to play in the transition 
to zero-carbon cities. New analysis by the Stockholm Environment Institute for 
this report finds that few of the low-carbon measures identified in Section 2.1 fall 
exclusively within the sphere of local government influence – nor are there many 
areas that are exclusively national or regional concerns. However, national and 
regional governments tend to have primary authority or influence over two thirds of 
this urban abatement potential. These higher levels of government generally hold 
the reins with respect to decarbonising the electricity supply, switching to lower-
emission fuels (in buildings and transport), introducing efficiency standards for 
equipment and appliances, and improving the fuel economy of vehicles. Meanwhile, 
local governments tend to have primary responsibility for 14% of urban mitigation 
potential. This includes urban form, travel demand measures, waste management and 
– in many countries – public transport and mode shifting. For the remaining urban 
abatement potential, national/state and local governments both have important roles 
to play in delivery (see Figure 15).
FIGURE 15. PROPORTION OF 2050 URBAN ABATEMENT POTENTIAL OVER WHICH  
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE PRIMARY AUTHORITY OR INFLUENCE. 
EXCLUDING DECARBONISATION 
OF ELECTRICITY (7.7 GtCO2-e)
PRIMARILY NATIONAL 
OR STATE-LED 35%
PRIMARILY 
CITY-LED 28%
SHARED 37%
INCLUDING DECARBONISATION 
OF ELECTRICITY (15.5 GtCO2-e)
PRIMARILY NATIONAL 
OR STATE-LED 67%
PRIMARILY 
CITY-LED 14%
SHARED 19%
Source: Stockholm Environment Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. See Annex 11 for the full methodology.
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If electricity decarbonisation is excluded from the analysis, the importance of local 
action and multi-level governance becomes more apparent. In this case, national 
and regional governments have primary authority or influence over 35% of urban 
abatement potential, while local governments are primarily accountable for 28%.  
For the remaining 37% of the urban abatement potential, responsibilities are much 
more varied across countries and typically require greater collaborative climate action 
among different tiers of government. The nature of such collaboration will vary by 
policy area. Local governments may be instrumental in implementing and enforcing 
state- or national-level policies, such as building codes, or can complement national 
efforts with local initiatives, for example by expanding charging infrastructure so that 
more households can take advantage of national incentives for electric vehicles.339 
This analysis clearly demonstrates that a transition to zero-carbon cities depends 
on meaningful partnerships among different tiers of government, with national 
governments actively enabling and supporting climate action at the local level.
National governments can support local climate action in cities in three key ways: 
clarifying the responsibilities and powers of different parts of government; supporting 
local actors to design, finance and implement low-carbon measures; and fostering a 
culture of experimentation, participation and learning that enables successful local 
initiatives to be scaled and replicated across the country.340 If national governments 
do not provide this support, they effectively hinder local climate action – and miss an 
important lever to achieve national economic, social and environmental goals.
First, national governments can clarify the responsibilities and powers of 
different parts of government. A clear framework, whether composed of 
legislation, judicial rulings or executive decisions, can establish the formal 
structures within which both public and private decisions impacting cities 
are made. This can enable more effective local decision-making within a 
vertically integrated framework. For example, it falls to national governments 
to explicitly articulate the own-source revenues available to local governments, 
and the conditions under which they can borrow from commercial banks, issue 
bonds, undertake public-private partnerships, or implement new charges and 
user fees.341 This is not necessarily about devolution. For instance, only 29% 
of countries allow local governments to reduce speed limits or have urban 
speed limits of 50 km/hour or below.342 Whether directly or indirectly, national 
governments have a clear opportunity to reduce air pollution, noise and traffic 
injuries in cities. While clarity is important, it will not guarantee effective 
coordination within government. As in any other organisation, personal 
relationships and institutional norms hugely shape learning and decision-
making, and need to be considered when introducing new ideas.343 
Second, national governments can support local actors to design, finance 
and implement low-carbon projects in cities. They can create a collaborative 
platform for city governments to say what data, support or enabling policies 
they need from national governments. National governments can then 
provide targeted information, funding and capacity-building – for example, 
to help city governments collect own-source revenues and enhance their 
creditworthiness. They can facilitate uptake of best practices, for instance, by 
helping city officials learn from their peers through national and international 
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networks of municipal governments,344 such as the Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy and its member city networks. National statistical 
agencies can routinely ensure that large datasets (such as the national census 
or demographic and health surveys) include spatial information, so local 
authorities can make more informed decisions. For larger one-off projects 
such as the construction and financing of mass transit infrastructure, national 
governments can provide dedicated technical assistance. For example, while 
some of the larger and more empowered city governments may benefit from 
dedicated project preparation facilities, it will often make more sense for 
national and regional governments to provide specialised inputs into project 
design and contracting – particularly for smaller urban areas.345 In much of 
the global South, it will be important to support people living and working 
in the informal sector (and their social movements) to ensure that informal 
settlements are upgraded in a sustainable, resilient way and that informal 
workers also have opportunities in a greener urban economy.346
Third, national governments can foster a culture of experimentation and 
participation around climate action. It will not be possible to reach net-
zero emissions without an evolution of behaviours, social norms, financing 
mechanisms, institutions, policies and urban design. Cities are an appropriate 
scale to experiment with new climate strategies and engage citizens with 
the difficult choices involved. National governments can purposefully and 
strategically work with city governments, fostering partnerships that stimulate 
innovation and focusing on enabling (rather than regulating) climate action.347 
They can then further help local governments monitor, report and evaluate 
on these experiments to enable learning. Supporting local action can ensure 
that climate actions are rooted in on-the-ground realities and priorities, while 
advancing national objectives. Success stories can then be replicated at a larger 
scale.348 Germany’s Energiewende offers a powerful example of the ways that 
national governments can partner with municipalities, businesses and citizens 
to accelerate low-carbon innovation and foster a culture of environmental 
citizenship (see Box 11). 
National and state governments have primary authority over 
35% of urban abatement potential, while local governments 
have primary authority over 28%. For the rest, collaborative 
climate action is needed across different tiers of government. *
* excluding electricity decarbonisation
4. ThE UNIQUE AND CRUCIAL ROLES OF NATIONAL GOvERNMENT 99
Box 11. Germany: Powering a 
renewable energy transition
In the 1990s, the German government introduced  
the Energiewende (Energy Transition), a plan to 
decarbonise the energy system through a combination 
of increased renewable energy generation, improved 
energy efficiency, and energy demand management.349 
The national strategy addresses four priorities: 
fighting climate change, reducing dependence on 
nuclear power, improving energy security and 
securing economic competitiveness. 
The Energiewende has met with great success: the 
share of renewable energy increased from 6% of 
electricity production in 2000 to 38% in 2018.350 
Renewables are also an increasingly important 
source of employment in Germany, accounting 
for about 370,000 jobs in 2013.351 Moreover, the 
Energiewende has remained politically popular.  
New legislation passed in 2010 raised the ambition 
of Germany’s emission reduction targets and 
more than 90% of German citizens supported the 
energy transition in 2017.352 The success of the 
Energiewende can be attributed to three key factors: 
a comprehensive and ambitious national policy 
framework, strong national-local partnerships and 
large-scale citizen buy-in.
The Energiewende employs a wide range of policy 
instruments including quotas, taxes, feed-in tariffs, 
efficiency standards, permits, pilot projects and 
carbon pricing. Arguably the most important policy 
has been higher feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, 
which enable investors to more quickly recoup their 
capital expenditure. The average supplement to the 
standard electricity price for a private residential 
consumer was €0.0624 per kilowatt hour in 
2014.353 This temporarily increased energy bills in 
Germany. However, complementary investments 
in energy efficiency mean that household energy 
expenditure is comparable to other European 
countries.354 Germany protected energy-intensive 
industries through rebates, exemptions and other 
preferential treatments worth €17 billion in 2016.355 
This was politically and economically important for 
safeguarding jobs, but may have hindered climate 
mitigation efforts by shielding these firms from the 
real costs of energy inefficiency and fossil fuels.
The national policy framework explicitly supports 
and empowers municipalities to advance the 
Energiewende. Many German municipalities have 
established local energy utilities (Stadtwerke) that 
have set even more ambitious renewable energy 
targets than the national government.356 Stadtwerke 
München, for instance, plans to increase the city’s 
renewable energy share from 39% in 2019 to 100% 
by 2025.357 In 2013, municipal utilities owned 6% of 
Germany’s generation capacity.358 Some municipal 
utilities are purchasing their local grids from larger 
operators in order to accelerate the renewable energy 
transition. Others plan to become net producers of 
renewable energy, generating a stream of revenue to 
support municipal investment. 
The Energiewende has benefitted from enthusiastic 
public participation. Citizens across Germany 
have formed local cooperatives that collectively 
invest in solar, wind and energy-from-waste 
systems. The number of energy cooperatives grew 
from 66 in 2001 to almost 900 at the end of 2013, 
which collectively had around 130,000 members. 
In 2012, these citizen-owned projects accounted 
for 46.6% of all installed renewable capacity 
in Germany.359 The democratisation of energy 
ownership has contributed to the ongoing popularity 
of the Energiewende, since so many Germans are 
personally invested in a renewable-powered future.
Germany cut its own greenhouse gas emissions by 
27% between 1990 and 2014. Moreover, its early 
leadership enabled technological learning and 
expanded renewable markets, which drove down the 
cost of decentralised energy technologies 
worldwide.360 The Energiewende faces two significant 
challenges going forward: fairly distributing the 
costs and benefits of the transition, and managing an 
intermittent electricity supply. National and local 
governments are already looking ahead to these 
issues, ensuring that Germany will remain at the 
forefront of the global energy transition. 
The Energiewende has met with great success: the share of 
renewable electricity increased from 6% of electricity 
production in 2000 to 38% in 2018.
4.5  Building a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, zero-
carbon cities
National governments are the principal actors and shareholders in the international 
legal system. They shape, enact and deliver international treaties and agreements, 
such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the New Urban Agenda and the Paris 
Agreement. These set the global agenda and have huge impacts on cities by establishing 
obligations and practices on a vast range of issues, from the use of force to the rights of 
individuals and groups, to the governance of the global commons, to the patterns of 
world trade. It is then up to national governments to interpret and implement them. 
National governments can build a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, zero-
carbon cities in three ways: setting a zero-carbon urban transition firmly on the global 
agenda, strengthening international frameworks that accelerate rather than 
undermine the transition, and using multilateral architecture – particularly the 
multilateral development banks – to support countries’ own urban climate actions.
First, national governments set the global agenda. Although they may invite 
others to participate and contribute, international agreements are ultimately 
decided by sovereign states. It therefore falls to national governments to 
ensure that these global agendas nurture inclusive, zero-carbon cities. This 
means ensuring that international agreements are supportive of strong 
local governments and sensitive to urban contexts. The seventh Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG), for instance, set targets for “improved water” and 
“improved sanitation” that were not appropriate for urban areas: a protected 
dug well and pit latrine can work well where there are low densities and large 
plots, but are not adequate in large, dense concentrations of people. The 
problematic design of this MDG meant that national and international statistics 
grossly underestimated the number of urban dwellers without access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation.361 In addition, the national-level targets in the 
MDGs often masked stark differences among a country’s cities and regions.362 
National governments should strategically use multilateral agreements to 
create the space, incentives and recognition for frontrunning cities to pursue 
more ambitious action towards low-carbon, climate-resilient development. 
 
National governments can build a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, 
zero-carbon cities by: (1) setting a zero-carbon urban transition firmly on the 
global agenda; (2) strengthening international frameworks to accelerate the 
transition; and (3) using multilateral architecture to support countries’ own 
zero-carbon urban strategies.
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Second, national governments govern transboundary activities that influence 
urban development. Cities are often shaped by, and depend on, international 
relations and policies. For instance, trade agreements significantly dictate 
where new jobs are created and new urban centres emerge; cities may depend 
on regional electricity grids or sit in water catchments that span national 
boundaries; and immigration policies determine whether cities can attract 
international entrepreneurs, investors and workers. National governments also 
regulate multi-national corporations that span boundaries and shape urban 
centres, especially through foreign direct investment in real estate. In this 
context, they need to ensure that international policy-making and legislation 
foster thriving cities and do not compromise the zero-carbon urban transition. 
An important stepping stone is encouraging and supporting governments at all 
levels to use standardised platforms to set emission reduction targets, develop 
climate plans and publicly report on progress towards net-zero emissions.363 
This can facilitate vertical integration of Nationally Determined Contributions 
to quickly increase ambition.
Third, national governments can use the international architecture – particularly 
the multilateral development banks – to accelerate a zero-carbon urban 
transition. Development banks and agencies, research institutes, city networks 
and other international organisations have a strong track record of supporting 
cities (and countries) to respond to climate change. National governments can 
facilitate these relationships. This might include supporting cities to undertake 
peer-to-peer learning so they can improve their creditworthiness or adopt 
low-carbon innovations; securing technical assistance to prepare “investment-
ready” urban programmes; or supporting city governments and utilities to 
access grants and concessional capital (with appropriate fiscal safeguards). 
Indeed, national governments can go farther by reforming the multilateral 
architecture to create a more favourable environment for a zero-carbon 
urban transition. This might include more effectively climate-proofing capital 
lending or creating direct access modalities for low-carbon urban projects.364 
In particular, as the development banks’ traditional shareholders and clients, 
national governments drive country investment strategies. If inclusive and 
sustainable cities aren’t prominently on national agendas (and in the absence 
of consultation with city governments), development banks may overlook the 
importance of cities and agency of local governments. 
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5.  Priorities for 
national action
A transition to zero-carbon cities offers an immense 
opportunity to secure national economic prosperity 
and improve quality of life while tackling the 
existential threat posed by climate change. Realising 
the potential of cities demands bold action by 
national governments, working in close collaboration 
with city governments, businesses, civil society, 
research institutes and other partners.
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FIGURE 16. SIX PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL ACTION TO ACHIEVE INCLUSIVE, ZERO-CARBON, CLIMATE-RESILIENT CITIES. 
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Now is the time to act not only because of the urgency of the climate crisis, but because 
2020 is a critical year. The Paris Agreement includes a “ratchet” mechanism to encourage 
countries to increase their climate commitments over time.365 New pledges are 
submitted every five years, with the next round due at the 26th Conference of the Parties 
in late 2020 (COP26). COP26 offers an international platform for national governments 
to showcase their climate leadership and stimulate greater global ambition.
This chapter presents key actions that national governments can take to foster 
thriving, resilient cities with net-zero emissions. The first and overarching 
recommendation is for national governments to prepare a national strategy to deliver 
shared prosperity while reaching net-zero emissions – and to put cities at the heart 
of it. Once this clear vision is in place, it can guide decision-making across different 
ministries, including how national governments (1) reform national policies, (2) fund 
and finance sustainable urban infrastructure, (3) empower local governments, and (4) 
engage with the multilateral system. All these national actions will be most successful 
if underpinned by a commitment to a just transition, as illustrated in Figure 16. 
Within those high-level priorities, this chapter offers a toolbox of policy options. 
While not all will be relevant to every country, the toolbox as a whole has relevance to 
countries at all levels of development. Income levels should not constrain ambition: 
many low-income countries are undertaking ambitious and complex actions that 
high-income countries could emulate. The recommendations are presented in three 
sequential categories:
Laying a strong foundation;
Seizing the opportunity; and
Raising the ambition. 
These categories reflect the diverse starting points from which national governments 
pursue climate action in cities. This is not solely based on levels of income. For 
instance, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and introducing a carbon price (Priority 
3.1 and Priority 3.2) are fundamental for systematically steering investment towards 
sustainable urban infrastructure – yet high-income countries such as Australia and 
Israel do not have a carbon price, while middle-income countries such as Colombia 
and South Africa do.366 These categories also recognise the importance of sequencing 
climate mitigation and adaptation policies appropriately. For instance, a country 
can use its position on the board of international financing institutions to encourage 
them to end all fossil fuel financing (Priority 5.2) as a step towards ensuring that all 
international public finance flows align with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (Priority 5.3). The breadth of these recommendations 
reflects the interconnectedness and centrality of cities to wider national development, 
and the myriad ways in which they are influenced by national policies.
These priorities draw on three years of research by the Coalition for Urban 
Transitions, supplemented by a consultation process involving over 50 institutions, 
including research institutes, networks of national and city governments, 
investors, infrastructure providers, strategic advisory companies, non-government 
organisations and grassroots organisations. All have been tested with representatives 
of national and city governments to confirm their relevance and viability. 
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PRIORITY 1: 
PLACE CITIES AT THE 
HEART OF A NATIONAL 
STRATEGY TO DELIVER 
SHARED PROSPERITY 
WHILE REACHING 
NET-ZERO EMISSIONS.
PRIORITY 3: 
FUND AND FINANCE 
SUSTAINABLE URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE. 
PRIORITY 4: 
COORDINATE AND 
SUPPORT LOCAL CLIMATE 
ACTION IN CITIES. 
PRIORITY 5: 
BUILD A MULTILATERAL 
SYSTEM THAT 
FOSTERS INCLUSIVE, 
ZERO-CARBON CITIES.
PRIORITY 6: 
PROACTIVELY PLAN FOR 
A JUST TRANSITION TO 
ZERO-CARBON CITIES.
PRIORITY 2: 
ALIGN NATIONAL POLICIES 
BEHIND COMPACT, 
CONNECTED, CLEAN 
CITIES. 
PRIORITIES FOR
NATIONAL ACTION
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PLACE CITIES AT THE HEART OF A
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO DELIVER 
SHARED PROSPERITY WHILE 
REACHING NET-ZERO EMISSIONS.
PRIORITY 1
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Priority 1: Place cities at the heart of a national strategy to deliver 
shared prosperity while reaching net-zero emissions.
Business-as-usual approaches to economic growth are not delivering a decent 
standard of living for most people, and are pushing the world to the brink of multiple 
ecological crises. Yet few national governments have a long-term strategy to deliver 
economic and social development in the context of a climate emergency. Because 
people, economic activity and emissions are increasingly concentrated in cities, 
achieving SDG11 and transitioning to inclusive, zero-carbon cities is a powerful lever 
to deliver faster, fairer economic development while tackling the climate crisis. 
Local governments cannot realise this opportunity on their own, as even the 
wealthiest and most empowered among them are subject to national policies and 
depend on national funding.367 Yet national policies are often designed without 
considering their impact on cities.368 For example, taxes incentivise households’ 
and firms’ choices about where to locate and how much space to occupy; mandatory 
performance standards for cars, lighting and appliances influence total energy 
demand as well as local air quality and living costs; and national education curricula 
determine whether the civil service, businesses and non-government organisations 
have the knowledge and skills to act on climate change. Almost every ministry makes 
choices that influence cities and climate change (see Figure 12), and accordingly 
needs to ensure that the policies and programmes in their purview favour a zero-
carbon urban transition.369 Yet most national governments are missing their chance to 
harness the power of cities. 
A long-term national strategy, focused on cities and underpinned by meaningful 
partnerships between national and local governments, is needed to seize this 
opportunity. It should offer a shared vision for compact, connected and clean 
cities, support coordination across levels and sectors of government, and set 
ambitious targets for reaching net-zero emissions by mid-century while delivering 
decent standards of living for all. This in turn can drive the structural economic 
transformation and behaviour changes needed to avoid climate catastrophe. Such a 
strategy may be embedded in national development plans or stand alone as a National 
Urban Policy. The key is that it achieves its primary purpose: equipping all branches 
of national governments to systematically and purposefully work towards inclusive, 
zero-carbon and resilient cities.
The national strategy needs to be co-produced by the head of state, key line ministries 
and city leaders, as well as civil society and private actors to ensure its legitimacy. 
No single ministry can drive this agenda. Ministries of education, energy, finance, 
housing, industry, infrastructure, transport and more have important roles to play. 
Every department and agency needs this mandate to proactively consider how their 
decisions may impact on cities’ potential to deliver shared prosperity and climate 
safety, and to shape their sector-specific strategies accordingly. They also need it 
to work together to create the mutually reinforcing policies and complementary 
investments that foster inclusive, zero-carbon cities. National governments can then 
implement the long-term strategy through policy, fiscal reforms, an infrastructure 
investment plan, support for local climate action, and efforts to influence the 
international agenda, as outlined in the remainder of this section. 
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2.1
REMOVE NATIONAL LAND 
USE AND BUILDING 
REGULATIONS THAT PROHIBIT 
DENSER, MIXED-USE 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT. 
2.3
INTRODUCE NET-ZERO CARBON 
BUILDING CODES FOR ALL NEW 
BUILDINGS AND REACH 
NET-ZERO OPERATING 
EMISSIONS IN ALL PUBLIC 
BUILDINGS BY 2030.
2.4
STOP THE SALE OF FOSSIL-
FUEL POWERED MOTORBIKES, 
PASSENGER CARS AND BUSES 
FROM 2030. 
2.5
ADOPT ALTERNATIVES 
TO CONVENTIONAL STEEL 
AND HIGH-CARBON CEMENT 
BY 2030.
2.6
SHIFT AWAY FROM BUILDING 
DETACHED HOUSING IN 
ESTABLISHED CITIES. 
2.2
REFORM ENERGY MARKETS 
TO DECARBONISE THE 
ELECTRICITY GRID BY 2050. 
SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY
RAISING
THE AMBITION
ALIGN NATIONAL
POLICIES BEHIND 
COMPACT, CONNECTED, 
CLEAN CITIES. 
LAYING A STRONG
FOUNDATION
PRIORITY 2
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Emissions from the 
electricity sector fell  
by 46% between 2013 
and 2016 in the UK
DOWN 46%
Priority 2: Align national policies behind compact, connected, 
clean cities. 
Laying a strong foundation
2.1  Remove national land use and building regulations that prohibit denser, 
mixed-use urban development. Many cities have density restrictions, 
sometimes for public safety reasons but mainly to limit demand on public 
services and preserve the character of neighbourhoods. Many of these 
regulations have roots in economic or racial exclusion. Even when well 
intentioned, land use and zoning policies that limit density can stimulate 
urban sprawl, which can depress productivity, contribute to local air pollution 
and encroach on surrounding ecosystems. Responsibility for this issue falls to 
different tiers of government in different countries. Where it falls in their remit, 
national governments can reform the overarching frameworks and champion 
reforms to minimum lot areas, maximum building heights, plot coverage ratios 
and land use restrictions, while safeguarding green space and avoiding the 
displacement of disadvantaged residents. This can stimulate markets to make 
better use of land and increase the supply of housing, reducing costs and 
enhancing the productivity of urban centres. In the US, relaxing restrictions 
on housing supply in just three cities – New York, San Francisco and San Jose 
(“Silicon Valley”) – would have improved the national allocation of labour 
enough to boost the country’s GDP in 2009 by 3.7%, or an additional US$3,685 in 
average annual earnings.370 In Namibia, reforms to minimum plot sizes enabled 
legal settlement at much higher densities and much lower costs (see Box 3).
2.2  Reform energy markets to decarbonise the electricity grid by 2050. 
Half the total urban mitigation potential identified in this report comes from 
decarbonisation of energy, primarily electricity (see Figure 2). Indeed, it is 
impossible to achieve zero-carbon cities without switching to clean electricity. 
At the same time, emerging economies must massively expand the supply of 
affordable electricity to meet their economic and human development goals, 
including industrial activity in cities, as outlined in SDG7. The economic case 
for clean energy options is increasingly compelling, especially when national 
governments remove fossil fuel subsidies and price carbon emissions (see 
Priority 3.1 and Priority 3.2). Decarbonising the grid also offers the opportunity 
to cut fossil fuel consumption – and the associated air pollution – through 
electrification of transport, buildings and industry.371 National governments can 
accelerate the energy transition by using quotas and targets, renewable portfolio 
standards, feed-in tariffs, tax exemptions, targeted auctions with long-term 
contracts, and green public procurement to encourage private investment and 
innovation in clean technologies. In some contexts, national governments can 
remove regulations that constrain the decentralisation of electricity generation, 
distribution and storage; this can empower local governments and utilities 
to adopt clean energy technologies even faster. The UK has seen impressive 
progress towards grid decarbonisation, with electricity sector emissions falling 
46% between 2013 and 2016 alone thanks to combination of fuel switching from 
coal to gas, rapid uptake of renewables and falling electricity demand.372
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Seizing the opportunity
2.3  Introduce net-zero carbon building codes for all new buildings and reach 
net-zero operating emissions in all public buildings by 2030.373 The majority 
of current and future building stock is concentrated in cities, and there are many 
economically attractive ways to improve its carbon-efficiency.374 Zero-carbon 
buildings are attainable with widely available technologies and well-understood 
architectural techniques such as passive design. This report finds that 58% of the 
urban abatement potential in cities can be attributed to the buildings sector. This 
equates to 3.3GtCO2-e, or 9.0GtCO2-e with the decarbonisation of electricity. All 
buildings need to have net-zero emissions (with minimal use of carbon offsets) 
by mid-century, and national building codes and public procurement policies 
can play an important role in transforming urban markets, growing local 
capacities to construct ultra-low energy buildings and deliver deep building 
retrofits.375 This should be accompanied by reforms to national policies on building 
construction and energy performance to favour more efficient and sustainable 
use of materials and energy (see Priority 2.5), enabling innovation and private 
sector leadership. City governments from Eskişehir in Turkey to Kochi in India to 
eThikwini in South Africa have already announced their intention to reach 
net-zero operating emissions in their buildings by 2030.376 At the UN Secretary-
General’s Climate Summit, a number of national governments will build upon 
these local actions by committing to ensure that all new buildings have net-zero 
carbon emissions from 2030, and existing buildings by 2050.377
2.4  Stop the sale of fossil-fuel powered motorbikes, passenger cars and buses 
from 2030. Transport contributes 14.3% of global greenhouse gas emissions378 
and up to 70% of urban air pollution, with the highest levels in developing 
countries.379 This report finds that a shift to more efficient and electric vehicles 
in cities could avoid 0.94GtCO2-e, with the mitigation potential of this measure 
rising to 1.68 GtCO2-e if the electricity supply is carbon-neutral. Maximising 
the benefits of electrification depends on decarbonising the electricity grid 
(see Priority 2.2)380 and using vehicles more intensively through car- and ride-
sharing platforms, as this can minimise ecological degradation from rare-earth 
mining and battery disposal. To build momentum and incentivise investment 
in charging infrastructure and electric vehicles, national governments can 
ban the sale and production of fossil-fuel powered vehicles, fund or support 
urban e-mobility pilot projects to build public appetite, and publish guidelines 
to assist cities in the procurement of public electric vehicles. This should be 
complemented by support to city governments and utilities to map out electric 
vehicle infrastructure needs over the next decade. Electrification of urban 
transport is already happening at pace, particularly in China (see Box 7). In 
India, senior decision-makers have suggested ending the sale of fossil-fuelled 
passenger cars and two-wheelers in 2030.381 At the UN Secretary-General’s 
Climate Summit, a number of national governments will recognise the 
opportunity to simultaneously improve air quality and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and will commit to implement sustainable mobility and e-mobility 
policies that can realise this potential.382
Senior decision-makers 
in India have suggested 
ending the sale of 
fossil-fuelled passenger 
cars and two-wheelers 
in 2030
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The cost to consumers of decarbonising 
cement and steel could be relatively 
small: 1% on the cost of a car or 3%  
on the cost of a house.
Raising the ambition
2.5  Adopt alternatives to conventional steel and high-carbon cement by 
2030. Steel production generates 7% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and 
cement production, another 6%.383 A growing share of the projects that use these 
materials are in and around cities. Keeping global warming below 1.5°C will 
require that less steel and cement is used in the future. National 
urban policies have a crucial role to play in cutting emissions by 
reducing total demand for cement and steel (particularly through 
greater materials efficiency in buildings and transport systems); 
promoting reuse instead of manufacturing (particularly for steel, 
which can be recycled relatively cost-effectively);384 regulating 
production to ensure that best-practice processes and technologies are used; 
and reforming national building standards to encourage low-carbon building 
materials such as bamboo, earth, processed wood and stone.385 These national 
standards can then serve as a template or baseline for local building codes. 
National governments can also reform professional certification processes to 
ensure that architects, engineers and other built-environment professionals are 
trained to use new materials (see Priority 4.2) and to use nature-based solutions 
more extensively. To meet massive demand for building materials without high-
carbon steel or cement, new options may be needed. National governments can 
direct R&D budgets to developing alternative building materials such as carbon-
eating cement (see Priority 4.6), and streamline their approval processes. The 
cost to consumers of decarbonising even these hard-to-abate sectors could be 
relatively small: 1% on the cost of a car or 3% on the cost of a house.386
2.6  Shift away from building detached housing in established cities. Many 
cities will need to expand their spatial footprint to accommodate rapid urban 
population growth while delivering high quality of life. However, many 
relatively mature cities – particularly in land-rich countries – continue to sprawl 
needlessly and expensively, as detached houses keep being built in suburbs 
and exurbs. This is a problem from Athens, to Atlanta, to Concepción (Chile), 
to Perth (Australia), to Quebec City. The economic, social and environmental 
costs of such sprawl are immense. Many cities already have an abundance of 
“single-family” homes, but demographic changes will raise demand for a greater 
diversity of housing types that can accommodate households ranging from single 
people, to flatmates, to large multi-generational or cooperative households, to 
older adults who value independence at home. Building on the reforms outlined 
in Priority 2.1, national governments can support brownfield development and 
densification of established neighbourhoods, as well as compact and transit-
oriented new development. They can write supportive national urban planning 
guidelines (for example, by revising fee structures so that property developers 
bear the costs of sprawling infrastructure provision); release publicly owned, 
vacant urban land for dense development; and reform national tax and financial 
structures that make detached homes cheaper to build or own than row houses 
or apartments (for example, by reforming mortgage interest deduction policies).
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3.1
ELIMINATE SUBSIDIES 
FOR FOSSIL FUELS BY 
2025, IF NOT SOONER. 
3.3
STRENGTHEN LAND AND 
PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION 
TO AT LEAST 1% OF EITHER 
NATIONAL GDP OR TOTAL 
NATIONAL PROPERTY VALUE.
3.4
WORK WITH CITY GOVERNMENTS 
TO ESTABLISH INTEGRATED 
SPATIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
PLANS THAT CAN UNDERPIN A 
PIPELINE OF CLIMATE-SAFE, 
BANKABLE PROJECTS.
3.5
SCALE LAND-BASED FINANCING 
INSTRUMENTS TO FUND 
SUSTAINABLE URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE. 
3.6
SHIFT NATIONAL TRANSPORT 
BUDGETS FROM BUILDING 
ROADS TO SUPPORTING PUBLIC 
AND ACTIVE TRANSPORT. 
3.2
ESTABLISH A CARBON PRICE 
OF US$40–80/TCO₂-e BY 
2020 AND US$50–100/TCO₂-e 
BY 2030. 
SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY
RAISING
THE AMBITION
FUND AND FINANCE 
SUSTAINABLE URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE. 
LAYING A STRONG
FOUNDATION
PRIORITY 3
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More accurate fossil fuel pricing in 2015 would have:
 lowered global CO2  
emissions by 28%,
reduced deaths from fossil 
fuel air pollution by 46%,
and raised government 
revenues by 3.8%  
of global GDP.
Priority 3: Fund and finance sustainable urban infrastructure. 
Laying a strong foundation
3.1  Eliminate subsidies for fossil fuels by 2025, if not sooner. Subsidies mask the 
true costs of coal, oil and gas, and undermine the case for investment in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. They eat up fiscal space and are regressive, 
mainly benefiting middle- and high-income households. There are better ways of 
supporting low-income households than by subsidising fuels, such as providing 
cash transfers or funding efficiency measures. Yet, as of 2017, the OECD and BRIICS 
countries allocated at least US$41.6 billion to subsidise the consumption of fossil 
fuels in urban areas (see Figure 14) – and the value of these subsidies is likely to 
rise as urban populations and economies grow. By eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, 
national governments can systematically favour cleaner fuels and free up fiscal 
space to support pro-poor, low-carbon development. More accurate fossil fuel 
pricing in 2015 would have lowered global CO2 emissions by 28%, reduced deaths 
from fossil fuel air pollution by 46%, and raised government revenues by 3.8% of 
global GDP.387 Indonesia has recently demonstrated how fossil fuel subsidy 
reform can yield rapid returns, as the national government was able to increase 
public spending on health, education and other popular issues (see Box 10). 
3.2  Establish a carbon price of US$40–80/tCO2-e by 2020 and US$50–100/tCO2-e 
by 2030. Market prices for high-carbon goods and services fail to reflect carbon’s 
true social, economic and environmental costs – particularly where depressed by 
fossil fuel subsidies (see Priority 3.1). In 2015, fossil fuel energy was underpriced 
by US$5.3 trillion, or 6.5% of global GDP.388 Cities, as hotspots of transport 
emissions, polluting industries, and climate risk, suffer disproportionately 
from this market failure. Carbon pricing could improve local air quality and 
systematically incentivise compact, connected, clean cities, while enabling the 
market to determine the most efficient way to reduce emissions. A study of 70 
cities worldwide found that a switch from low to high fuel taxes significantly 
reduces car ownership and increases urban density by over 40%.389 The Carbon 
Pricing Leadership Coalition recommends a price of at least US$40 per tonne of 
CO2 from 2020, rising to US$50 from 2030, to achieve the Paris Agreement, with 
higher-income countries adopting even higher carbon prices.390 Revenues from 
these taxes should be redistributed to low-income and other marginalised groups 
at risk of being left behind by the zero-carbon urban transition (see Priority 
6.3). As of 2018, 45 countries are putting a price on carbon, including emerging 
economies such as Chile, China, Colombia, Mexico and South Africa.391 
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Seizing the opportunity
3.3  Strengthen land and property tax collection to at least 1% of either national 
GDP or total national property value. In many countries, land and property 
tax collection is stymied by limited capacity, unclear ownership, and challenges 
in assessing the value of land. In much of Africa, for instance, land and property 
tax collection is often worth less than 0.5% of GDP.392 In other countries, land 
and property are taxed in ways that incentivise sprawl or punish low-income 
households.393 However, land and property taxes can be the bulwark of 
municipal finance,394 giving local governments more fiscal space to deliver core 
services and act on climate change. If well designed, a land or property tax can 
also incentivise more intensive use of urban land, promoting higher densities. 
395 One option is to introduce a simple tax based on basic features such as 
occupancy, plot size, location or floor area (for an individually owned apartment 
in a multi-unit building).396 Another option is to establish a comprehensive land 
and property registry, as Rwanda has done (see Box 8), which can help identify 
prospective taxpayers while improving tenure security for residents of informal 
settlements (see Priority 6.1). In South Korea, progressive property taxes have 
been used since the 1970s to redistribute the benefits of rising land values more 
equitably and finance public services (see Box 2).397 In 2016, property-related 
taxes accounted for over 10% of total tax revenue in South Korea.398
3.4  Work with city governments to establish integrated spatial and 
infrastructure plans that can underpin a pipeline of climate-safe, 
bankable projects. Trillions of dollars will be invested in urban infrastructure 
to 2030. To arrest increasing inequality and avoid climate catastrophe, 
these investments must be compatible with a 1.5°C trajectory with net-zero 
greenhouse gas emissions and greater resilience to climate impacts. Few local 
governments have the capacity to develop and implement detailed land use and 
infrastructure plans, particularly taking into account new climate constraints. 
National governments can support city governments to develop integrated 
land use, housing and transport plans that specify the desired infrastructure 
investments in electricity distribution, mass transit, sanitation and water 
supply. These plans should accommodate anticipated population growth 
(see Priority 6.6). Clear capital investment plans can then form the basis for a 
coherent financing strategy based on projected tax receipts, land value increases 
and other revenues.399 These bundles of core infrastructure investments can 
anchor the growth of compact, connected and clean cities, creating the basis 
for agglomeration economies and virtuous cycles of development.400 They can 
also enhance the creditworthiness of municipal governments by building and 
demonstrating their ability to design, implement and manage projects. At the 
UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit, a number of national governments will 
collectively commit to support 2,000 cities to strengthen their project preparation 
capabilities, create 1,000 bankable, climate-smart urban projects and link 1,000 
such projects to finance by 2030.401
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Raising the ambition
3.5  Scale land-based financing instruments to fund sustainable urban 
infrastructure. Public infrastructure, zoning changes and other interventions 
can significantly increase urban land values – but the economic returns are 
often captured entirely by a handful of private individuals or firms. Prudent use 
of land-based financing instruments such as betterment levies and transferable 
development rights can ensure that public funds are used primarily for public 
benefit by enabling national and local governments to capture some of the 
increase in real estate values. Land-based financing instruments benefit from 
effective spatial and infrastructure planning (see Priority 3.4), since they 
generate more revenue if the area is accessible and intensively used. National 
governments can both deploy land-based financing instruments directly, and 
create policies to enable state and city governments to deploy them in fiscally 
and environmentally sustainable ways. Land value capture instruments 
have been successfully deployed from Tokyo in Japan, to Hyderabad in India, 
to Córdoba in Argentina.402 The Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 
Corporation alone raises up to US$1.5 billion annually via their LVC model.403 
 
Land value capture instruments have been  
successfully deployed from Tokyo in Japan,  
to Hyderabad in India, to Córdoba in Argentina.
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3.6  Shift national transport budgets from building roads to supporting public 
and active transport. Urban land is expensive and in demand. Streets make 
up the majority of public space, and their design fundamentally shapes a city’s 
identity, appearance and connectivity. Some road-related spending is necessary 
to maintain existing networks, to serve (electric) public transport, emergency 
vehicles and cyclists, and to fill gaps in road networks within and among cities. 
In cities, this spending should support slow, safe and shared streets rather than 
fast, wide roads. Intra-city and inter-city rail and high-capacity bus systems should 
all be attractive long-term investments to promote compact cities and cut emissions 
from freight and aviation. This is why two thirds of transport experts recommend 
shifting road budgets towards funding public transport, sidewalks and cycle 
lanes.404 This could be achieved by reallocating capital expenditure or by adopting 
road pricing (which may require national legislation) to internalise the costs of 
driving and generate revenue to make alternative modes of travel more affordable, 
efficient and pleasant.405 A new analysis by the Overseas Development Institute 
for this report focused on eight geographically and economically diverse 
countries and found that all spend far more on roads than on rail infrastructure. 
Australia, China, Mexico and Tanzania spent roughly US$3 on roads for every 
US$1 spent on rail. Spending on roads was even more dominant in Ethiopia and 
Canada, consuming 94% and 86% of their inland transport budgets, respectively. 
Ethiopia is already seeking to re-balance its spending, with a new Light Rail 
Transit project within Addis Ababa and a new railway connecting the capital 
to Djibouti. Meanwhile, India was found to have the most balanced portfolio, 
with 55% of all inland transport investment being directed to roads while 45% 
was spent on railways (see Figure 17). For fast-growing cities, shifting national 
transport budgets to support public and active transport projects could “lock in” 
more efficient use of urban land; for more established cities, it could accelerate 
densification. For all countries, improving rail networks among cities could do 
much to reduce the emissions from both personal travel and freight transport. 
 
In cities, public transport budgets should support slow, safe  
and shared streets rather than fast, wide roads. Intra-city  
and inter-city rail and high-capacity bus systems should also  
be attractive long-term investments to promote compact  
cities and cut emissions from freight and aviation.
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RAIL
ROAD
TOTAL INLAND 
TRANSPORT BUDGET
(US$ BILLIONS).
FIGURE 17. THE SHARE OF TOTAL INLAND TRANSPORT INVESTMENT ALLOCATED TO ROADS AND RAIL, 2014-2016 AVERAGE. 
Source: Overseas Development Institute for the Coalition for Urban Transitions. For the full methodology, see Annex 12.
AUSTRALIA $16.3
FRANCE $19.3
CANADA $7.3
INDIA $26
CHINA $532
MEXICO $6.1
ETHIOPIA $2.5
TANZANIA $0.2
23%
22%
6%
14%
27%
36%
*
23%
45%
77%
78%
94%
86%
73%
59%
77%
55%
*Percentages do not add up to 100% because 5% of inland transport spending was on investments other than road and rail.
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4.1
ADOPT LEGISLATION EXPLICITLY 
OUTLINING THE ROLES AND 
POWERS OF DIFFERENT TIERS 
OF GOVERNMENT – INCLUDING 
OWN-SOURCE REVENUES AND 
ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS. 
4.3
CREATE METROPOLITAN 
AUTHORITIES TO ENABLE 
INTEGRATED LAND USE AND 
TRANSPORT PLANNING. 
4.4
AUTHORISE AND ENCOURAGE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO 
ADOPT CLIMATE POLICIES 
AND PLANS THAT GO 
BEYOND THE AMBITIONS 
OF NATIONAL POLICIES. 
4.5
ESTABLISH “REGULATORY 
SANDBOXES” FOR LOW-CARBON 
INNOVATIONS IN CITIES.
4.6
ALLOCATE AT LEAST A THIRD 
OF NATIONAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT (R&D) BUDGETS 
TO SUPPORT CITIES’ CLIMATE 
PRIORITIES BY 2030.
4.2
STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITIES 
OF BUILT-ENVIRONMENT 
PROFESSIONALS TO 
PURSUE ZERO-CARBON, 
CLIMATE-RESILIENT 
DEVELOPMENT. 
SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY
RAISING
THE AMBITION
COORDINATE AND
SUPPORT LOCAL CLIMATE
ACTION IN CITIES.  
LAYING A STRONG
FOUNDATION
PRIORITY 4
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Priority 4: Coordinate and support local climate action in cities. 
Laying a strong foundation
4.1  Adopt legislation explicitly outlining the roles and powers of different 
tiers of government – including own-source revenues and access to capital 
markets. Many local governments struggle because their legal responsibilities 
and rights are unclear. Many more struggle with unfunded mandates: most 
African city governments, for example, have less than US$30 to spend per 
person per year,406 leaving huge unmet needs for urban infrastructure and 
services. National governments can codify the roles and rights of subnational 
governments in law. It is particularly important to clarify the revenue streams 
available to municipal governments, and the conditions under which they 
can use debt financing. Clear frameworks to govern fiscal transfers, revenue 
collection and spending across ties of government can empower local authorities 
to act on climate change, give confidence to investors and lenders looking 
to finance sustainable urban infrastructure and offer security to national 
governments that are ultimately liable for subnational debts. Johannesburg and 
Cape Town, for example, were two of the first cities in the global South to issue 
green municipal bonds. This achievement was made possible by the Government 
of South Africa, which alone on the continent has explicitly and constitutionally 
enshrined the right of municipalities to borrow while putting in place clear 
conditions to safeguard the creditworthiness of all levels of government.407  
4.2  Strengthen the capacities of built-environment professionals to pursue 
zero-carbon, climate-resilient development. There is much to learn still 
about how to achieve net-zero emissions and adapt to climate risks – and do so 
in ways that maximise the economic and social benefits. National governments 
can nurture the ecosystem of knowledge and skills that cities will need for 
this transition. They can ensure that sustainability and inclusion criteria are 
rigorously included in relevant curricula and industry certification systems, 
so public education budgets are used to train or reskill built environmental 
professionals in emerging urban and climate “best practices”. This should 
span architects, commercial bankers, engineers, ICT officers, mechanics, 
surveyors, town planners and more. National governments can also support 
the dissemination of learning and best practices by facilitating membership 
of professional associations, city networks, global alliances, federations and 
citizens’ assemblies. They can also ensure that relevant national datasets  
(such as censuses and demographic and health surveys) have spatial 
components and are publicly accessible, which can support built-environment 
professionals in the public, private and civic sectors to make more informed 
decisions. A systematic approach to building the knowledge and skills of built 
environment professionals can help city governments, firms and civil society 
access the capabilities that they need to pursue ambitious climate action, and 
support the emergence of community-led efforts and new business models. 
Johannesburg and Cape 
Town were two of the  
first cities in the global 
South to issue green 
municipal bonds. This  
was possible because 
South Africa’s constitution 
enshrines the right of 
municipalities to borrow.
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Seizing the opportunity
4.3  Create metropolitan authorities to enable integrated land use and 
transport planning. Many people who work in a city commute from beyond 
its official boundaries. In other cases, urban governance is fragmented, 
undermining efforts to make cities more compact and connected: Dakar, for 
instance, is divided into 19 municipalities, while Sydney is divided among 29 
city councils. In large cities and urban agglomerations, establishing a single 
transport and land use authority with responsibility for the metropolitan region 
can enable the development of more coherent strategies that effectively link 
people to jobs, services and amenities. These land use and transport authorities 
should hold sufficient power over infrastructure delivery and operations, budget 
management and land use planning to meaningfully shape urban transport 
systems,408 but should also have strong representation by local governments 
within the metropolitan area. Transport for London is a good example of an 
integrated authority, with responsibility not only for the public transport within 
Greater London but also several of the rail lines serving its commuter belt. 
4.4  Authorise and encourage local governments to adopt climate policies and 
plans that go beyond the ambitions of national policies. In some parts of 
the world, cities and states are adopting more ambitious building codes, vehicle 
efficiency standards, road pricing policies and renewable energy targets than 
their national governments. London’s Ultra-Low Emission Zone, for instance, 
will drive change throughout the regional vehicle fleet, while Stadtwerke 
München plans to meet the city’s entire energy demand with renewables by 
2025 (see Box 11). National governments can adopt policies that empower local 
governments to set their own regulations and procurement policies, provided 
that they aim higher than the national environmental standards. This can 
support local leadership and innovation and build private-sector capacity to 
produce climate-compatible goods and services.
Raising the ambition
4.5  Establish “regulatory sandboxes” for low-carbon innovations in cities.  
A regulatory sandbox offers a space where novel technologies, systems, processes, 
business models and institutional arrangements can be tested without the 
usual constraints. Such spaces can help reduce the cost of experimentation and 
barriers to entry; they also allow policy-makers to collect evidence on emerging 
innovations to inform the design of regulation. Appropriate supervision and 
safeguards are essential: a regulatory sandbox should be regarded as the 
equivalent of a pharmaceutical clinical trial, but for low-carbon products. Cities 
offer an ideal scale to pilot many low-carbon innovations (such as new mobility 
or energy services), so they are a good fit with regulatory sandboxes. The UK 
launched the world’s first energy regulatory sandbox in 2014. It revealed a 
suite of energy innovators in local energy, peer-to-peer trading, energy storage, 
digital platforms and electric vehicles, and helped the national energy regulator 
navigate the complex mix of industry norms, codes, licenses and fee structures 
that might inhibit scaling of new low-carbon options.409
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4.6  Allocate at least a third of national research and development (R&D) 
budgets to support cities’ climate priorities by 2030.410 Reaching net-zero 
emissions in cities depends on developing and deploying innovations that 
can fill key data, technology and institutional gaps. Many countries have vast 
R&D budgets: the US government, for instance, spends over US$140 billion 
per year in laboratories and universities across the country. Universities in the 
top 100 metropolitan areas average US$500 million in federal R&D funds.411 
National governments can use these budgets strategically to enhance economic 
competitiveness by bolstering local entrepreneurs, leveraging private R&D 
investments and strengthening regional innovation clusters to support the 
advancement and adoption of technologies, products and processes that 
accelerate the zero-carbon urban transition. China has demonstrated how 
effective this strategy can be, as its targeted R&D investments have positioned 
its cities and firms at the forefront of the electric vehicle revolution: Shenzhen 
was the first city in the world to electrify its entire public bus fleet (see Box 7). 
Particular attention should now be paid to harder-to-abate sectors that often 
serve or locate in cities, such as aviation, trucking, cement and steel.412
Many countries have vast R&D budgets:
The US government spends over  
US$140 billion per year in laboratories  
and universities across the country.
Universities in the top 100  
metropolitan areas receive on average  
US$500 million in federal R&D funds.
National governments can use these budgets strategically to enhance economic  
competitiveness by bolstering local entrepreneurs, leveraging private R&D  
investments and strengthening regional innovation clusters.
US$140 BILLION US$500 MILLION
 
China has demonstrated how effective this  
strategy can be, as its targeted R&D investments  
have positioned its cities and firms at the  
forefront of the electric vehicle revolution.
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5.1
ENSURE THAT COLLABORATIVE
CLIMATE ACTION IN CITIES IS 
REFLECTED IN THE NATIONALLY 
DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS 
SUBMITTED IN 2020 AND 2025.
5.3
ENSURE THAT INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
IS ALIGNED WITH NATIONAL 
URBAN STRATEGIES, THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT AND THE 2030 
AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT.
5.4
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL 
CARBON PRICE FLOOR FROM 
2025. 
5.5
HELP CITY GOVERNMENTS 
ACCESS INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
FINANCE FOR LOW-CARBON, 
CLIMATE-RESILIENT 
DEVELOPMENT.
5.6
ENFORCE EXISTING TRADE 
RULES ON FOSSIL FUEL 
SUBSIDIES, PARTICULARLY 
THOSE WITH THE MOST 
HARMFUL IMPACTS ON CITIES.
5.2
REQUIRE INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
TO END ALL FOSSIL FUEL 
FINANCING BY 2024.
SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY
RAISING
THE AMBITION
BUILD A MULTILATERAL 
SYSTEM THAT 
FOSTERS INCLUSIVE, 
ZERO-CARBON CITIES.  
LAYING A STRONG
FOUNDATION
PRIORITY 5
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Priority 5: Build a multilateral system that fosters inclusive, zero-
carbon cities.
Laying a strong foundation:
5.1  Ensure that collaborative climate action in cities is reflected in the 
Nationally Determined Contributions submitted in 2020 and 2025. NDCs 
should commit to reach net-zero emissions by mid-century, harnessing the power 
of cities and local action to drive low-carbon innovation and behavioural change. 
Today, only 23 countries have NDCs that speak directly to climate mitigation 
in cities (see Figure 13), although many more have made urban-relevant 
commitments – for instance, to cut emissions from buildings or transport. This 
is a huge missed opportunity to raise national ambition, since nearly 10,000 
local governments worldwide have committed to set emission reduction targets 
that go above and beyond existing national commitments under the Paris 
Agreement.413 In the lead-up to COP26 in 2020, national governments should 
involve local governments in the design of their NDCs and integrate city-scale 
actions and targets into their next round of commitments. Effective dialogue 
and collaborative strategy development can also strengthen implementation, 
ensuring that different levels of government are aligned behind common goals 
and that climate actions are matched to their budgets and powers.414 Mexico, 
for example, has been systematically recording climate policies and projects by 
states and municipalities, and will use these to enhance its ambition in the next 
round of climate negotiations. 
5.2  Require international public finance institutions to end all fossil fuel 
financing by 2024.415 Between 2008 and 2015, 30% of multilateral development 
banks’ energy financing went to fossil fuels. This investment was worth US$7 
billion in 2015 alone416 – and excludes fossil fuel-friendly investments such as 
car-based infrastructure in cities. As the primary shareholders and clients, 
national governments can require international finance institutions to end all 
fossil fuel financing except in very rare circumstances, where it is the only way to 
secure energy access for the poor. The next business plans of the international 
finance institutions should reflect this shift in their energy and transport 
portfolios in particular, redirecting lending towards low-carbon, urban-relevant 
infrastructure projects such as metros, electric buses, building efficiency or solar 
farms. Since these institutions encourage blended finance approaches, that reform 
should have a multiplier impact by reducing the incentives for commercial banks 
to lend to or underwrite private companies in the coal, oil and gas sectors. 
 
Today, only 23 countries have Nationally Determined 
Contributions that speak directly to climate mitigation in cities. 
Scaling urban climate action therefore offers a huge opportunity 
for national governments to enhance ambition at COP26 in 2020.
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Seizing the opportunity
5.3  Ensure that international development assistance is aligned with national 
urban strategies, the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Public climate finance from developed to developing countries 
reached US$54.5 billion in 2017.417 This is progress towards the pledge in 
the Paris Agreement to mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2020. However, 
even if this goal is reached, it is not sufficient to reach net-zero emissions and 
adapt to climate impacts. All international development assistance must be 
consistent with net-zero emissions by mid-century and fully mainstream climate 
resilience.418 International development assistance is usually allocated according 
to country strategies, ideally developed by national governments in tandem 
with multilateral development banks. National governments can ensure that 
inclusive, zero-carbon cities – particularly sustainable urban infrastructure 
projects – are prominent parts of these agencies’ country strategies, and that 
municipal governments are consulted in their development. Donors can further 
reinforce the importance of this alignment. 
5.4  Establish an international carbon price floor from 2025. Although a carbon 
price is a very efficient way to systematically incentivise compact, connected 
and clean cities, many national governments are concerned about the perceived 
economic costs of unilaterally enacting one. An internationally agreed carbon 
price floor – consistent with Priority 3.2 – could provide reassurance that the 
near-term economic competitiveness of frontrunning cities and countries will 
not be affected, while still offering flexibility in domestic policies: national 
governments could use emission trading schemes, carbon taxes or minimum 
price auctions to implement the carbon price.419 If a coalition of large emitting 
countries were to jointly champion this policy, it would help to overcome 
domestic political barriers to action – particularly if any revenues are used to 
ensure a just transition (see Priority 6.3).
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Raising the ambition
5.5  Help city governments access international public finance for low-
carbon, climate-resilient development. While financing for sustainable 
urban infrastructure exists, there is a critical lack of funding and resources 
necessary to mature projects from the concept phase through to actual financing 
solutions. Moreover, many projects are not well-positioned to attract private 
finance because they do not generate a commercial return and the governments 
commissioning them are not creditworthy. National governments can help to 
mobilise much-needed investment in urban infrastructure in two critical ways. 
First, national governments can provide financial and technical assistance 
in the earliest stages of project development to support detailed feasibility 
studies and project planning. This can accelerate capital deployment into urban 
infrastructure projects, especially where countries have established robust fiscal 
and regulatory frameworks to reassure investors. Second, national governments 
can support subnational governments to access international development 
assistance and climate finance, which is typically lower-cost than private 
finance. A few international finance institutions, such as the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, have well-developed lines of lending to 
municipal authorities and utilities. These arrangements have proven valuable not 
only for the low-cost capital flowing to sustainable urban infrastructure, but also 
for building private-sector experience with lending to subnational governments. 
5.6  Enforce existing trade rules on fossil fuel subsidies, particularly those 
with the most harmful impacts on cities. Within countries, fossil fuel 
subsidies exacerbate inequality, exacerbate air pollution (which is concentrated 
in cities), incentivise costly urban sprawl, take up fiscal space and contribute to 
the climate crisis. Fossil fuel subsidy reform and carbon pricing could lead to 
the displacement of production, investment and fuel consumption to cities and 
countries with lower levels of climate ambition.420 To avoid this perverse outcome, 
national governments could use the multilateral trade system to accelerate fossil 
fuel subsidy reform – for instance, by making a case under the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.421 Many 
countries have successfully used multilateral trade systems to reduce harmful 
subsidies in other sectors, such as agriculture. Indeed, many disputes on 
renewable energy support have been brought before the WTO, though national 
governments have yet to initiate legal proceedings against subsidies for oil, coal 
or gas.422 Globally, fiscal reform to eliminate subsidies that support fossil fuel 
consumption – US$41.6 billion in cities alone (see Figure 14) – could redeploy 
substantial government revenue to support a just transition to zero-carbon cities.
 
Globally, fiscal reform to eliminate subsidies that support fossil fuel 
consumption – US$41.6 billion in cities alone – could release substantial  
public funds revenue to support a just transition to zero-carbon cities.
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6.1
STRENGTHEN TENURE
SECURITY FOR THE
URBAN POOR.
6.3
USE REVENUES FROM CARBON
TAXES OR FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDY 
REFORMS TO COMPENSATE 
THOSEWHO BEAR ANY COSTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE 
ACTION. 
6.4
SUPPORT COMMUNITY-DRIVEN 
UPGRADING OF INFORMAL 
SETTLEMENTS AT THE NATIONAL 
SCALE. 
6.5
ANTICIPATE, PROTECT AND 
SUPPORT THE WORKFORCE OF 
THE FUTURE, INCLUDING BY 
DEVELOPING TRANSITION 
PLANS FOR FOSSIL FUEL-BASED 
WORKERS AND INDUSTRIES.
6.6
SUPPORT LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE 
WELL-LOCATED, SERVICED 
LAND AVAILABLE 
FOR GROWING URBAN 
POPULATIONS. 
6.2
ENHANCE CLIMATE RESILIENCE
AND GENDER EQUALITY IN 
CITIES BY EDUCATING ALL 
YOUNG PEOPLE.
SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY
RAISING
THE AMBITION
PROACTIVELY PLAN 
FOR A JUST TRANSITION 
TO ZERO-CARBON CITIES.  
LAYING A STRONG
FOUNDATION
PRIORITY 6
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Fair, efficient urban land governance is critical for a just transition.  
A legal address is often required to:
enrol as a voter open a bank account access health care  
or education
connect to water, 
sanitation and 
electricity networks
Priority 6: Proactively plan for a just transition to zero-carbon cities.
Laying a strong foundation
6.1  Strengthen tenure security for the urban poor. A legal address is often 
required to enrol as a voter, open a bank account, access entitlements such 
as health care or primary education, and get formal connections to water, 
sanitation and electricity networks.423 Secure tenure thus enables families to 
access risk-reducing services and infrastructure that improves their quality 
of life and enhances their resilience to climate shocks and stresses. A lack of 
comprehensive land registries and cadastres, meanwhile, limits governments’ 
ability to shape urban growth for enhanced economic productivity or reduce 
exposure to climate hazards. National governments can help city governments 
improve tenure security in informal settlements by supporting partnerships 
between formal and informal actors, as Namibia has done (see Box 3); setting 
up simplified registration systems as Rwanda has done (Box 7); reforming 
land regulation to favour the consolidation of occupancy rights (particularly 
protection against eviction) over the provision of property titles; devising tenure 
formulas that support collective ownership and prioritise collective rather 
than individual interests; and training and employing surveyors to accelerate 
regularisation, tenure and titling programmes (see Priority 4.2). 
6.2  Enhance climate resilience and gender equality in cities by educating 
all young people. Recognising the wide range of factors that shape climate 
resilience, women are – on average – more vulnerable to environmental hazards 
than men. They have lower incomes, fewer assets, less formal education and less 
access to support, despite having more responsibility for children and the elderly, 
especially in the Global South. This means that women face greater risk during 
and after extreme weather events,424 so there is a need to implement gender-
responsive climate change action plans, policies or strategies. Mandating and 
resourcing universal, high-quality education for all young people irrespective of 
gender – in line with SDG4 and SDG5 – can further enhance climate resilience. 
Better-educated women tend to be healthier, earn more, find (formal) jobs, marry 
at a later age and have fewer children, who in turn have better access to health 
care and education opportunities. This has huge relevance to cities where formal 
labour markets are overwhelmingly concentrated and where most population 
growth will take place over the next 30 years.425 Education of all forms can also 
be provided very cost-effectively in urban areas. 
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US$41.6 BILLION 
SUBSIDISING 
FOSSIL FUELS  
IN 2016
US$33 BILLION 
RAISED BY CARBON 
PRICING REVENUES 
IN 2017
Seizing the opportunity
6.3  Use revenues from carbon taxes or fossil fuel subsidy reforms to 
compensate those who bear any costs associated with climate action. Poorer 
households tend to spend a greater share of their income on essentials, such as 
fuel. Consequently, vulnerable groups such as fixed-income households and 
informal workers in urban areas can suffer more from actions such as fossil fuel 
subsidy reform, even though energy subsidies are generally regressive.426 National 
governments can redress this inequality by explicitly using the savings from fossil 
fuel subsidy reform and carbon pricing (see Priority 3.1 and Priority 3.2) to fund 
social protection and invest in new low-carbon industries with high potential for 
job creation. This strategy can also minimise the potential political fallout,427 as 
Indonesia’s recent successes demonstrate (see Box 10). Governments spent about 
US$41.6 billion subsidising fossil fuels in urban areas in 2016 (see Figure 14) and 
raised about US$33 billion in carbon pricing revenues in 2017.428 This offers 
significant fiscal space to fund social protection and productive infrastructure.
6.4  Support community-driven upgrading of informal settlements at the 
national scale. Sustaining appetite for climate mitigation and enhancing 
urban resilience will depend on more inclusive development policies and 
practices. Participatory upgrading programmes can help to transform “slums” 
into neighbourhoods that are dense, liveable and affordable.429 To date, there 
are few examples of large-scale informal settlement upgrading schemes; most 
examples are at the project or (occasionally) city scale. While upgrading is 
primarily delivered by local authorities working in partnership with grassroots 
organisations of the urban poor, national governments have important roles 
to play in: reforming minimum plot sizes and maximum floor-area ratios that 
limit density and increase costs; reforming construction regulations to allow 
for incremental housing solutions as the incomes of the residents permit; 
providing funding for core infrastructure to both municipal governments and 
organised communities; and allowing collective ownership to resist pressures of 
gentrification.430 The Chile Barrio programme illustrates how national and local 
governments can work with communities to systematically upgrade informal 
settlements (see Box 9). At the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit, a number 
of national governments will commit to bolster community adaptation in citywide 
planning and national policies, including by putting the urban poor at the centre 
of Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans.431
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200 MILLION PEOPLE
IN MANUFACTURING
110 MILLION
IN BUILDINGS
88 MILLION 
IN TRANSPORT
30 MILLION 
IN ENERGY 
Raising the ambition
6.5  Anticipate, protect and support the workforce of the future, including by 
developing transition plans for fossil fuel-based workers and industries. 
Nearly 1.5 billion workers around the world are in sectors critical to climate 
stability, including 200 million people in manufacturing, 110 million in 
buildings, 88 million in transport and 30 million in energy.432 Some cities 
are largely dependent on carbon-intensive industries.433 In these cases, local 
governments cannot manage the consequences of a zero-carbon transition 
alone. National governments need to anticipate and respond to shifts in the 
labour market, including the spatial distribution of employment opportunities. 
They can support local governments, trade unions, employers, investors and 
communities to collaboratively plan for a just transition through establishing 
joint management-labour committees with transparent terms of reference and 
appointment processes. These forums can seek ways to minimise the trade-offs 
of climate action, forecast employment opportunities, and plan for appropriate 
retention, reskilling and redeployment of workers.434 National governments 
can also ensure adequate and sustainable social protection for job losses 
and displacement. At the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit, a number 
of national governments will commit to support a just ecological transition, 
pledging to create mechanisms for inclusive social dialogue, supporting skills 
development to enable people to find work in a changing labour market, and 
designing social protection policies to protect workers and vulnerable groups in 
the context of long-term climate strategies.435
6.6  Support local governments to make well-located, serviced land available 
for growing urban populations. The urban population is expected to expand 
by 1.5 million people every week to 2050, with 90% of this growth concentrated 
in Africa and Asia.436 There is no evidence that policies to slow rural-to-urban 
migration are effective.437 Actively preparing for this population growth offers 
national governments an opportunity to create compact, connected and clean 
cities with healthy, productive residents. Otherwise, these people will largely 
end up in costly, unsafe informal settlements. Retrofitting infrastructure after 
settlement has occurred can be three times more expensive than investing 
beforehand.438 National governments can help municipal governments make 
well-situated, serviced urban land available by opening up new areas for 
managed urban expansion; altering jurisdictional boundaries so that municipal 
governments can develop and implement plans in this extended area; providing 
funding for core infrastructure such as transit systems, sewers and water mains 
to connect these parts of the city; and allowing some flexibility in planning 
standards to accommodate the needs of poorer households.439 
Nearly 1.5 billion 
workers around the 
world are in sectors 
critical to climate 
stability, including 
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The Coalition for Urban Transitions 
encourages national governments to draw 
on the evidence and recommendations 
in this report to craft their next Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution and 
inform a long-term strategy to nurture 
inclusive, zero-carbon, resilient cities. 
The organisations and individuals who 
contributed to this report will play our  
part in supporting bold national leadership. 
There is no time to lose.
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